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2009

AN ACCOUNT

OF

The Campaign in Mysore

(1799)

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BY

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Accn. No: 1394
No. of Pages: 126

PRINTED AND PUBLISHED BY

THE UNIVERSITY PRINTING & PUBLISHING CO., LTD.

1, GANGADHAR BABU LANE, CALCUTTA.

Price Rs. 2.

XXI 4164

Introduction.

The following pages contain a narrative of the last of the wars that Tippoo Sultan of Mysore fought with the British and their allies, and which ended so gloriously for the allied arms with the fall of Seringapatam. They have been described by one of the principal actors in the scene, Major Allan (afterwards Sir Alexander Allan, Bart.) The first few pages contain an introduction relating the causes which led up to the war and the subsequent events that followed, before the actual commencement of hostilities. Then follows a diary of the war, so admirably written by Major Allan. A memorandum on the plan of campaign is lastly added. The foot-notes are mine.

Major Allan was the Deputy Quarter-Master General with the Madras and Bengal Forces operating against Tippoo Sultan. He was an officer distinguished not less by his humane conduct after the war than by his ability in the conduct of it. As the result of a reconnoitre by him, several tanks were secured by the allied army and an abundant supply of water was ensured during its march to the capital. On the fall of Seringapatam, he was deputed to proceed with a flag of truce to the palace and to offer protection to the fallen foe. He discharged the important trust reposed in him with great humanity and judgment. The Governor-General wrote thus to the Court of Directors: "During the awful event of the storm of Seringapatam, the humanity displayed by Major Allan towards the family of Tippoo Sultan, at that time in a most critical situation and the judicious and spirited exertions made by that officer for the safety of the family entitle him to our warmest approbation." The Governor-General felt so deep an impression of Major Allan's meritorious conduct on this occasion that Lord Mornington was pleased to distinguish him by the honour of an appointment to be one of his Lordship's Honorary Aides-de-Camp. The operations during the war, and specially the narrative of the fall of Seringapatam, have been described with an unrivalled accuracy of detail in the luminous pages of the diary. The original manuscript of Major Allan is in the Imperial Library of Calcutta and has never been published. The Librarian of the Imperial Library—my late lamented friend, Mr. Harinath De, lost, alas! so early to scholarship—requested me to edit the work. Encouraged by his kindly advice, I undertook the task though with diffidence.

It may not be out of place to give a short account of the history of Mysore during the period of usurpation by Hyder Ali and his son Tippoo. The meteoric rise of Hyder from a common soldier to the head of a powerful and orderly State has a parallel in the rise of Napoleon—the other great foe of the English

during the second half of the eighteenth century. The dynasty of Hyder was, to use the words of a distinguished writer, Napoleonic in the suddenness of its rise, the brilliancy of its succes, and the completeness of its overthrow. But while Napoleon advanced the arts of peace by his Code of Laws, Hyder was unlettered, and left no such enduring monument of his fame. There is also a striking contrast in the fate of the two soldier-monarchs. Hyder died while fighting successfully with the British, but Napoleon died a captive in their hands.

Hyder is one of the three great Indian rulers,—totally ignorant of the arts of reading and writing—who have in modern times, won their way to the throne by the sword. But while Sivaji created the Marhatta nation, and Ranjit Singh consolidated the Sikh fraternity, Hyder's ideal was merely personal aggrandisement. His son Tippoo had not the masterful resource of his father, nor any sympathy with his subjects, and with him ended the iron rule of an usurper in Mysore. The throne founded by genius was lost by the recklessness of a vain successor.

Hyder was born in the year 1722. His father Fateh Naik was a fugitive when he got the post of a peon in the service of a Naik. He afterwards rose to be a Naik himself in the service of the Nawab of Lera. Fateh Naik died on the field of battle, and Hyder, then only seven years old, and his elder brother,—a boy of nine years,—were left without the protection of a father. The Nawab plundered and tortured the boys, who now sought the protection of their maternal uncle, Ibrahim Saheb, Killadar of Bangalore. The elder boy became in time a commandant of peons and the younger Hyder saw his first service at the age of twenty-seven, as a volunteer horseman under his father at the siege of Devanapully. His bravery was rewarded by Nandraj—the minister of the Hindu king of Mysore—with the command of a small force. Hyder rose to fame and power in the course of successive actions that Mysore fought with her neighbours. Hyder's first action with the British was fought in the war between the Hindu Raja of Mysore and Mahommed Ali of Carnatic, who was aided by his British allies. On the conclusion of the war, Hyder was appointed Foujdar of Dindigul and he succeeded in subduing the polygars of the neighbourhood. Here by plunder and systematic fraud on the Government, he accumulated immense treasure and obtained large assignments of territory for the maintenance of the troops under his command. He assisted in expelling the Marhattas and he obtained still further assignments of the revenue. The king of Mysore was a puppet in the hands of his minister Nandraj, and with Hyder's help, the fall of the minister was accomplished. Hyder was now the first man in the State. His power now became more formidable than ever, and the king devised a plan in concert with Khundey Rao,—formerly Hyder's revenue officer,—for his destruction. Hyder escaped, however, with difficulty and ultimately became victorious over Khundey Rao, who was commanding the Raja's troops. Hyder now (June 1761) became master of the State, and the Hindu king

of Mysore became his pensioner. His usurpation was now complete, and he rapidly extended his conquests. There were, however, breaks in his prosperous career in 1764, and in 1767, when the Marhattas defeated him and exacted large sums of money. In 1767, Hyder's fortunes were at their lowest ebb. Murari Rao—the Marhatta—, the British, and the Nizam invaded his territories. The Marhatta chieftain who proved himself to be the most formidable enemy, and who gained many successes was bought off, and the Nizam was converted into his ally. The British alone were left to fight with him. Soon after the commencement of hostilities, Hyder's son Tippoo marched almost up to the gates of Madras. The British were, however, mostly successful in the early period of the campaign, but in the end, Hyder recovered almost all his losses and suddenly appearing before Madras, dictated peace to the British, on the moderate condition of mutual restitution of conquests and prisoners. Hyder was not, however, long left at peace. The Peishwa invaded his country and after suffering a number of reverses, Hyder concluded peace by ceding a portion of his territory and by agreeing to pay a large sum as *chouth*. Within three years, however, the loss was retrieved, and the amount of *chouth* reduced. Hyder now turned his arms against the Raja of Coorg and the awful slaughter of its brave inhabitants marked him as a blood-thirsty tyrant. Once more differences arose between Hyder and the British. Hyder commenced hostilities by marching with a formidable army almost up to Madras, desolating the country in the wake of his victorious march. A detatchment of the British army under Colonel Baillie was almost cut off, and the survivors, including the gallant Colonel, were taken prisoners. The fort of Arcot,—once the scene of Clive's glories—fell before Hyder. Hyder's victorious career received, however, a check, when Sir Eyre Coote took the field. He lost severely in two battles, but shortly afterwards nearly cut to pieces a British force under Colonel Braithwaite, who shared the fate of Colonel Baillie. While the war was still going on, Hyder died in December 1782. His son Tippoo who was born in 1740 succeeded him and continued the war, with alternate successes and reverses. The important fort of Bednore, as well as General Mathews who had previously captured it, however, surrendered to Tippoo. Peace was ultimately concluded in 1784 on the condition of mutual restitution of conquests and prisoners. The tortures of prison life had already removed many of Tippoo's prisoners, while many were forcibly detained. Soon afterwards, the revolt of the people of Coorg was ruthlessly subdued. War broke out between Tippoo and the Marhattas in 1786, and it was only after the cession of a small portion of his territory and the payment of a large amount of *chouth* that peace was restored. The interval of peace was not, however long. Tippoo's incursion into the territory of the Raja of Travancore gave rise to a war between him and a confederacy of the British, the Marhattas and the Nizam. The campaign was directed by the Governor-General, Lord Cornwallis in person and after a series of reverses, Tippoo concluded peace by ceding half his territory and an immense sum to the allies. Tippoo had also to give two of his sons as hostages. A pathetic picture of the parting scene was lately hanging on the walls of

the Victoria Memorial section of the Indian Museum of Calcutta. Lord Cornwallis determined to exact "such conditions as should put it out of the Sultan's power to disturb the peace of India." But Lord Cornwallis was mistaken. Tippoo continued his intrigues for the extermination of the British in India—intrigues, that caused the last of the Mysore wars which ended with his defeat and death, and the fall of Hyder's dynasty.

Having thus surveyed the main incidents of the two reigns, an examination of the character of the two monarchs will not, I think, be altogether unfruitful. Both father and son were brave, but the son had not the cool and calculating mind of the father. Hyder owed his success not a little to this frame of his mind, while Tippoo's defeat was in a great measure due to his rashness. On the other hand, Hyder was a drunken debauchee, Tippoo was not; Hyder was illiterate; Tippoo was, if not a scholar, well-educated. With Hyder, all religions had their source from God and all were equal in the sight of God. He never persecuted the Hindus, venerated the Hindu temple of Seringapatam and offered Puja in Hindu temples. Islam received no preferential treatment from him; talents regulated his choice of officers. Hyder recognised merit, irrespective of religious faith. With Tippoo, profession of Islamism remedied all defects in a man. He hated and oppressed all those of an alien faith.

The worst traits in Hyder's character were inordinate lust and cruelty. His administration of the country was harsh, but it was comparatively efficient, though it was carried on with a system of espionage, partly justified by the times and not unknown even in our own age. Successive ministers, honest or otherwise, were tortured and plundered; the result was that the dignity became a dangerous one. Hyder's administration may have its faults, but not, however, his genius for war, which must be acknowledged. In the words of a French general, without the advantages of education he acquired an extensive knowledge of the sciences of war and politics, and by his superior talents, raised himself from a private station to the sovereignty of a powerful kingdom. He lived in one of the most troublous periods in the history of India. The old Moghul Empire which held the nominal suzerainty of India was crushed by the weight of invaders from beyond the Indus; the Emperor was a fugitive, and afterwards, a prisoner of the Scindhia; rebellious Viceroys were seizing vast tracts of the country; foreigners from beyond the seas,—the English and the French—after outstripping other similar rivals in the race, were scrambling for the sovereignty of India; the Sikh fraternity was rising to stem the tide of Afghan invasions; the Marhatta confederacy—themselves torn by bitter internal dissensions—already carved out a great Hindu Empire in India and were extending their claim of *chouth* to every province; in the Deccan itself, Hyder had to fight for his existence with a number of powers. He had his sympathisers in the French, but his opponents were the English, the powerful Marhatta chieftain Murari Rao, the Nizam, and Mahomed Ali of

Carnatic, besides a great number of petty chieftains. By military skill and diplomacy, Hyder averted all dangers from so many powerful foes and died after a victorious career in the zenith of his fame. The sceptre he left fell into the hands of the vain Tippoo.

Tippoo's administration of the country was, however, much worse. With the exception of the able Poornea, his father's Hindu officers were supplanted by Mussalmans, often illiterate. The administration of the country was nothing but systematic spoliation of the subjects. Tippoo was a cruel bigot or rather a sanctimonious tyrant. Mahmud of Ghazni was a tolerant and merciful iconoclast compared with Tippoo. Tippoo boasts in his "King of Histories" that in Malabar alone, he destroyed eight thousand Hindu temples. At the time of his fall, two temples at Seringapatam alone remained open throughout the extent of his dominions. He carried out his threat to the Coorgis and Nairs to "honour them with Islam" but too truly. Thousands of these brave people were forcibly converted to Islamism or banished from the country. Hyder was shocked at Tippoo's wanton outrages on the feelings of the great mass of his subjects. Nor did the Christians of the Malabar Coast fare any better under Tippoo. Tippoo's own narrative of their conversion in his "King of Histories" is so full of character that I cannot do better than describe it in his own words. After stating that the Portuguese forcibly converted thousands of Brahmins and other Hindus to Christianity, Tippoo goes on to state "When his Majesty, the Shadow of God, was informed of these circumstances, the rage of Islam began to boil in his breast; he first gave orders, that a special enumeration and description should be made and transmitted of the houses of the Christians in each district: detatchments under trusty officers were then distributed in the proper places, with sealed orders, to be opened and executed, on one and the same day, after the first devotions of the morning; and in conformity to these instructions, sixty thousand persons, great and small of both sexes, were seized and carried to the resplendent presence; whence being placed under proper guardians and provided with everything needful they were despatched to the royal capital, and being formed into battalions of 500 each under the command of officers well-instructed in the faith, they were honoured with the distinction of Islam."

Hyder, as I have already stated, was cruel, but he was not wantonly cruel like his son. His cruelty was means to an end. If the end could be attained without cruelty, Hyder could be generous. He waded through crimes to reach the throne, but achieved through blood, what blood only could effect. He treated his prisoners harshly, because they were deemed unruly; they were scantily fed, for that was economical; there was no compassion, but there was no feeling of anger or revenge. As Colonel Wilks observes "Everything was weighed in the balance of utility, and no grain of human feeling, no breath of virtue or of vice was permitted to incline the beam". With Tippoo cruelty was

the outcome of his deep hatred for all alien religions. He was cruel to the Nairs, cruel to the Coorgis, cruel to the Christians, because they professed alien faiths. In the words of an eminent historian, "Tippoo, in an age when persecution only survived in history, renewed its worst terrors; and was the last Mahommedan prince, after a long interval of better feeling, who propagated that religion by the edge of the sword".

Hyder, though illiterate, could understand the character of men ; Tippoo had no penetration into character. Hyder was cool and calculating, but resolute when occasion arose ; Tippoo was supremely arrogant. Hyder being unlearned, did not profess to innovate, but improved civil and military administration ; Tippoo considered himself one of the greatest scholars of his age, and had a restless spirit of innovation, which resulted in no improvements. Hyder's mind was steady and powerful ; Tippoo's intellect was unsteady. As Colonel Wilks says " The decision of history will not be far removed from the observation almost proverbial in Mysore that 'Hyder was born to create an Empire, Tippoo to lose one'." Tippoo's downfall meant religious and political enfranchisement to his subjects—almost wholly Hindu—and the British never engaged in a juster war than that which they fought with Tippoo.

If the war was a just one, the settlement of Mysore by the British after the fall of Seringapatam was humane and generous. It is a splendid page in the record of the English conquest of India, illumined by so much chivalry and temperance in the hour of victory. The sentiments expressed by the Marquis of Wellesley when giving his directions for the settlement of the conquered country were worthy of the noble mind of His Lordship. Portions of the country were divided between the British, the Nizam and the Marhattas. It was decided to establish a central and separate power in the ancient territories of Mysore. The difficult question was whether this power should be placed in the hands of one of Tippoo's sons or the ancient line of Hindu kings should be restored. As Lord Mornington (afterwards Marquis of Wellesley) stated, the claims of humanity on both sides, rendered the decision a painful and ungracious task. In two of the many brilliant despatches penned by the noble lord, he states the case in some remarkably lucid sentences. According to him, no alternative remained but to depose the dynasty which he found upon the throne or "to confirm the Mahommedan usurpation, and with it, the perpetual exclusion and degradation of the legitimate Hindu sovereigns of the country." The Governor-General goes on to state that to his mind, it was desirable to place the new State in the hands of one of Tippoo's sons, but in such an event, he feared the renewal of French connection with Mysore. Such a settlement would have cherished in its bosom a restless and powerful principle of its own dissolution; "with such a prince, no sincere alliance, no concord of sentiments or union of views could ever have been established ; the appearances of amity or attachment must have been delusive ; even his succession must have been reluctant, if not treacherous, where bitter memory of fallen dignity, wealth

and power, must have united every passion and vice with many of the noblest virtues in a constant desire to recover an empire, originally acquired by an extraordinary combination of falsehood, cruelty and courage, and maintained for a long time with eminent policy and vigour, as well in its internal government, as in its foreign relations." On the other hand, the restoration of the ancient line of Hindu kings was, according to the Governor General, incumbent upon him on every principle of justice and humanity as well as of attention to the welfare of the people, if he were to look to moral considerations alone. As Lord Morington states "Their high birth, the antiquity of their legitimate title, and their long and unmerited sufferings, rendered them peculiar objects of compassion and respect, nor could it be doubted that their government would be both more acceptable and more indulgent than that of the Mahommedan usurpers, to the mass of the inhabitants of the country, composed almost entirely of Hindus". Motives of policy too favoured their restoration. The Hindu Raja would owe his throne to the British and every motive must concur to attach him to British interests. A scion of the ancient Rajas of Mysore was accordingly placed on the throne.

Tippoo's line was not restored to political power, but nevertheless, the treatment of the victorious British to the descendants of their fallen foe was a most generous one. The Governor-General in his treatment of the members of Tippoo's family was extremely solicitous to vindicate the humanity of the British character by taking the utmost degree of care for them. He was determined to grant to the families of Hyder Ali and Tippoo Sultan a more magnificent maintenance than either had enjoyed during the late reign, and to provide with the same liberality for the principal Mahommedan officers and chiefs of the state, who had survived the Sultan, and for the families of all those who had fallen in the course of the war. The very large number of descendants of Hyder and Tippoo, legitimate and illegitimate, were granted pensions on a liberal scale. Magnanimity on such a munificent scale to a fallen foe added lustre to the victorious arms. Thus ended a noble page in Indian history.

The Campaign in Mysore.

ON the 8th of June, 1798, a vague report reached Lord Mornington of a proclamation issued by Mons Malartic at the Isle of France (*a*), which was considered a fabrication. But on the 18th of June his Lordship received a regular authentication of the Proclamation in letters from Lord Macartney (*b*) and Sir Hugh Christian, of the 28th of March. It appeared by the letters from the Cape, that Tippoo had despatched two ambassadors to the Isle of France and that the Proclamation had been published subsequent to their arrival.

In order to obtain the most accurate information with respect to the circumstances attending the reception of embassy, the publication of the Proclamation (*c*) and the conduct of the ambassadors, Lord Mornington the next day, 19th June, examined upon oath some respectable persons

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(*a*) Island of Mauritius.

(*b*) Governor of the Cape of Good Hope.

(*c*) The following is the text of the Proclamation. An English translation is given on the right hand side :—

Liberté. Égalité.

République Française,

Une & indivisible.

PROCLAMATION.

Anne Joseph Hyppolite Malartic, Général en Chef, Gouverneur-Général des Isles de France et de la Réunion, et Commandant-Général des Etablissements Français, a l' Est du Cap de Bonne Espérance.

Citoyens,

Connaissant depuis plusieurs années votre zèle & votre attachement pour les intértês & la gloire de notre République, nous sommes très empressés & nous nous faisons un devoir de vous donner connaissance de toutes les propositions que nous fait Tippoo Sultaun par deux ambassadeurs qu'il nous a dépêchés.

Ce prince a écrit des lettres particulières á l' Assemblée Coloniale à tous les Généraux qui sont employés dans ce Gouvernement & nous a adressé un paquet pour le Directoire Exécutif.

1°. Il demande à faire une alliance offensive et défensive avec les Français, en proposant d'entretenir à ses frais, tant que la guerre durera dans l'Inde, les troupes qu'on pourra lui envoyer.

2°. Il promet de fournir toutes les choses nécessaires pour faire cette guerre, excepté le Vin & l' Eau de Vie, dont il se trouve absolument dénué.

Liberty. Equality.

The French Republic,

One and indivisible.

PROCLAMATION.

Anne Joseph Hyppolite Malartic Commander-in-Chief and Governor-General of the Isles of France and Reunion and Commandent General of all the French Establishments to the eastward of the Cape of Good Hope.

Citizens,

Having for several years known your zeal and your attachment to the interests, and to the glory of our Republic, we are very anxious and we feel it a duty to make you acquainted with all the propositions which have been made to us by Tippoo Sultan through two ambassadors whom he has despatched to us.

This prince has written particular letters to the Colonial Assembly, to all the generals employed under this Government and has addressed to us a packet for the Executive Directory.

1. He desires to form an offensive and defensive alliance with the French, and proposes to maintain at his charge, as long as the war shall last in India, the troops which may be sent to him.

2. He promises to furnish every necessary for carrying on the war, wine and brandy excepted with which he is wholly unprovided.

who were present in the isle of France during the residence of the ambassadors at Port Nord Ouest. From the concurrent testimony of those persons afterwards corroborated by intelligence from various quarters, his Lordship obtained connected accounts of the whole transaction.

It appeared that Tippoo despatched two ambassadors who embarked at Mangalore for the Isle of France and arrived there at the close of the month of January 1798. They hoisted Tippoo's colors, and were received publicly and formally by the French Government. The second day after the arrival of the ambassadors, an advertisement was published of the same purport as the Proclamation; and immediately afterwards, the Proclamation was fixed up in the most public places and circulated through the town.

The Proclamation stated, that Tippoo Sultan, through two Ambassadors despatched for the purpose to the Isle of France, had addressed letters

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3°. Il assure que tous les préparatifs sont faits pour reçevoir les secours qu'on lui donnera, & qu'a l'arrivée des troupes, les chefs & officiers trouveront toutes les choses nécessaires pour faire une guerre à laquelle les Européens sont peu accoutumés.

4°. Enfin il n'attend plus que le moment où les Français viendront à son secours, pour déclarer la guerre en Anglais, désirant avec ardeur pouvoir les chasser de l' Inde.

Comme il nous est impossible de diminuer le nombre des soldats des 107 *e.* & 108 *e.* regimens and de la garde soldée du Port de la Fraternité, a cause des secours que nous avons envoyés á nos alliés les Hollandais, nous invitons tous les citoyens de bonne volonté à se faire inscrire dans leurs municipalités respectives, pour aller servoir sous les drapeaux de Tippoo.

Cé prince désire aussi avoir des citoyens de couleur, libres, & nous invitons tous ceux qui voudront aller servoir sous ses drapeaux à se faire aussi inscrire.

Nous pouvons assurer tous les citoyens qui se feront inscrire, qui Tippoo leur fera de traitements avantageux qui seront fixés avec ses ambassadeurs qui s'engageront en outre, au nom de leur souverain, à ce que les Français qui auront pris parti dans ses armées, ne puissent jamais y être retenus quand ils voudront rentrer dans leur patrie.

Fait au Port Nord-Ouest, le 10 Pluvoise, l'an six de la République Française, une & indivisible.

(Signé) Malartic.

3. He declared that he has made every preparation to receive the succours which may be sent to him, and that on the arrival of the troops, the commanders and officers will find everything necessary for making a war, to which Europeans are but little accustomed.

4. In a word, he only waits the moment when the French shall come to his assistance, to declare war against the English, whom he ardently desires to expel from India.

As it is impossible for us to reduce the number of soldiers of the 107th and 108th regiments, and of the regular guard of Port Fraternity, on account of the succours which we have furnished to our allies the Dutch; we invite the citizens, who may be disposed to enter as volunteers, to enroll themselves in their respective municipalities, and to serve under the banners of Tippoo.

This prince desires also to be assisted by the free citizens of colour, we therefore invite all such who are willing to serve under his flag, to enroll themselves.

We can assure all the citizens who shall enroll themselvss, that Tippoo will allow them an advantageous rate of pay, the terms of which will be fixed with his ambassadors, who will further engage in the name of their sovereign that all Frenchmen, who shall enter into his armies, shall never be detained after they shall have expressed a wish to return to their own country.

Done at Port North-West the 30th January 1798.

(Signed) Malartic.

to the Colonial Assembly of the Isle of France, to all the Generals employed there, and to the Executive Directory of France, and had made the following propositions :

1st. That he desired to form an alliance, offensive and defensive with the French, and offered to maintain at his expense, during the continuance of the war in India whatever troops should be furnished by the French and to supply (with the exception of certain spirituous liquors), stores, and everything necessary for carrying on the war.

Secondly.—That he had given assurances that all his preparations were already completed, and that the Generals and Officers would find everything necessary for carrying on a species of war, to which Europeans had not been accustomed in their contests with the native powers in India.

Thirdly.—That he only waited for the succour of France, to declare war against the English ; and that it was his ardent desire to expel them from India.

Upon the ground of these facts, the Proclamation recommends a general levy of men for the service of Tippoo, and it concludes by assuring " All the Citizens who shall enlist, that Tippoo will give them an advantageous rate of pay and allowances, which will be fixed by the Ambassadors ; who will also engage in the name of their Sovereign that the Frenchmen who shall have enlisted in this army shall never be detained after they shall have expressed a desire of returning to their native country."

The ambassadors levied 150 Officers and Privates for the service of Tippoo ; few of the officers, of any experience ; and the privates, the refuse of the democratic rabble of the Island.

On the 7th March 1798, the ambassadors embarked on board the French Frigate La Preneuse together with their recruits and proceeded to the Isle of Bourbon, with the hope of obtaining more.

The ambassadors together with the force thus collected, not exceeding 260 (*a*) landed from La Preneuse at Mangalore on the 26th April. Tippoo formally received them and the French Officers at Seringapatam with public marks of honour and distinction.

These acts of the ambassadors, ratified by Tippoo, accompanied by the landing of a French force in his country, was considered by the Governor-

(*a*) In a letter from the Earl of Mornington, Governor-General, to Mr. Henry Dundas, dated the 6th July 1798, this force is stated to be not more than 200. Col. Beatson in his Narrative of the War estimates the number as 100.

General as a public unqualified and unambiguous declaration of war; aggravated by an avowal that the object of the war was neither explanation, reparation nor security, but the total destruction of the British Government in India.

In so clear and plain a case, a demand of explanation would have been justly attributed by Tippoo to a defect of spirit; it would have disgraced our character and diminished our influence and consideration in the eyes of every native power in India. Lord Mornington therefore rejected the idea of demanding an explanation as being disgraceful and frivolous and justly considered that against an enemy of this description no effectual security could be obtained, otherwise than by such a reduction of his power, as should not only defeat his actual preparation but establish a permanent restraint upon his future means of offence.

On the day following 20th June, the Governor-General sent orders to the Government of Madras to put the army in readiness for field service. To this prompt decision of his Lordship we owe our final success. His Lordship a few days after he received the first report of the proclamation called on the Madras Government for a variety of information. General Harris put querries to several persons which with the answers were transmitted to the Governor-General. At the same time I sent his Lordship many papers containing military and geographical information which I thought might be useful, in the event of offensive operations against Mysore being resolved upon.

Lord Mornington when at the Cape, on his passage to India formed the plan for the annihilation of the French power at the Court of Hyderabad. If at this period such a measure was judged to be expedient, it now became absolutely necessary.

His Lordship sensible of the danger of encouraging the raising of corps even if officered by British subjects, in the service of the native powers, yet thought it advisable to oppose some counterpoise to the large military establishment of the French under Mons. Perron, who had succeeded to the command on the death of Mons. Raymond in April 1798. Hence the introduction of Mr. Finglass into the service of the Nizam, and the subsequent augmentation of his Corps. But this security against danger at Hyderabad was deemed inadequate, and the complete subversion of the French Army was determined upon.

A Treaty was set on foot with the Nizam, one of the articles of which stipulated for the removal of every Frenchman from the service of his High-

ness; and another for the increase of the subsidized force. This treaty was concluded on the 1st of September 1798.

During the period of this negotiation, a detachment was formed in the Guntoor Circar under Colonel Roberts, and was ordered to join the Bengal Detachment at Hyderabad: ostensibly, that in the event of the death of the Nizam, which from his advanced age and increasing infirmities was daily looked for, there might be a force at that Court, sufficient to secure the succession to the rightful heir; but in fact, for the more immediate and important purpose of enforcing the plans of the Governor-General.

The Guntoor Detachment joined at Hyderabad under Lieutenant-Colonel Hyndman and Colonel Roberts took the command of the whole.

It was now intimated to Mons. Perron from the Durbar, that it was necessary all French subjects should quit the service of His Highness; to which he declared his intention to submit at the same time expressing his hope, that his accounts would be settled and all just demands be previously liquidated. In the meanwhile, the Bengal Detachment under Colonel Hyndman marched from his cantonment, and, on the 19th of October, took up a position within 600 yards of the rear of the French lines.

Mons. Perron surprised at this movement, was still more so, on the night following, at being advised from the Durbar to be on his guard, as he would be attacked early the next morning, by the Guntoor Detachment in front, and by the Bengal Corps in his rear, supported by a body of 2,000 Horse. His accounts not being settled and not having received his dismissal, Mons. Perron immediately ordered his troops under arms and made a disposition for defence. But considering this manœuvre, planned by the Durbar, with a view to get rid of him, without satisfying the just demands of himself and his officers, he determined to claim the justice and liberality of the British Government; and for that purpose, sent two officers to the Resident Captain Kirkpatrick, who gave them assurances of his interference and protection.

Mons. Perron had repeatedly declared that he would acquiesce in any reasonable arrangement, and on the 21st of October, proposed to surrender himself and officers to Colonel Roberts, but was prevented by his troops. Considering themselves about to be abandoned, by those to whom they looked for the payment of their arrears, the sepoys seized and confined their officers and they remained in this state of mutiny until assured that their claims should be attended to. In some Corps however the mutiny broke out again in the evening. They attacked Mons. Perron's house and

attempted to secure his person; but he was defended by part of his own Battalion and during the contest, in which six of the mutinous sepoys were killed, he effected his escape to Roberts' camp about midnight.

The French Corps continuing in a state of mutiny, Colonel Roberts on the 22nd instant was directed by the Resident to disarm and force them to surrender; allowing them half an hour to come to a determination. Colonel Roberts finding it necessary to enforce the submission of the mutineers, was met (*a*) by Captain Malcolm the Assistant Resident, who had just quitted the French lines. He had been assured by many native officers with whom he had conferred, that a large body would surrender, on the near approach of the English Force. And all the French troops excepting one corps which marched off with its arms, threw down their firelocks and retired to a commanding ground, when a flag of protection had been hoisted and Colonel Roberts took possession of the cantonment.

Only 20 days' pay was due to the Sepoys but they received allowances for an entire month, with which they were well satisfied.

The French force consisted of about 200 Europeans (of whom 46 were officers) and 15,000 sepoys, formed into regiments of 1,000 strong, commanded by European officers, with 4 guns attached to each. The whole had good arms and accoutrements and were in a respectable state of discipline. On the 5th of November, the French officers and men were sent from Hyderabad, and on their arrival near Masulipatam were embarked on the Bombay frigate for Bengal. During their residence in Colonel Roberts' camp, they were treated with every kindness, and to the humanity of our Resident, they were indebted for the preservation of their property.

This measure so ably planned, so well executed and of which not a person, except those in the confidence of the Governor-General, had the slightest intimation until it was accomplished, was followed by the ratification of the Subsidiary Treaty; by which, the British force with His Highness the Nizam was augmented to 6,000 Sepoys, 2 Companies of Artillery and 6 guns, and the subsidy increased, from 6, 44, 556 to 24, 17, 100 Arcot Rupees.

I cannot think of this important measure, at the very commencement of Lord Mornington's administration and which has reflected so much credit on him, but with pleasure at the same time mingled with sincere regret: with pleasure, because every person who spoke on the subject, did justice to Lord Hobert who at a very early period foresaw the danger or encouraging a French force at Hyderabad which not only destroyed out

(*a*) See Malcolm's India, p. 244.

influence at that Court, but might have threatened our power in India; and with sincere regret because his declaration of these sentiments occasioned those differences between his Lordship and Sir John Shore, which was the principal cause of Lord Hobert not succeeding to the supreme Government. It is a melancholy reflection that instead of reward, he should have been deprived of that honour which from his high character there is no doubt but he would have acquired. On the 9th of November, the Governor-General approved of the conduct of the Resident at Hyderabad and that of all the officers concerned in the overthrow of the French force; and ratified the new subsidiary treaty. His Lordship stated to Captain Kirkpatrick, that as the complete subversion of the French party would allow of the Courts coming forward with a strong force in concert with the allies, for co-operation in the common cause, it was therefore necessary to ascertain information on the following points.

1stly. The force, cavalry, infantry and ordnance to be expected and his Lordship stated, that, as the reduction of Seringapatam must constitute the sole object, it would be advisable that the Company's six subsidiary Corps, should form part of the infantry of the Contingent. These with the additions of 6,000 of Mr. Finglass's Corps and a suitable train of field ordnance joined by a body of the Nizam's best cavalry, under approved Sirdars, would form a sufficient force. And the Resident was directed to get excluded from command, every Sirdar suspected in the last war of treachery and, if necessary, formally to protest against them.

2ndly. The earliest period at which such Contingent could move from Hyderabad, and to hasten its progress as soon as possible.

3rdly. The place of junction which might be adjusted by the Commander of the Contingent and the Commander-in-Chief.

4thly. The route to be taken which, although it depended upon the place of junction, there was no difficulty in fixing some general direction, as by Amboor, and therefore it would be convenient to proceed to *Curpah*.

5thly. The period of junction. That as the army was to leave Amboor by the end of January, the contingent ought to be put in motion by the 5th of December.

6thly. The Sardar to command. That as it was extremely desirable Azeem-ul-Umrah should be at their head and seeing no substantial reason to the contrary, he should be urged to go. That it was of no consequence whether he was accompanied by one of the Princes or not. That if the

minister objected, a person who has zeal for the common cause with a due share of personal weight and authority in preference to military qualities should be found. That if the minister went, the Resident was to accompany him and leave the Assistant at Hyderabad; if not, *vice versa*. That it should be advisable for the Nizam to advance in person to the bank of the Kistna, to give the appearance of a hearty co-operation; although from age and infirmity, it was hardly to be expected.

7thly. The means and resources for the supply of provisions for the Nizam's and the Company's troops. To recommend to His Highness the storing of grain at Ganjeecotta Sedhout and the forts on his southern frontier; to give every encouragement to *the Brinjaries* to accompany and follow the contingent; and to co-operate with Azeem-ul-Umrah in engaging the cordial services of these people in behalf of the Company by an advance if necessary, not exceeding 50,000 Rupees; and that all supplies for the army at Seringapatan must pass through the Carnatic.

The Governor-General at the same time, (*a*) wrote to the Resident at Poona, that he viewed with concern, not less the embarrassments of Scindia; which obstructing his return to Hindustan and by weakening his authority, threatened to deprive us of an active ally, should the northward be invaded by Zeeman Shah, (*b*) than the slow progress made by the Peshwah in settling his Government; which by disclosing his weakness and irresolution, left a doubt, whether his counsel would finally be friendly or inimical to the Company; and should a rupture take place between Tippoo and us, whether any confidence could be placed in a connexion with him. That the period was now arrived, for the Peshwah to fulfil the ancient articles of treaty, which had been recognized by him; and his Lordship enclosed a copy of his letter to Tippoo, founded on the Peshwa's declaration and proposed draft of a letter to that Sultan. That to give weight to our negotiations, the Peshwah must advance his troops to his frontier to co-operate with the allies, and that his Lordship should be satisfied, if the contingent amounted to 20,000 Cavalry; provided they were of the best description and commanded by Sirdars and a Chief well affected to the common cause. That the contingent should not pass the frontier, until informed of the failure of the negotiation or required to move, by the Commander-in-Chief in Malabar.

The Resident was directed to communicate with the Government of Bombay on the progress of his negotiation for the contingent; in order to enable General Stuart to establish concert in the movements of his army.

(*a*) Letter dated the 10th November 1798.
(*b*) King of Kabul.

The Governor General on the 8th of November addressed a letter to Tippoo Sultan, in which His Lordship stated, that, it was impossible he should suppose him ignorant of the intercourse which subsisted between him and the French, whom he knew to be the inveterate enemy of the Company and to be then engaged in an unjust war with the British nation. That Tippoo could not imagine him to be indifferent to the transactions which had passed between him and the enemies of his country; nor did it appear necessary or proper, that his Lordship should any longer conceal from him the surprise and concern with which he perceived him disposed, to involve himself in all the ruinous consequences of a connection which threatened, not only to subvert the foundations of friendship between him and the Company, but to introduce into the heart of his kingdom the principles of anarchy and confusion; to weaken the obedience of his subjects and to destroy the religion which he revived.

That his Lordship perceived with great satisfaction, that, in all his letters he constantly professed a disposition to strengthen the bonds of sincere attachment and the foundation of harmony and concord established between him and the Honorable Company. That combining these professions of amity on his part with the proofs which the Company's Government had constantly given him, of their sincere disposition to maintain the relation of friendship and peace with him, it was natural for his Lordship to be extremely slow to believe the various accounts transmitted to him of his negotiation with the French and of his military preparation. But whatever his reluctance to credit such reports might be, prudence required both of his Lordship and of the Company's allies, that they should adopt certain measures of precaution and self-defence That they had accordingly been taken, as he would no doubt have observed.

That the British Government and the allies wishing nevertheless to live in peace and friendship with all their neighbours; entertaining no projects of ambition, nor any views in the least incompatible with their respective engagements and looking to no other objects than the permanent security and tranquillity of their own dominions and subjects, would always be ready, as they then were, to afford every demonstration of these pacific dipositions. That the Peshwah and His Highness the Nizam concurred with his Lordship in the observations which he had offered to him in this letter, and which, in the name of the Company and the allies, his Lordship recommended to his most serious consideration. But as he was also desirous of communicating to him, on behalf of the Company and of the allies, a plan to promote the mutual security and welfare of all parties, his Lordship proposed to dispatch to him for that purpose Major

Doveton, who was well known to him; and who would explain to him more fully and particularly the sole means which appeared to his Lordship and to the allies of the Company to be effectual for the salutary purpose of removing all existing distrust and suspicion, and of establishing peace and good understanding on the most durable foundations.

His Lordship added that, he should expect his answer to that letter with an earnest hope, that it might correspond with the pacific views and wishes of the allies; and that he might be convinced, that he could not in any manner better consult his true interest than by meeting with cordiality, the present friendly and moderate advance to a satisfactory and amicable settlement of all points, on which any doubts or anxiety might have arisen in the minds either of himself or of the allies.

It is worthy of remark, that this letter was neither shewn nor any part of its contents communicated by Tippo to any person in his kingdom.

On the 10th of December, the Governor General repeated the same proposal, as contained in his letter of the 8th November and informed Tippoo that he expected to him the pleasure of finding his answer to that letter, on his arrival at Madras, to which place he was on the point of setting out from Calcutta. But the Sultan declined by various evasions and subterfuges, this friendly and moderate advance on the part of the allies.

The Governor General having apprised the Residents at the Native Courts, of his intention to proceed to the coast, embarked on his Majesty's frigate La Sybelle on the 14th of December.

Previous to his departure, his Lordship stated in Council, that Sir Alured Clarke the Commander-in-Chief in India, was detained in Bengal, by account of Zeeman Shah having crossed the Attock, in consequence of which Lieut.-General Harris was appointed to the general command of the forces, on the coasts of Coromandel and Malabar; that the period for opening negotiation with Tippoo Sultan being arrived, his Lordship was of opinion, that the forces of the allies should be advanced immediately; and that the Coorg Rajah should be requested by the Bombay Government to collect grain in his country. That the Resident at Hyderabad had been already instructed to ascertain the force and nature of the assistance to be expected from thence. And that the Nizam was advised to store his frontier garrisons. And that the Resident at Poonah had been sent similiar instruction. That to strengthen the hands of General Harris all officers of Government on the coast were directed to obey his order without any reference to Government. And that His Excellency Admiral Rainer was advised of these preparations and was requested to cruise off Malabar with the British Squadron till April.

The Governor General added that he entertained no hopes of a treaty, unless Tippoo was alarmed for the safety of his capital: if therefore Tippoo refused to accede, his Lordship was of opinion that the armies must march against it direct, and that Lieut.-General Harris should consider it as the sole object. That as Lieut.-General Clark did not go round to the coast, Lieut.-General Harris should form the plan of operations, always keeping in view, the capture of Sringapatam, as the only means of security for any treaty.

The Governor General at the same time directed the Madras Government to order the battering train to be advanced towards Mysore.

In the meanwhile Lord Clive (*a*) apprised of these measures, ordered on the 5th of November advances to be made by Major Dallas the agent, for 10,000 draft and 30,000 carriage bullocks; and in the month following for a further supply of 8,000 carriage bullocks; many more were furnished by the store-keepers at the different garrisons. His Lordship called on the Commander-in-Chief on the 4th of December, for a plan of invasion of Mysore on the following date:—that by the end of December, the troops collected in the Centre Division would be 13,000; that the stores and grain would be at Vellore by the 20th Inst, when the army might encamp—; That 3,000 native infantry from Bengal might be expected to arrive at Madras by the end of the month; and the whole of the bullocks (50,000) by the middle of January:—that the subsidiary army of the Nizam, 6,000 of His Highness's Infantry and 10,000 of his Horse, would be at Curpah by the 10th of January—that the Bombay Army of 6,000 was ready to co-operate.—that of 4,500 men expected from Europe, 1,500 were calculated to arrive in time; 1,000 of whom seasoned at the Cape, might take the field—and that by this computation, the total force would amount to nearly 30,000 fighting men.

Lieutenant-General Harris on the 18th of December delivered in Council his proposed plan of offensive operations against Mysore; in which he stated, that he had weighed the advantages and disadvantages of the two routes of advance from the Carnatic to Seringapatam; that to the north, by Bangalore and that to the south, by Caveriporam: that he conceived the co-operation of the Mahrattas, could hardly be looked for till late in the campaign: that he thought the army might proceed from Vellore early in February: that our troops and the force from Hyderabad would be insufficient to invest Seringapatam, so completely as it was invested in the last war; consequently that the enemy might keep a force in the field, to interrupt the supplies and therefore oblige us to depend

(*a*) Governor of Madras.

solely upon those carried with the army, which ought to be 40 days in full allowance. for the fighting men and 20 for the public followers; which economized might last 60 days:

That from Coramangulam, a convenient situation in the Barramahal, Seringapatam might be reached in an equal number of days either by the route of Bangalore or Caveriporam, that the latter being little known and less frequented by our armies than the former, (although more secure being strengthened by the Cavery) he was induced to prefer the route by Bangalore, as more convenient for a numerous army, and more likely to accord with the wishes of the Nizam; that the Contingent ought to join at Amboor by the route of Calway and Rampoor: that for reasons he assigned, he thought the southwest face of the fort, the most likely to be attacked, and that a detachment ought to be formed under Colonel Read to keep open the communication with, and bring forward supplies to the army.

On the 23rd of December, General Harris wrote to General Stuart, for returns of cattle and grain, required his opinion of the quantity which might be expected to be brought forward, and of the possibility of bringing on any heavy ordnance—stated, that as there was no likelihood of the French being able to penetrate to India, he hoped, he would be able to collect a greater force for field service, by drawing troops from the different garrisons,—that the attack of Seringapatam being the primary object, he must recollect, that all operations on the Cavery must cease by the middle of May. He directed General Stuart to advance to the head of the Poodacherrum Pass and there to take up a strong position, keeping in mind, that the junction must be formed, so as to encamp before Seringapatam, by the 10th of March, at farthest. The General recommend, that materials for the siege, should be prepared in the Coorg country, and he informed General Stuart, that as grain was to be sent from Bengal to Cannanore it would be expedient to collect all the cattle possible to bring it on to the army, and he concluded by observing that great exertions had become absolutely necessary to oppose the lateness of the season.

On the 25th of December, the Commander-in-Chief notified in general order that the troops directed to be in readiness for field service were to be on full batta from the 1st of January and ordered that the whole should encamp on that day agreeably to the following arrangements.

The 19th Regiment of Dragoons and the 2nd Battalion of Artillery near the Meenut under Colonel Smith with the proportion of the field train at that station.

The 3rd Regiment of Native Cavalry and the detachment of the Meuron Regiment at Poonamalee near that station under Colonel Orr.

The 74th Regiment and 2nd Battalion 3rd Regiment near Wallajawbad, under Colonel Sheewe with the detachment of artillery and the proportion of the field train at that Cantonment.

The detachment of the Meuron Regiment at Tripasore near that Post, under Major de Meuron.

The 1st Regiment of Native Cavalry, the 73rd Regiment, 1st Battalion 6th Regiment, and 2nd Battalion 9th Regiment with a proportion of Artillery and Field Ordnance having been ordered some days previous to assemble and encamp at Wallawjawnagur under the Hon'ble Colonel Wellesley, this officer was desired, conformably with the authority which he had already received to direct, the 25th Regiment of Dragoon and the 2nd Regiment of native cavalry from Arcot; the detachment of the Regiment De Meuron and the 2nd Battalion 12 Regiment from Vellore; and the Detachment of the 1st Battalion of Artillery with two 12 and two 6 pounders of the Field Train, His Majesty's 12th Regiment and the 2nd Battalion 5th Regiment from Arnee, to march to Wallajawnagur, and encamp in line with the Corps ordered to assemble at that station.

Colonel Stevenson with the 4th Regiment of native cavalry was ordered from Cuddalore to join the troops under Colonel Wellesley (*a*) at Wallajownagar and Major Tolfrey with the 1st Battalion 12th Regiment, to march from Pondicherry to Wallajawbad.

A few days afterwards, General Harris recommended to the Madras Government, that as large a force as possible should be drawn together south of the Caleroon to assist that under Colonel Read, to secure the Coimbatoor country, and to collect and convey supplies, by the way Caverporam to the army at Seringpatam. Colonel Brown was named for the command of this detachment.

On the 31st of December, the Governor General arrived at Madras.

On the 9th of January, his Lordship wrote to Tippoo and renewed with increased earnestness his anxious desire to despatch an ambassador to him. His Lordship expressly solicited the Sultan to return an answer within one day to this letter, as it could not require a longer consideration.

(*a*) Afterwards Duke of Wellington.

Tippoo remained silent although his Lordship had plainly apprised him that dangerous consequences would result from delay.

On the 10th of January, the Governor General informed the Commander-in-Chief that the Contingent consisting of 6,000 of the Company's subsidiary troops, 6,000 of the Nizam's infantry commanded by British subjects, and about 10,000 of His Highness's Cavalry, were on their way to join the grand army; that the Nizam had appointed Mir Allum to command His Highness's troops; that the assistant Resident was to proceed with them, to conduct the communication, first between Meer Allum and the commanding officer of the British subsidized force, and ultimately between Meer Allum and the Commander-in-Chief and that relative situations by obligation of treaty required all his wishes and communications to the commander of His Highness's force, should go through the assistant Resident, unless Meer Allum himself should expressly think proper to dispense with this rule; that should it at any time be deemed advisable, that all or a part of the subsidized troops should be brought into the line or separated from the remainder of the contingent, the General was to communicate on that head through Captain Malcolm to Meer Allum and that it was advisable that the whole of the contingent should act conjointly.

General Harris was further informed, that the Governor General relied upon his taking every care, for the security of His Highness's troops when acting separately, as well as of Meer Allum's person; also for taking effectual means for maintaining harmony between those and the Company's troops and particularly conciliating the different chiefs.

On the 16th of January Major Bannerman * was appointed Resident at Travancore and was instructed to stimulate the Raja, to prepare troops for any eventual service and to give every encouragement to Brinjarees and Bazar men to join the Bombay army, to restrain the Rajah from committing any premature hostilities, to urge him to turn out all French and other foreigners from his dominions and to inform him that if he wished it, our Government would replace them with British subjects.

* Major Bannerman sent many thousand bullocks from Travancore to the Bombay army.

At the same time, a Resident (Captain Maheny) was appointed at Coorg to collect grain, coolies, etc. for the use of the army.

On the 22nd of January, the Governor General pointed out to the Resident at Hyderabad, the radical defects of the Nizam's Cavalry

that being silladars they do not like to expose their horses, without assurances of being repaid, and that the horsemen if disabled for life having no provision made for them, therefore, are unwilling to expose their persons.

Aware that His Highness would not adopt the necessary amendments to any extent ; his Lordship at the same time authorized Captain Malcolm to pledge the Company's Government for the faithful performances of any promises made to the horsemen and if these suggestions were not carried into effect, that some monthly allowance might be made to the officers under such plain or ostensible grounds, as would not create jelousy in the Nizam's Government ; and further, that an increase of pay during the present service, might be made to the late French Corps, but not above those in the Company's service ; by which although the expense probably, might fall on the Company ultimately, the advantages at this moment would be a full compensation.

On the 27th January, General Harris left Madras to take the command of the army, which had been assembled in the neighbourhood of Vellore.—It may be better to take notice of some further measures of the Governor General and then refer to the Journal of the operations of the army.

In the meanwhile, the season for military operations had already advanced to so late a period, as to render a speedy decision indispensable to the security of the allies. Under these circumstances, the Governor General, on the 3rd of February, declared to the allies ;—that the necessary measures must now be adopted without delay, for securing such advantages as should place their common safety, beyond the reach of the insincerity of Tippoo Sultan and of the violence of the French. With this view, his Lordship, on the same day, issued orders to the British armies to march ; and signified to the commander of His Majesty's squadron, that the obstinate silence of the Sultan must be considered as a rejection of the proposed amicable negotiation.

At length on the 13th of February, a letter(*a*) from Tippoo Sultan reached the Governor General, in which he signified to his Lordship that being frequently disposed to hunt he was accordingly proceeding upon a hunting

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(*a*) From Tipoo Sultan to the Rt. Hon. the Governor-General.

I have been much gratified by the agreeable receipt of your Lordship's two friendly letters, the first brought by a camelman, the last by hircaras, and understood their contents. The letter of the Prince, in station like Jumshied ; with angels as his guards ; with troops numerous as the stars ; the sun illuminating the world of the heaven of empire and dominion ; the luminary

excursion, and added that the Governor General would be pleased to despatch Major Doveton to him unattended.

On the 22nd of February the Governor General acknowledged the receipt of this extraordinary letter, lamented most sincerely that the friendly intimation contained in his Lordship's letter of the 9th January regarding the danger of delay had produced no effect, and that he had deferred his reply to that letter to so late a period of the season, stated that his long silence on this important and pressing occasion, compelled him to adopt the resolution of ordering the British armies to advance in concert with the armies of the allied powers. That this movement of the armies was to be imputed entirely to his repeated rejection of his Lordship's amicable offer of sending an ambassador to his presence; that under the present circumstances to send Major Doveton to him could not be attended with those advantages which would have resulted from his mission at a proper season; that the allies however, retaining an anxious desire to effect an adjustment with him, Lientenant General Harris had been empowered to receive any embassy which he should despatch to him, and that General Harris would also authorize, such persons as he might think proper to concert in communication with his ambassadors, a new treaty of friendship, founded on such conditions as appeared to the allies, to be indispensably necessary, to the establishment of a secure and permanent peace.

On the 23rd of February, the Governor General, from the more important advocations of the Commader-in-Chief, thought it necessary to appoint a Commission, to act in communication with the General and to obey his instructions; to receive overtures from all subjects of Tippoo Sultan, of whatever class; to receive overtures for peace; to correspond with the Commissioners in Malabar, and to report their proceedings to his Lordship as often as possible. The Hon'ble Colonel Wellesley, Lt. Colonel Close and Agnew and Captain Malcolm were the commissioners, and Captain Macaulay, the secretary.

General Harris at the same time was directed, not to delay an hour, in proceeding to enter Mysore; to forward the above-mentioned letter to Tippoo which was sent to him; to advance with all possible speed to his

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giving splendour to the universe of the firmanent of glory and power; the Sultan of the sea and the land; the King of Rum (Constantinople); be his Empire and his power perpetual! addressed to me, which reached you through the British envoy, and which you transmitted, has arrived. Being frequently disposed to make excursions and hunt, I am accordingly proceeding upon a hunting excursion. You will be pleased to despatch Major Doveton (about whose coming your friendly pen has repeatedly written) slightly attended (or unattended).

Always continue to gratify me by friendly letters, notifying your welfare.

capital; to circulate the declaration of war by the Governor General; and to conciliate the subjects of the Sultan.

The General was desired, if the Sultan should avail himself of the channel of negotiation still left open previous to the arrival of the army at Seringapatam, or previously to having taken up the position for the siege, and sent an embassy to receive it, without relaxing in his operations, and he was directed to consult with the Commissioners, on all points relating to negotiation. He was advised not to disclose the extent of the demands, until the junction of the Bombay Army, or until he was in a strong position for the siege. But, after having taken up such a position and before opening the batteries, to send the demands, of which his Lordship enclosed a draft requiring the signature of the Sultan, and the delivery of the hostages within 24 hours, at the same time, signifying, that in the event of being obliged to open batteries, he would not desist, without the demands contained in another draft which was also enclosed, being complied with.

The General was desired not to admit after this, of any embassy unaccompanied by Tippoo's assent to the second draft together with the money and hostages, but if Tippoo assented to make a disposition with General Stuart for taking immediate possession of Malabar.

The Commissioners were directed in concert with the allies, to settle a definitive treaty, on the basis of the preliminary articles transmitted by his Lordship, which were to be previously signed by the Sultan.

The case of being compelled to prosecute the siege to the last extremity and of obtaining possession of Seringapatam opened so extensive and complicated a change in the political state of India as to require the most comprehensive system of arrangement; and the Governor General desired that for the present necessary measures might be taken, for securing our possession in the Fort; supporting the inhabitants of Mysore who might take protection and opening a safe and easy communication to both coasts, until his Lordship could send specific instructions.

General Harris was directed, whether the person of the Sultan fell into his hands or not, to open no negotiation, involving the final settlement of the country with the Sultan or any other person, until he received final and special authority from the Governor General.

On the 25th of February, the Governor General stated the probable cases of negotiation; such as Tippoo placing his army in any situation between ours and Seringapatam; offering terms to protract time; and the

season being over; and he informed General Harris, that no attempt at negotiation must retard his progress. Therefore to attack Tippoo having first dismissed his *Vakeels*, that it was his wish no treaty, preliminary or definitive, should be entered into, until after the junction of the Bombay Army, and we were in a situation to commence the siege with a prospect of success; and his Lordship directed, that after a victory in the field, the General should not consent to negotiate, but coutinue to advance to Sringapatam; which might probably procure its immediate reduction; in which case, he was to follow his Lordship's instructions, for a successful siege. That after a victory, if it was judged expedient to propose, the demands contained in the second draft, (from which the General was not to depart,) and if the person of the Sultan should fall into his hands after an action, even in that case, he was not to delay his march to the capital.

The General was desired to observe from the whole tenor of these instructions, the Governor General's decided opinion, that no treaty could safely be concluded, unless the capital was actually in our hands, or we had the effectual means of securing its reduction.

From the possibility of treachery, the Governor General suggested to General Harris, never to admit *Vakeels* into his camp, but to let all conferences be held at some distance.

Copy of Preliminary Articles.

Preliminary articles for the re-establishment of the ancient friendship and for the adjustment of existing differences between the Hon'ble English Company, the Nawab Asoph Sah, Row Pundit Purdhan and Tippoo Sultan; settled by Lieutenant-General Harris, etc., in virtue of powers delegated to him by the Right Hon'ble Governor General, by Meer Allum Bahadur, on the part of the Nawab Asoph Sah, by............................on the part of the Peshwah and by............................on the part of Tippoo Sultan.

Article 1st.

Tippoo Sultan to receive and honorably entertain an ambassador from each of the allies, and for as long a period of time as any of the said allies shall require; the allies on their part, consenting to receive and entertain in the same manner and on the same terms, an ambassador from Tippoo Sultan.

Article 2nd.

Tippoo Sultan to dismiss without delay from his service and to remove from his dominions not only all the Frenchmen or natives of the islands of Mauritius and Bourbon, or of any other country now subject to France

but also all Europeans, natives or subjects of countries now at war with Great Britain—to which end they shall be sent to the British Camp in the course of 48 hours, where, with the exception of deserters they will be treated as prisoners of war and sent at the expense of the British Government by convenient opportunities to their respective countries.

Article 3rd.

Tippoo Sultan to renounce all connexion with the French nation and to engage, that none of the subjects of that nation shall ever hereafter be entertained in his service or be allowed to reside within his dominions.

Article 4th.

One half of the dominions of which Tippoo Sultan was in possession before the war, to be ceded to the allies, from the countries adjacent to their present respective boundaries, and agreeably to their selection; and it is hereby agreed and determined, with a view to the prevention of delays that the several districts to be ceded by Tippoo Sultan shall be taken at the valuation at which they were respectively rated in the accounts delivered in by his vakeels during the negotiations of the treaty in 1792.

Article 5th.

Tippoo Sultan to relinquish for ever all claim to the lately disputed districts of Ameera and Souleah and Ersawaraseemy; to any part of the territory possessed by the Rajah of Coorg at the commencement of war, to the whole of the Tambachery Pass, and generally, to all places on the present borders of any of the allies, which may at this time be in dispute.

Article 6th.

Two crores (*a*) of sicca Rupees shall be paid by Tippoo Sultan to the allies, agreeably to the following particulars, 1st, one crore shall be paid immediately, in pagodas or gold mohurs or Rupees of fullweight and standard, or in gold and silver bullion; 2ndly, the remaining crore shall be paid within six months from the date of the present treaty.

Article 7th.

All prisoners in the hands of the several powers to be fairly and unequivocally released.

(*a*) See Marquis Wellesley's Despatches, Vol. I. P. 461, where the amount of indemnity is mentioned as one crore and a half, each instalment being of 75 lakhs. In draft B, the amount of indemnity is stated to be 2 crores

Article 8th.

Until the due performance of the Articles of the present Treaty, four of the sons of Tippoo Sultan, to be selected by Lieutenant-General Harris, to be delivered into the General's hands; and as a further security for Tippoo's faithful execution of the same, four of his principal officers, to be named by Lieutenant-General Harris, shall also be delivered into the General's hands. (*a*) On the arrival of the said sons and officers in camp and on the payment of the first moiety of the money, agreed to be be paid by the 5th Article, cessation of hostilities shall take place; but the army of the allies shall not quit their position before Seringapatam, unless they deem it expedient or until the forts and districts to be ceded under the 4th Article shall actually be in the possession of the troops of the allies.

Article 9th.

The allied armies shall be entitled to a free and uninterrupted communication with the Malabar coast and the Carnatic on both sides of the Cavery, until the allies are put in possession of the forts and districts to be ceded under the 4th Article, shall actually be in the possession of the troops of the allies.

Article 10th.

Tippoo Sultan shall signify his assent or rejection of the above article within 24 hours after receiving them and in 24 hours more, the hostages and money must arrive in camp.

Article 11th.

When an agreement, containing the articles above written, shall arrive bearing the seal and signature of Tippoo Sultan, counter agreements shall be sent to Tippoo Sultan from the allies; and after the cessation of hostilities, a definitive treaty of perpetual friendship shall be settled and entered into by the several Powers.

(a) Instead of the words "four..........hands" the following occurs in Marquis Wellesley's Despatches Vol I. P. 461: "The fortress or fortresses of shall be delivered up to the Company." The following note is also appended: "The blank is to be filled up by the Commander-in-Chief; but it is to be observed that it is not to be filled up by the word "Seringapatam."

I left Madras late at night on the 27th of January and early the next-morning reached Conjeveram, where I found General Harris and his suite. We set off in the evening, but being disappointed in pallankine bearers, we stopped for a few hours with General Floyd near Wallajawnagur, and in the afternoon reached Colonel Wellesley's camp, on the north side of the Palaur, opposite Vellore.

1799.—27 January.

General Harris looked at the troops drawn up in line, and was much pleased with their appearance. As I passed the colors of the 12th Regiment, my heart bled at the recollection of the unhappy fate of poor Aston, and I dropped a tear to his memory. That his country and his friends should be deprived of so valuable a character at this period, when so much was expected from him, is truly melancholy. Had he lived, he would have been one of the brightest characters in the field and his loss is most sincerely regretted. He was appointed to command the troops ordered to assemble near Arcot, when that unfortunate affair took place, which terminated so fatally for him and so unhappily for his friends. It is but a melancholy consolation that he cautiously avoided his fate, as long as it was consistent with his honour to do so, and that he displayed the greatest forbearance and magnanimity after he received his wound (which he thought might prove mortal) as well as fortitude and resignation until he expired. Colonel Wellesley, who went to Arnee to see him was ordered to assume the command of the troops.

30 January 1799.

General Harris, after having looked at the line proceeded to the Park of Artillery, drawn out on the glacis of Vellore, and found everything in a state of readiness to move. He particularly examined the stores, and it seemed to be the opinion of every person present, that there were a great many more than would be required and which were likely to encumber us. The General gave some orders to Col. Carlisle respecting his department, and I believe it was recommended to leave behind such stores, as were thought not absolutely necessary and to make some alteration in the packing of the remainder, for most of the carts appeared to be but half loaded.

Lieutenant Sydenham of the Guides was sent from camp by the way of Goriatham and Cheadagerry to meet Col. Roberts, on his march from Hyderabad and to conduct the detachment towards Amboor, where it is to join the army.

All descriptions of persons speak in high terms of praise of Colonel Wellesley not only of his military talents, but of all his arrangement particularly those for drawing resources from the country and supplying the army with provisions which have been abundant and at a cheap rate.

Went with Col. Richardson and Captian Orr to fix upon ground for our next encampment. The failure of rain this season is really alarming: the country is parched up and no green forage is to be seen; many large tanks which at this time of the year are usually full are quite dry, and there are but few, which have any water.

31st January.

Accounts from Col. Roberts of the 22nd Inst. at Mortagoonta state that the detachment had struck off into the road to Bodwall and was to enter the Doonall Pass, the day following. He expected to be at Calway on the 27th, at Rampoor on the 29th, and to form the junction by the 10th of February. The detachment had been joined by no more than 2,000 of the Nizam's Horse, of the worst kind and picked up by Meer Allum on the march. Owing to the exertions of Captain Malcolm there are expectations that the detachment will bring forward large supplies of grain.

General Harris looked at and approved of the proposed ground of encampment which is a little to the westward. The 19th Dragoons joined yesterday and encamped on the right of the line.

1st January.

General Harris looked at the 19th Dragoons; the horses are in low condition, which at the very commencement of a campaign is rather serious.

2nd February.

The division of the army under Major-General Floyd joined from Wallajawnagar, and encamped on the right.

4th February.

The detachment under Major-General Popham joined from Madras and encamped on the right of Géneral Floyd.

5th February.
This detachment remained at Madras to bring in the money, etc

A battalion of Sepoys was sent to the south side of the Palaur, to take up a position near Chitterbury house, in order to protect the cattle of the ordnance and grain departments. The remainder of the bullocks wanting to complete are expected to arrive in the course of a few days; it is to be hoped therefore, there will be no delay; for at this advanced season a day is of the utmost consequence.

6th February.

The army was this day formed into six brigades of infantry and two of cavalry, agreeably to the annexed order of battle. The army consists of 912 European and 1766 Native Cavalry; 576, European artillery; 4,608 European and 11,061, Native Infantry; 2,726 Gun Lancers and Pioneers; amounting to 21,649 fighting men. There are 2,618 horses.

7th February.

The several divisions of the army marched early in the morning, and encamped about 4 miles N. W. of Vellore taking up their ground agreeably to the new order of battle.

8th February.

The cavalry moved from the right flank to ground about 2 miles west of the army. Colonel Wellesley, Captain Orr and myself were appointed a committee to examine the rice and gunnybags. It appeared on the examination this morning, that the average wastage is $3\frac{20}{53}$ seers on each bag of 72 seers. The rice has been in bags since the 26th December and has been carried 100 miles in 12 marches. It is packed in double bags, of Bengal gunny, which is of so bad a quality for the purpose and of so open a texture that the rice works through, upon the most trifling movements, and it is probable the wastage will increase, in proportion as the bags become used and as the quantity of rice they contain is diminished. The actual wastage from the bad quality of the gunny alone being 5 per. cent. in 12 marches, on a good road, through an open country and without any impediment whatever, it is but fair to presume that the wastage during the next 30 marches will be 15 per. cent. or 20 per. cent., on the whole, before we reach Seringapatam. This estimate does not include the losses which may be occasioned, by bullocks throwing their loads in the jungle, by the pilfering of the bullock drivers or by what may be taken by the enemy; on these accounts, at the most moderate computation, 5 per. cent. may be allowed, which will reduce the whole quantity of rice with the army one-fourth. Aware of the arts of the natives, we have taken every precaution to prevent imposition, in ascertaining the wastage which I recommended to Col. Wellesley, and I thought it right to be very explicit with Major Hart. We waited upon General Harris with our report and showed him some of the bags. This merits the most serious consideration, and means should be devised if possible to guard against so great a diminution of the grain. The gunny bags are such as are used on boardship, but are altogether unfit for the purpose of transporting rice by and. There has been a neglect somewhere and it may be too late to remedy it entirely. Orders have been sent to Vellore and Arnee for all the gunny in store which, with those bags which have been emptied will serve to put additional cover to a considerable quantity. Of 14,713 bags or bullock loads of rice, 2,571 were ordered to be left at Vellore and the empty bags were put over the rice carried with the army. It seems, that the Military Board long since ordered gunny to be made up to the northward, but it has not arrived, and I believe none has been made in the Barramall although ordered, owing to some misconception of the order. This is scandalous, and if the deficiency has proceeded from

economy it is extremely ill-judged. Gunny should be an article of public store.

9th February.

Met Col. Carlisle at Chitterbury and pointed out to him the ground which is to be occupied by the park of Artillery. General Harris looked at the line of infantry drawn up for the occasion.

10th February.

The Park of Artillery moved from the Glacis of Vellore to the west side of Chitterbury house, where it is protected by one battalion of sepoys. 2,571 bags of rice are ordered to be left at Vellore in consequence of the bad quality of the gunny.

General Harris looked at the cavalry and was much pleased with their handsome appearance. They are a noble body of men, and we may hope, with the experience of last war, that they will be brought before the enemy, not only in a high state of disciplin~ but the horses in good orders. The 19th has been frequently tried and the 25th is a beautiful Corps, and there is no doubt but if ever Col. Cotton has an opportunity that he will distinguish himself. Every precaution has been taken to ensure supplies of grain, but a great scarcity of forage may be apprehended.

11th February.

The army moved to ground about 6 miles N. W. of Vellore; the right at Lalgurry, the left pointing towards Brinjiveram. The army encamped in three lines, the left wing in front, the cavalry in the centre and the right wing in the rear. This disposition was made for the convenience of water, which is principally from the Palaur. The confusion on the march points out the propriety of moving as frequently as possible, if it is only a couple of miles, that by seeing our blunders and defects we may rectify them.

No baggage master has been appointed. I spoke to Macaulay(*a*) on the subject; it seems, the appointment has been kept vacant for Captain Schohey, who is a very fit person; but as he has the command of a Corps of the Nizam's Sepoys under Captain Malcolm, it is not likely that he will relinquish his present situation.

The weather is unusually hot, for this time of the year.

(*a*) Military Secretary to the Commander-in-Chief.

The heavy Park and Stores are to proceed along the south bank of the Palaur, as far as Vaniambady, parallel to the route of the army, and to encamp in the rear. This will facilitate our movements and give us the forage on both sides of the river.

12th February.

The Ordnance Department is as follows:—

Four	24-Pounders.		
Thirty	18	do.	Iron Battering guns.
Eight	12	do.	Iron Battering guns.
Four	18	do.	Brass Field Train.
Eight	12	do.	Brass Field Train.
Thirty-four	6	do.	Brass Field Train.
Two	8-Inch Howitzers		Brass Field Train.
Four	5/2	do.	Brass Field Train.
Four	Gallopers 6-Pounders		Drawn by horses and attached to the cavalry.
Eight	do. 3	do.	Drawn by horses and attached to the cavalry.

5989	barrels of powder.		
860	do.	of musket ammunition.	
4800	do.	24-pounder shot.	
36400	do.	18	do.
10400	do.	12	do.
3600	do.	6	do.
1200	do.	3	do.
1000	do.	8	Inch shells.
4000	do.	5/2	do.
400	do.	4/2	do.

One 24, six 18, two 12-pounder spare carriages for the battering train. One 18, two 12, seven 6-pounder spare carriages for the field train; 95 tumbrels, including 10 for treasure and 10 for small stores, 342 platform and 329 common carts.

The army marched at daybreak, from Lalgurry to ground on the north bank of the Palaur, opposite Policondah, and about 10 miles distant from Vellore.

14th February.

Statement of bullocks ordered for the use of the Army.

	Country carts.	Draft bullocks.	Carriage bullocks.
Furnished by store-keepers at the different garrisons, for the removal of troops, &c. ...	...	3.515	5,742
Ordered on the 5th of November and advanced for, between the 7th and 25th inst. ...	...	10,000	30,000
Ordered in December	700	...	8,000
Total	700	13,515	43,742

DISTRIBUTION AS FOLLOWS.

To Commissary-General of Stores ...	439	8,417	10,947
To Commissary of Grain	...	42	18,006
To Commissary of Provisions ...	250	647	820
To Camp Equipage Department ...	...	386	4,260
To Cavalry Grain Agents	...	...	2,500
To Field Apothecary Department ...	11	...	...
Spare bullocks to assist the Department ...	...	4,023	7,209
Total	700	13,515	43,742

THE MONTHLY EXPENSE.

P. I.		PAG.	T. C.
13515 Draught bullocks at 2-8 each	...	29,604	12-0
43742 Carriage do ... at 1/2 each	...	65,613	...
700 Country carts ... at 7/2 each	...	5,250	...
29 head mistries, one for 2000 bullocks ... ... at P. 10 each	...	240	...
1173 inferior mistries at 2 each	...	2,346	...
29 Conicopolies, one for 2000 bullocks at 5 Pag. each	...	145	...
Total Pagds.		1,03,248 : 12 : 0	

The Commissary of grain received from Mr. Brodie, the Garrison store-keeper of Madras, 14713 bullock loads of rice, equal to 220 gara, 279 marcals 9 seers; and he left at Vellore, by order of the Commander-in-Chief, 2571 bullock loads.

15th February. The army halted, on account of the Park of Artillery.

16th February. The army marched and encamped on the south side of Goriattam.

17th February.

The army marched by the left, 10 miles and a [illegible] encamped on the east side of Amboor. There is a scarcity of rice in our bazars, which is to be lamented, not because it subjects the troops and followers to any real inconvenience, but because it may make an unfavourable impression at this early period, and they may apprehend great distress when we enter the enemy's country. Our bazars have been ill-managed lately by Mr. Kelly, who was not equal to the task, and it is perhaps to be regretted, that the Quarter-Master-General (*a*) was not allowed to remain incharge of them. Although it might have been advantageous to him, there is no doubt, but the army would have been abundantly supplied. Captain Macleod, the Superintendent of supplies, joined on the 15th, and the arrangements he has made, will prevent any scarcity in future, at least while we remain in our own territories.

Having suggested to General Harris the propriety of Captain Orr going in advance of the army to ascertain the state of the roads and nature of the different grounds for encampment, which I have pointed out, as far as the neighbourhood of *Ryacottah*, he has been detached for that purpose. During his absence, I give every assistance to the guide department.

Colonel Roberts' Detachment and a large body of the Nizam's troops, horse and foot, under Meer Allum, arrived in the afternoon at Goriattum, and took up the ground which had been occupied by the army.

18th February.

Orders were issued for the army to march, but late in the evening they were countermanded ; in consequence of some communication with Meer Allum.

19th February.

The army marched by the left and encamped three miles south of Amboor. The contingent marched from Goriathum and encamped close to Amboor ; Colonel Roberts's Detachment occupying ground immediately north of the Pettah, the right extending towards Cuddapanetam.

Having been directed by the General to point out the ground for the contingent, I had an opportunity of seeing the Nizam's troops ; the infantry are well-looking men, but the cavalry are of the worst description and not to be compared with those we had last war.

20th February.

General Harris and Meer Allum had a meeting in the forenoon, in a tent pitched for the purpose, half ways between the two camps. Many of the principal officers of the army and of the Nizam's cavalry attended.

(*a*) Lt.-Colonel Richardson.

By a letter from Cannanore of the 1st February, the Bombay Army consists of six battalions of Sepoys 3,600 effective men; and the flank companies of the 75th; 77th and Bombay Regiment 1,350 effective Europeans. The Grenadier Battalion with a Company of Artillery had been ordered to Poonah, under Colonel Little with the view of inducing the Mahrattas to advance towards Tippoo's frontier. Provisions for 40,000 men for six weeks are collected at Ithacoor and will be at the head of the Poodacherrmun Ghât by the 25th of the month and considerable magazines of grain have been established in the Coorg country. The cattle are good and in high condition; they have not been employed in transporting the grain, nor have the troops; whole having been done by contract with the natives.

21st February.

Meer Allum paid General Harris a visit of ceremony in the morning, which the General returned in the afternoon. The Nizam's infantry was drawn our and formed a street, leading to Meer Allum's tent. There are a great many fine-looking men among them and we may expect to derive some benefit from their services. The General afterwards looked at Colonel Roberts' Detachment, which was under arms; they are a remarkably fine body of men, and well appointed.

22nd February.

The army marched by the left, and encamped about 2 miles east of Vaniambudy. The contingent took up the ground which had been occupied by the army south of Amboor. The contingent consists of, 142 European Artillery, 6,325 Sepoys and 318 gun making 6,785 fighting men with 20 Field pieces; the subsidiary force under Colonel Roberts' seven Battalions of the Nizam's Sepoys, officered by British subjects; with 14 guns, under the immediate command of Captain Malcolm; who has a troop of mares, as a body-guard; and 5 or 6,000 Horse under Meer Allum.

Captain Malcolm gave the General a memorandum of the number of Brinjaries actually with the contingent and expected to join.

	Bullocks.
With the contingent	16,528
Sent from the contingent to load Vellore ...	3,618
Sent to load at different places in the Pollams ...	700
Sent to Cummum	3,760
Coming from Hyderabad and expected within a month, excepting 6,500 detained, having been disappointed of grain.	35,000
Total	59,606

If this number actually join, besides those which Captain Malcolm expects from Ongolo, they will bring a grand supply of grain and bazar articles for the use of the army; but as far as I can judge, from a conversation with the General, I think we shall be disappointed and that Malcolm is too sanguine.

23rd February.

For the convenience of forage and water as well as to make it less fatiguing to the army and cattle, it has been determined to move in two divisions The first under General Floyd consists of the cavalry, with the exception of one regiment, and the left wing; the second division, one regiment of native cavalry. The right wing and park, with the grain and provision departments. The contingent forms a separate division and is to encamp in the rear. The park joined the line.

The first Division marched at daybreak and encamped on the west side of Tripatore. I sent Colonel Richardson an account of the road and a sketch of our encampment, with the position, I think, he should take up with the remainder of the army. I shall continue to do so every march, until the second Division joins.

24 February.

The First Division marched near 15 miles and encamped about a mile S. W. of Matoor. The road is in general good, being over a hard gravelly soil; but in the low grounds under the banks of the tanks and which cross the road, it is soft and swampy and will occasion some trouble with the heavy guns. I have particularly informed Colonel Richardson of this and have recommended that the army should be encamped at Cockangerry or on the bank of the Malpady river.

25th February.

The First Division marched 11 miles and encamped immediately south of Baroor, the Poneaur river separating the Cavalry and Infantry.

26th February.

The First Division marched about 8 miles and encamped a mile and a half south of Coramungalum, fronting the west and the passes; the cavalry on the left, separated from the infantry by the small river which comes from Poliode, I have taken up the ground so as to admit of the right wing and park encamping immediately on our right, and occupyin[illegible] between the first division and the small forts of Caramungalum.

Colonel Read's Detachment, under the immediate command of Major Cuppage, and which for some days past had been encamped on the north

side of Coramungulum, marched at daybreak to Caripatam. Captain Orr was prevented going further to the westward than this place, by an idle report from Kistnagarry, which was considered as a signal of alarm; in consequence of which, Major Cuppage's Detachment had slept on their arms two nights. I recommended to General Floyd, to write to Major Doveton and to request of him to send direct to this division of the army, any information which he thinks may be of consequence. General Floyd has ordered a battalion to occupy a position near Policode which covers the entrance into the Barramahl.

28th February.

The Second Division joined. On the 24th it marched from Vaniambady and encamped at Tripatore; on the 25th at Cocknagerry, on the 26th at Muttoor, on the 27th at Barror and on the 28th at Caramungalum; occupying the interval between the right of the First Division and the small fort. The contingent which had followed the route of the army, joined in the course of the day, and encamped in the rear.

1st March.

It having been settled that Mir Allum was to see the troops under arms, they were drawn up in the afternoon to receive him. He did not arrive on the right of the army until past five; when he was saluted with 17 guns from the heavy park. He appeared much surprised at so formidable a train of artillery and with the army, which was drawn up in one time on very favourable ground. His progress was so slow along the front, being on his elephant, that it became quite dark before he reached the left of the infantry. A profusion of torches were lighted, but the confusion, occasioned by the darkness of the night, by the elephants, horsemen and crowd of followers was so great, that it was impossible to go along the front of the cavalry and they were ordered from the parade. It is not uncustomary for native princes to review their troops by torch light; but to us, this was most unmilitary and provoking, because we were anxious that the Nizam's Chiefs should have seen our cavalry, particularly the European Corps.

The Nizam's infantry, with the contingent, before they were organized by Captain Malcolm, consisted of seven of the French Corps, each about 450 men with 4 guns, commanded by natives, the whole under Mahomed Ameer Cawn [illegible] of Mr. Finglass's Corps each about 750 men with three guns, commanded by Mr. Grant, Mr. Finglass having been removed.

They are now as follows. Two of the French Corps drafted into Mr. Grant's two battalions are formed into three battalions, with a brigade of guns attached to each; the whole under the command of Mr., now called Major, Grant. The remaining French Corps are formed into four battalions with a brigade of guns attached to each; the whole under the command of Captain Schohey.

Captain Malcolm found it neceessary to dismiss and send back to Hyderabad all the native commandants because they had been mutinous and were refractory. Their disaffection frequently shew itself on the march from Hyderabad, and on the 13th of February, the detachment was detained by a mutiny among the French Sepoys. They had been entertained in the Nizam's service, after their surrender to Colonel Roberts at Hyderabad, and the charge of them had been given to Mahomed Amed Cawn; the battalions still commanded by the former native officers. The Sepoys often during the march had given proofs of a turbulent disposition, particularly on the banks of the Kistna; and it was thought that they retained a great attachment to their former French Officers and to their republican principles. Captain Malcolm had proposed to newmodel the whole; to place British Officers in command of the several battalions and to superintend them himself. This received the consent of the Nizam and the sanction of the Governor General. He proceeded to carry this arrangement into effect and communicated his intentions to the native commandants; who foreseeing the loss of their own authority and influence determined to oppose the proposed reform. They refused to march with the detachment unless assured, that no European Officers were to be introduced among them; and if this point was not given up, they threatened to return to Hyderabad with their arms, guns and stores. One of the Corps had charge of the treasure. Captain Malcolm pointed out to Meer Allum the necessity of taking decisive measures and prevailed upon him to send a positive order for the Corps to march. In order to enforce obedience, the Nizam's Horse were drawn up on their flank and Colonel Roberts' detachment was under arms. The steps and the personal exertions of Captain Malcolm, induced the Sepoys to obey the order and their ready acquiescence was the strongest evidence that the commandants were at the bottom of the business.

General Harris has furnished these Corps with European Officers to command them and a with a few non-commissioned and from the salutary measures adopted by Malcolm, we may expect to derive considerable benefit from their services; at all events they will save our own troops.

Major Grant's Corps and 1,500 Horse under Mahomed Ameen Cawn, are ordered to join Colonel Read's Detachment which is to be employed above the ghats; and 500 Horse under Mahomed Semant Cawn are ordered to join Colonel Brown's Detachment to the southward which is to penetrate by the Coveriporam Pass and bring forward supplies to the army at Seringapatam.

2nd March.

Being perfectly acquainted with this part of the country, I have recommended that the army should march from this ground, in four columns and join at Maranhelly.

The army marched by the left, in four columns. The Park on the great road leading to Ryacotta flanked on the left by the Right Wing, the Left Wing along the north and the Cavalry on the south bank of the Policode river. The Park and Right Wing encamped opposite Verabadroog, the Left Wing and Cavalry near Policode. Major Gibbons, who had been detached by General Floyd from Coramungalum, joined the line. The contingent halted. After having marked out the ground for the Cavalry, and Left Wing, I joined Head-Quarters, and had an opportunity of seeing, how much this mode of marching, when the country and position of the enemy will admit of it, facilitates the movement of this immense army and equipment, besides the convenience it affords, of an extensive range of forage for our cattle.

3rd March.

The army marched by the left in four columns, and encamped at Maranhelly. The contingent took up the ground, which had been occupied by the Right Wing yesterday.

The 33rd Regiment joined the contingent, and the Hon'ble Colonel Wellesley was appointed to the command; Colonel Roberts having been requested to resign and to take his command in the line, which is that of a native brigade.

4th March.

The Right Wing and Cavalry, with the exception of one native regiment, marched by the right and encamped 3 miles N. W. of Ryacottah. The contingent encamped at Maranhelly. The Goomoonoor Pass, through which we marched, is the most practicable for an army, of all the passes which lead into Mysore. It was cleared in 1792 by order of Marquis Cornwallis.

The Park and 6th Brigade joined from Maranhelly and encamped to the west of Ryacotta, on the left of the cavalry.

5th March.

I always was of opinion that any money expended on Ryacotta, except merely to strengthen the works, would be thrown away in that opinion, I am now confirmed, and I cannot but consider the great carriage road, which has been made at so much labour and expense, as having weakened the place. It affords an easy and ready access to the upper fort, and if an enemy were to get possession of it, which is very practicable, all communication with the lower fort would be cut off. The store houses on the hill are almost useless, for hill forts are out of the question for the purpose of depôts, and Ryacotta the least calculated of any, because an army cannot encamp sufficiently near to be able to draw supplies from it.

Major Cuppage's Detachment, which had marched from Cavripatum by the Ryacotta Pass, consisting of two battalions of sepoys with three guns, reinforced from camp by the Right Company of the 12th Regiment, and a troop of native cavalry was sent this morning to take possession of Neeldroog and Auchittydroog, two hill forts, just within Tippoo's boundary. It is worthy of remark that Tippoo on the same day encamped at Periapatam, crossed his own frontier by cutting roads, through the woods on the borders of the Coorg country, and the next day attacked General Stuart's outposts at Sedasur. Neeldroog was deserted and found in the same dismantled state in which it had been left by Marquis Cornwallis last war. Auchittydroog surrendered, the Killedar being permitted to retire with the garrison of about 100 matchlockmen. An English 9-pounder was found in the upper fort.

The Right Wing Park and Cavalry marched from Ryacotta: the two former encamped to the southward of Neeldroog and the cavalry S. E. of Auchittydroog close to the road.

6th March.

After having marked out the ground for the cavalry, I went to Auchittydroog. From the upper fort I observed a large body of the enemy's Horse at the distance of 6 miles, on the high road from Assoor moving towards us. As the only two roads which led from Assoor to the ground on which the several divisions of the army are encamped, pass through narrow defiles,—one, immediately on the north, and the other, on the south side of Auchittydroog,—I recommended to Major Cuppage to take up such a position with

his detachment, as to occupy both of them, which he did. After having concerted signals, which were to be made from the top of the hill to our cavalry, I returned to General Floyd, and having apprized him of the situation of the enemy galloped back to Head-Quarters beyond Neeldroog. The 12th Regiment and Flank Companies of the 74th under Major-General Baird were detached to join General Floyd, to whose discretion it was left, to attempt to surprize the enemy during the night, in case they should remain in the neighbourhood. About 9 o'clock, General Baird marched with the European and 14 Companies of Sepoys from Major Cuppage's Detachment to within a few miles of Assoor, but did not fall with the enemy. After a very fatiguing march, having missed the road coming back, they returned to Kellamungalum about daybreak. General Floyd had moved through the southern defile with the cavalry, and took up a strong position, to support General Baird, had it been necessary. All the troops were much fatigued, having been under arms the whole night.

7th March.

The Right Wing and Park marched from Neeldroog and encamped S. W. of Kellamungalum; the cavalry remained on the ground they had taken up during the preceding night. The Left Wing marched from Ryacotta and encamped to the S. E. of Auchittydroog. The contingent halted.

As the advanced Guard came to the ground of encampment at Kellamungalum, several parties of the enemy's Horse showed themselves and some were rather daring. They conversed with us, and desired us not to fire upon them, for that they were ordered by the Sultan not to molest us, but only to destroy the forage in the neighbourhood of our Camp; which in some degree they effected, notwithstanding our endeavours to prevent them.

8th March.

The cavalry moved ground and encamped on our right. The contingent marched from Ryacotta and encamped about 2 miles in the rear of the army.

9th March.

The Left Wing and Park came into the Line. The halt on this ground will refresh the cattle for there is abundance of forage in our rear, and there are several large tanks of fine water within the encampment, to which we have hitherto been strangers.

On the 7th instant, Lieutenant-Colonel Oliver was detached with his Battalion of Sepoys to take Woodiadroog. It surrendered without making

any resistance, the Garrison consisting only of 50 peons. On the 8th the Hill fort of Rutengerry was captured by a Battalion of Sepoys under Captain Irton, from Colonel Read's Detachment. Captain Irton assaulted the place, and having escaladed two of the walls the enemy called out for quarter, which was immediately granted. There were about 50 peons in the place. The possession of these hill forts will cover the roads leading into the Barramahl.

Colonel Read has brought forward a great number of Brinjaries, with supplies of provisions for the use of the army.

During the halt at this place, I have had many conversations with the General and his Confidential Staff Officers, respecting the route to Seringapatam, and I thought it advisable to discuss the subject very fully with Major Beatson *(a)*. After referring to my Field Books of the Marches of the Army under Marquis Cornwallis and to a variety of other information of the several roads, we have given our opinions that we should proceed by the way of Aunacull to within 9 miles of Bangalore and then strike into the road leading to Kankanelly, which was the route taken last war. We prepared a particular description of the several roads and assigned our reasons, for giving that by Kankankelly the perference, which meeting with the concurrence of Colonel Richardson and Captain Orr and the approbation of the General, is to be adopted.

I have made sketches of the proposed route of the army from hence to Seringapatam, not only for the General and Colonel Wellesley, but also for Meer Allum. Hitherto, every march the army has made, has been determined upon, from the information I have given to the General, which has been found correct, and I trust we shall be equally fortunate henceforward. On every occasion, Captain Orr has not only had access to all my maps and fieldbooks but has had my personal assistance on the march; and as I every evening prepare sketches of our actual position and that proposed for the ensuing march, as well for Wellesley as the General, I have scarce a moment to myself. I hope I shall on every account exert myself, but I am particularly anxious, the General should be sensible that I have no recollection of his behaviour respecting the Quarter-Master Generalship, and yet had he behaved, as he ought to have done, how enviable would my situation be now.

(a) Author of "View of the Origin and Conduct of the War with Tippoo Sultan."

The army marched by the right from Kellamungalum to Gairadapilly.

10th March.

The enemy's Horse were very daring on the march, some of them coming within pistolshot of the head of the Advanced Guard. Their principal object is to burn the dry forage in the neighbourhood of the route of the army and the camp. On coming near our ground, Colonel Richardson pushed on with two galloper guns and a troop from each regiment, and saved a great deal of forage. This was the first time we opened the galloper guns and with effect.

Colonel Close (*a*) having rode up to a village about a mile in front of the Line, when there was some forage, had a very narrow escape. He saw a few horsemen whom he took for the Nizam's, therefore paid no attention to them. They allowed him to cross them, at the distance of a few yards. When he had turned corner of the village and they had got between him and camp, they charged him. The first idea Colonel Close had that they were enemies, was seeing the pike of the foremost man within five yards of him ; he clapped spurs to his horse and for some minutes the enemy kept pace with him. At length his horse, an Arabian, getting heated and animated and coming to some rough ground carried him clear off, after a pursuit of about a mile. It was perhaps fortunate that Close had neither food nor pistols, for had he stopped to make use of them, one minute's delay might have proved fatal to him.

Soon after the army had encamped, a report was sent to Head-Quarters that a very large body of the enemy's horse, infantry and guns, was in march towards our camp. The troops were immediately ordered under arms; and a second report coming from the Grand Guard, that it was probably Tippoo in full force, a disposition was immediately made, and the General and principal Staff officers went out with three Regiments of Cavalry to reconnoitre. It was soon discovered that the body of troops, so confidently reported to have been the enemy, was the contingent. It had been settled that the contingent should march parallel to the army, at a sufficient distance on the right, to admit of the baggage moving between the two columns. The ruggedness of the country and not having a sufficient number of Pioneers, prevented Colonel Wellesley keeping his station and obliged him to make a considerable detour and a retrograde movement of former five miles, to gain his proposed ground of encampment near the army. During the march, the contingent was harassed by a very large body of the enemy's horse and rocket boys;

(*a*) Adjutant-General.

Colonel Wellesley made an excellent disposition, to cover the baggage and stores and obliged the enemy to draw off. But we had the misfortune to have a Grenadier Company of Sepoys entirely cut off, not one man having escaped unhurt ; 20 were killed, Dr.Reynolds and 36 were wounded, and the remainder were carried off. All the killed and wounded, excepting Lieutenant Reynolds and one Sepoy, were stripped of their accoutrements and coats. The coats were carried to Tippoo, and the Officer reported that he had cut off a Grenadier Battalion. I trust this will be useful lesson and prevent some more serious accident, at a future period. We have information, that all Tippoo's Regular Horse are in the neighbourhood of the army, and their appearance confirms it. There was some confusion during the march among the baggage, occasioned by some of the Nizam's horse crouching on us and who were taken for the enemy. It was late in the evening before the troops returned to their tents and the Rear-guard did not get to the skirts of the camp till the middle of the night.

12th March.

The army marched by the right and encamped at Argudda. On coming to the ground, the Galloper guns were of great use in dispersing the enemy's Horse, who endeavoured to burn the forage. The contingent flanked the baggage close on the right. Nothing could be more judicious than the disposition of the army during the march, and everything was so well conducted that not a bullock load was lost, although large bodies of the enemy hovered about us all the day.

13th March.

It is truly mortifying that it should be found necessary to halt. Our bullocks are bad and the Store Department is deficient in number. Meer Allum has already given considerable assistance to that department, so has Captain Malcolm, but still a great deal more is required.

14th March.

The army marched by the left and encamped at Cattagaraputty within sight of Bangalore. On the Advanced Guard coming to the ground, three bodies of the enemy's Horse shewed themselves in front, and as they evidently were regulars and in considerable force, about 4,000, it was necessary to be rather cautious. One cavalry advanced a little and formed, but on a shot or two being fired, the enemy drew off. Great fires in the neighbourhood of Bangalore which indicate that the enemy expect us in that direction. We were informed by followers from the enemy's camp, that General Stuart had an action some days since with Tippoo's troops ; that the enemy had lost 2,000 men, but that General Stuart had been obliged to retire below the Gauts.

The army again obliged to halt. A considerable quantity of powder and shot was left on the ground yesterday, owing to a deficiency of bullocks and the Bazar men not having sent those they promised to the Park; but it seems no blame is imputed to them. Meer Allum has consented to increase the number of 18-pounder shot to be carried by his people to 2,000; and Captain Malcolm has prevailed upon the Brinjaries to promise to carry 1,000. A great quantity of superfluous stores, which should have been left at Vellore, were burnt last night. Major Dallas gives every possible assistance to the Park and Colonel Close is indefatigable in his personal exertions. Notwithstanding all our regulations, so well framed, and with a knowledge of the abuses of last war, we are still at the mercy of the bullock owners. I have had conversations with Close and Macaulay on the subject, and have said everything to induce Vanketrangum Dallas's Dabesh (*a*) to use his influence with all descriptions of natives in the Bullock Department and to promote the public service, which he promises faithfully to do. The very movement of our equipment depends upon this branch of the Service, and it may be wise to deviate in some measure from the prescribed regulations, in order to prevent a total failure; and even to wink at abuses, for it is not in our power to prevent them at this period.

15th March.

N. B.—Roebuck's carts for the transportation of guns.

The army marched by the left. Crossed the rugged high grounds which run from Bangalore to the Cavery and encamped at Cagliporam. Four regiments of cavalry were added to the usual Rear Guard, the whole under General Floyd; the enemy, although in great bodies, did not attempt anything. The contingent encamped on the heights, on the right of the army. The Brinjaries, who had promised to carry 1,000 shot, disappointed us and they did not move them from the ground; but owing to the exertions of Captain Malcolm, they were brought forward. We were very uneasy about Colonel Close, and apprehensive that he might have been taken, as there were straggling Horse, in the intervals between the Line and the Park; he did not reach Head-Quarters till late in the evening.

16th March.

The army marched by the left in two Divisions: the Cavalry, left Wing, 5th Brigade and Park, forming the first; and the 1st and 3rd Brigades, the second Division. They marched at different hours, an interval was kept, which was attended with considerable inconvenience, because small parties of Horse interrupted the communication. The getting on the Ordnance Department

17th March.

(*a*) Interpreter.

is our principal embarrassment. The cattle are in low condition; the Brinjaries have not given the assistance they promised; Colonel Carlisle (*a*) although a most respectable officer, appears to want energy, and the subordinate officers under him are not much to exert themselves. The General has called upon the army to afford their assistance in the carriage of stores. There never was a more zealous army, but there are certain characters who should be inspired with a spirit of exertion; but, alas, that depends solely upon the mover of the machine, and then I fear, we are defective.

18th March.

Some sorties were taken by the Nizam's Horse, they say that Poorneah (*b*) with all Tippoo's Cavalry, few guns and Rocketboys, are in the neighbourhood of Bangalore, with orders to watch the motion of our army; and that the Sultan is in great force near the Muddoor river, determined to give us battle.

19th March.

The First Division marched by the left and encamped at Arravelly: The Second Division remained on its ground to protect such of the stores, as could not be moved. The contingent also halted. The failure in the Bullock and Store Department is really serious. On this very ground last war we experienced a similar and much greater distress; but there was a different feeling in the army arising from that confidence, which every man had in the noble Lord at our head. It is not in my nature to despond, and I never listen with patience or temper to those who look only on the gloomy side of the picture; but this is a period which calls for the utmost exertions of everyone who is interested in the public welfare. Independent of all our embarrassments, we have to contend with time which may prove our most serious enemy. Close and Macaulay have a just sense of our situation and of our resources and are indefatigable. Wellesley is all zeal and so indeed is every man on whom anything depends, but that zeal should be properly directed.

20th March.

The army marched; the First Division encamped at Tagganelly; the second with the Park, about 2 miles S. W. of Arrapilly and the contingent close to the

(*a*) Commissary of Stores.

(*b*) The famous Minister under successive Mysorean rulers. He was a Brahmin of uncommon talent, and was the Minister of finance under Hyder Ali and his son Tippoo Sultan. Hyder owed not a little of his success to the admirable arrangement of the commissariat during his wars, and to the able administration of the revenues during peace, by Poorneah. In Tippoo's reign, he was the only Hindu holding high office under his Government. On the restoration of the old Hindu dynasty, the British appointed him Dewan of the new Raja, and his administration of Mysore till his retirement in 1811 was marked by extraordinary prosperity. General Wellesley (afterwards Duke of Wellington) wrote year and a half after the fall of Seringapatam. The "Dewan......seems to pursue the wisest and most benevolent course for the promotion of industry and opulence, the protection of property, and the maintenance of internal tranquillity and order in Mysore." He died in 1812.

Mud Fort. This was a very tiresome march, but owing to the exertions of individuals, few or no stores were left behind.

The movement of the army from the neighbourhood of Bangalore, by this route, seems to have been unexpected by the enemy, for we have seen but very few of their horse and have found a great deal of dry forage.

The army marched and encamped at Kankanhelly; the Park remained on the north side of the Arkawatly river, and the contingent took up its ground, near that which was occupied yesterday, by the First Division. There was a great scarcity of forage immediately in the neighbourhood of our camp; but a great quantity was brought in from the S. E. of the Fort. This place is in the same ruinous state, in which it was left last war and appears to have been quite neglected.

21st March.

The distance from the river at Kankanhelly to that at Sutlanpetta, being 17 miles, and the enemy having it in their person to destroy the tanks in the intermediate space, as they did last war, has made us look forward to the march from hence, with no small degree of anxiety. The ill effects of this very march were not recovered by Lord Cornwallis's army during the campaign; and has frequently been the subject of conversation at head-quarters; whichever route we had taken, we were liable to a similar inconvenience. It being of the utmost importance, in the reduced state of our cattle to shorten the march, I proposed to the General to reconnoitre and he gave me a regiment of cavalry for that purpose. I took a few Pioneers with me but was disappointed in not finding water in a sandy bed a few miles from Kankanhelly, where I hoped it might have been had by digging. I proceeded to the Pass near Achell and with a few dismounted troopers ascended a high hill, from which I discovered two or three tanks with water, a little off the road. There were some hundreds of the enemy's horse posted at them, probably to watch the motions of our army. Captain Orr *(a)* was with me; we were particularly careful to prevent our being observed by the enemy, and having made a sketch on the spot, we returned to camp and reached head-quarters about 8 in the evening. I suggested to the General the absolute necessity of securing the tanks without delay. A long and warm discussion took place; for there were various opinions; some thinking it too hazardous to detach any part of the army so far in advance, while Tippoo was reported to be in the neighbourhood of Sultanpetta. Luckily my field books of the

(a) Captain of the Guides.

Marches of the army last war showed the nature of the ground beyond the tanks to be so strong, that a few corps properly disposed, could oppose Tippoo's army were he so imprudent as to cross the Maddoor and Sultanpetta rivers and quit a very strong position, which was not likely. The General ordered the 5th Brigade and a Regiment of Native Cavalry, under Colonel Roberts, to accompany me and Orr, and we set off at 10 at night to secure the tanks, to surprize the enemy, being but a secondary consideration. The enemy's videttes, posted on the road just beyond the Pass, apprized the party of our approach. They had scarce time to escape for we pushed them with the cavalry, wounded a few and took two prisoners. I immediately examined the banks of the tanks, which had been cut through, in the course of the evening and the water was running fast out. A great quantity of milkhedge had been thrown into them to poison the water, which the Sepoys removed and we repaired the banks. The detachment took up a favourable position, and at daybreak we were obliged to open guns upon the enemy's horse, who were very troublesome.

22nd March.

The army was formed into two divisions: The first, consisting of the cavalry with the exception of one regiment and the right wing; the second, of one regiment of cavalry, the left wing, park and stores. The first division marched at daybreak from Kankanhelly and encamped on the west side of the tanks at Achell. The park crossed the Arkawatty river and encamped at Kankanhelly, protected by the 2nd division, which moved ground. The contingent marched from near Taganelly and encamped about a mile north of the fort.

Two prisoners taken by Captain Walker (who commands Malcolm's Troop) say, that Tippoo is with his army between Sultanpetta and Mallavelly; that Poorneah had marched with the Regular Horse from Bangalore, by the way of Chenapatam, to join the Sultan; that there has been an action between General Stuart and Tippoo, in which a great many were killed and wounded; among the killed was the Binkey Nabab, and Syed Ghaffar (*a*) was wounded, two of their best Officers. These men belong to a party of about 60 Horse, who have watched the motions of the army, since we have crossed the frontier, and have daily sent intelligence to Tippoo.

(*a*) Syed Ghaffar was formerly a Subedar in the Native Cavalry of the Nabab of Arcot; and afterwards commandant of a Revenue Corps in the Company's service; in which station, he was taken prisoner by Tippoo Sultan in 1782. Sometime afterwards, he was prevailed upon to enter into the service of the Sultan, to whom he was much attached and always proved himself a brave and faithful adherent——BEATSON'S WAR WITH TIPPOO SULTAN.

The first division marched by the left and encamped at Sultanpetta.

23rd March.

On the Advanced Guard approaching the ground of encampment a great cloud of dust to the westward, indicated that the enemy in force was in motion. The contingent marched at two in the morning. The General intended that it should have halted at Achell; but as Colonel Wellesley had advanced close to the army, he was obliged to cross the small river on account of water and encamp in our front. The second division encamped at Achell. Having taken the precaution to place guards over the tanks, to prevent the cattle going into them, there was a sufficiency of water for the several divisions of the army.

The first division which is considered the fighting part of the army

24th March.

marched at 6 in the morning, and took up a very strong position, on the west bank of the Madoor river; the cavalry encamped on the east bank, in the rear. This movement became necessary, because Tippoo's army is at no great distance, and because the contingent had taken up its ground in our front. The second division, with the park, encamped at Sultanpetta. The whole army is again nearly connected.

As the army crossed the Madoor river, a letter was received from General Stuart, confirming the accounts of the action with Tippoo. The letter states, that on the 6th instant, Tippoo attacked the advanced posts of the Bombay Army, with the best part of his force, that in the attempt he was repulsed, with considerable slaughter and the loss of some principal Officers, and that on the 11th the enemy had moved back towards Seringapatam.

Abundance of forage was found on the right of the camp, and by the exertions of Colonel Wellesley, some thousand bundles of straw were brought in, which were given to the cattle of the Ordnance Department. Tippoo's army had been encamped on this ground extending along the west bank of the river; and last night, from a hill near Sultanpetta, the enemy were seen striking their tents. Syed Ghaffar, who was encamped within two miles of Sultanpetta, moved only yesterday morning, upon the approach of the army. Tippoo had lately opened the road from this to Kankanhelly and Arravelly. It is natural to suppose that it was his intention to have opposed us, before we advanced so far. That he did not at the Madoor river is unaccountable. The ground was particularly favourable for him and had he sacrificed a few guns, which he might have placed to great advantage on the heights in our front, which command the passage of the river, he might have given us a great deal of annoyance, killed and wounded a

number of men and when pressed by our troops, as the country was quite open in his rear, he might have drawn off, in perfect security. He must have been aware of these advantages, and from all our information, it was supposed, he would have availed himself of them. Tippoo was advised by Mons. Chapny to oppose our army at this place, and at one time had resolved to do so! but on the approach of our army he retired towards Mallavelly. That he did not, can only be attributed to a want of confidence in his troops; occasioned probably by the repulse he met with at Sedaseer. Hitherto we have met with scaree any opposition from the enemy, when he ought to have harassed us every day on the march, and by retarding us, have gained time, which should be his principal object.

25th March.

Orders of march had been issued yesterday, but were this morning countermanded after the General had beat. We are too near Tippoo, to be moving in separate divisions; and it would be the height of imprudence to leave the park, stores or provisions in the rear. Our object is to protect our equipment and to take up a position before Seringapatam as expeditiously as possible; not to seek an action. In our present almost crippled state for want of carriage, it would but add to our embarrassments, to have to carry perhaps two or three hundred wounded men. It seems necessary to give this impression to the General; at the same time, an action should not be avoided. I have more than once mentioned the conduct of Marquis Cornwallis, on the day we took up our ground before Bangalore in the face of the whole of Tippoo's army. Although we did not return one shot, it was one of the most brilliant days during the war.

The cavalry crossed the Madoor river and encamped on the left of the Line; the second division marched from Sultanpetta and took up the ground, which had been occupied by the cavalry.

Another letter was received from General Stuart stating, that Tippoo arrived in force at Periapatam on the 5th instant; the next morning his troops in two columns attacked the advanced post at Sedasser, consisting of Colonel Montresor's Brigade, which maintained its ground, until General Stuart brought up a reinforcement of Europeans, about 2 in the afternoon and repulsed the enemy. Tippoo's loss was considerable and some of his best officers were killed and taken prisoners.

Yesterday, I received an official letter from the General, stating the very great satisfaction he feels in offering me his thanks for the important public service rendered by me on the evening and night of the 22nd, that although, fully sensible of the able and useful assistance he uniformly receives from my zeal and experience, the judicious reconnoitre which I

conducted that day, more particularly demands his acknowledgments; as it enabled him, by adopting my suggestions to secure water for the army in tanks cut by the enemy, halfway between Kankanhelly and Sultanpetta; and thus defeat the view of distressing us, which must have been the case, had the water escaped. He adds that he shall take an early opportunity of conveying these, his sentiments, to the Governor General in Council.

From conversations I have had with Colonel Gent (a), it is very evident, that he is rather disgusted and I think with great reason. As yet no question has been asked him, respecting the plan of attack of Seringapatam. Whatever may have been determined upon, such conduct is scandalous and cannot fail to damp the ardour and repress the zeal of the whole Corps of Engineers. I have mentioned this to Macaulay and have pointed out the propriety of General Harris communicating with Colonel Gent. I know it is believed by Gent, that whatever is proposed by Beatson, will be adopted; and that *he* will have merely the executive part. But no plan can be determined upon until the Fort is reconnoitred, and Beatson's favourite idea of attacking the N. E. angle cannot be adopted. It is decidedly the strongest fort, in point of defence; and a very large train of artillery would be requisite to silence the fire of the enemy; which might be from 60 or 70 pieces of cannon. Besides, the attack of the Island would be a serious undertaking. Close and Macaulay (b), who are in favour of an attack on the S. W. face, have requested Beatson to turn his thoughts to it. Macaulay will speak to the General about Gent, and remove any discontent or cause of jealousy, and Beatson to whom I have spoken, will communicate with the Engineers. The General has little more to do than to secure the cordial services of the army, to ensure success.

Extract of General Letter.
"The Commander-in-Chief has reported to us that Major Allan had rendered important service to the Army at an early period of the Campaign, by enabling His Excellency to make a judicious movement for securing supplies of water, which had been endangered by the operations of the Enemy."

26th March.

The army marched by the left, the contingent flanking the baggage to the left, and encamped at Basuwanaporam. Large bodies of the enemy's horse were in front, during the march and our cavalry, which led the Column, was rocketted on approaching the ground of encampment. A very large body of the enemy's horse, with elephants, &c., drew up on the road to Mallavelly, at the distance of four or five miles; the line therefore remained under arms, for sometime after it had taken up its grouud and until the enemy drew off. Reports from Hircarrahs and followers say, that the Sultan is determined to give us battle at Mallavelly.

(a) Chief Engineer.
(b) Military Secretary to the Commander-in-Chief.

In the afternoon I reconnoitred, as far as I could with safety, to ascertain the course of a deep nulla, in which there is a great deal of water and which passes close by Wellesley's Camp. It probably comes from the large tanks at Mallavelly, the banks of which may have been cut by the enemy; not only with a view of distressing us for water, but also to overflow the low ground, where Tippoo may oppose us, with some advantage. They cut the bank of the tank, which waters the army on *this* ground; but a party was sent the preceding evening to repair it. Those at Mallavelly are too large to admit of the whole of the water being drained off.

27th March.

Captain Macaulay yesterday afternoon, from a rock near the cavalry lines, observed a large body of the enemy with guns 14 or 15 to the westward of Mallavelly, moving in S. W. direction, across the road leading to Seringapatam. The proposed disposition of the army for the ensuing march was discussed last night at General Harris's tent, with some warmth. Every one thought it probable, we should have an action; and it was determined that the army should move on the high road, the right wing leading and the park in the rear, protected by the left wing; and, if practicable, that the contingent should turn the right flank of the enemy. The usual order of march of our line, being by the left, and that of the contingent by the right, flanking the baggage on our left; I suggested, pointed out in a sketch I had prepared for the General, and urged the propriety of Colonel Wellesley marching by his *left*; in order to gain time and prevent his being obliged to countermarch to the right, in face of the enemy. It was, however, determined that we should march in the usual order; but no plan was formed, which from our knowledge of the position of the enemy and of the ground, ought not to have been neglected.

The army moved at daybreak. On approaching Mallavelly, the enemy was at no great distance, and our cavalry was ordered to form on the left of the road, between the rightwing and contingent. The enemy did not attempt to oppose the army crossing the low swampy ground to the eastward of the village, which they might have done with considerable advantage. Some Rocket boys were scattered in a large garden close on the left of the road and under cover of the bank of a large tank on the right; but were driven off by a few shots from the advanced piquets, which were at the head of the Line. On reaching the fort of Mallavelly, the enemy's First Line was distinctly seen, drawn up on high ground to the westward, at the distance of about 2 miles. General Harris and his suite came up, when Colonel Richardson suggested the necessity of obliging the enemy to retire, before the army encamped; but after some conversation, he was desired to mark out the ground as usual. He

moved on for that purpose, with the advance piquets which had been augmented, supported by the 25th Light Dragoons and 2nd Regiment Native Cavalry; and I was ordered to mark out ground for the left Wing on the N. E. side of the village. The piquets were posted in front, with their right to a village, and drove off by a fire of musketry, a party of Horse and Rocketboys, which had advanced towards them; while the two Regiments of cavalry covered the Line of Encampment, which was marking out. About half past ten, the enemy opened several guns; the cavalry being within range of their shot, some of which had taken effect were ordered to fall back; but as the piquets were considerably advanced and threatened by the enemy, the cavalry were again ordered to advance and support them, which brought on the action.

The right Wing, which led, had reached its ground of encampment, immediately on the west side of the fort; three regiments of cavalry, with the contingent, on their left, had crossed the low ground; the heavy guns, stores and baggage even in the village of Mallavelly; and the left Wing had taken up its ground in the rear of the whole; few situations could have afforded better cover for so large an equipment. As the enemy continued the cannonade, the 5th which was the leading brigade, under Colonel Roberts, was ordered to form on the left of the advanced piquets; the 25th Dragoon being on their right and the 2nd Regiment Native Cavalry in the rear of their left. The first Brigade under Major-General Baird, moved on in column and formed on the left of the 5th and the 3rd Brigade, under Colonel Gowdie, on the left of the 1st; thus having reversed the order of battle of the right Wing. It was while these movements were making that I returned, after having marked out the ground for the left Wing. The several brigades, even single corps were advancing towards the enemy unconnected and so rapidly, as to have left their guns behind. They were at so great a distance, that Captain Young and myself were almost at a loss to determine, which body of troops we were most likely to be able to reach. We joined the European Brigade, and at this period, Tippoo's Horse, if they had done their duty, would have prevented our gaining any advantage during the day. The enemy retired to the next rising ground, keeping up the cannonade, and we opened some field-pieces and two brass 18-pounders, which were brought to a commanding spot, and fired with effect over the right Wing as it advanced, which by this time was nearly formed in Line, although not quite connected, there being intervals between the brigades. It was necessary to send Companies to the rear, to cover the field-pieces, which had been left behind; the bullocks, not being able to keep pace with the troops. Neither the three regiments of cavalry, nor the contingent on

the left, were in sight; although the services of the cavalry were particularly required. On reaching a hollow, which separated the two ridges of high ground, the enemy's infantry as well as cavalry kept up a smart fire on the 74th Regiment; which was rather advanced and on the left of the 1st Brigade. I had before brought up the 2nd Regiment of Native Cavalry, to the rear of the interval between the 1st and 5th Brigades; and at this period, I prevailed upon the General to allow me to take forward the Regiment, to charge a body of the enemy with a howdaed elephant; we have since learned that this elephant carried the Royal Standard and that Tippoo was there in person; only a few hundred yards in our front. We had got beyond the right flank of the 1st Brigade, at a smart pace, when the regiment was suddenly ordered back; because the body of the enemy was too formidable. At the very moment, a small, but select party of Horse, advanced and charged the two righthand Corps of the 1st Brigade; which were the 12th Regiment and Scotch Brigade; they came on rather slow, and undaunted, but were repulsed with considerable loss; many of them were shot close to the ranks, and two or three who penetrated the line, were killed in the rear. I think it was unfortunate, that the 2nd Regiment of Cavalry was ordered to halt; for the men were going on with the greatest spirit. And it is to be lamented that it did not occur to any person about the General who knew where the 25th Dragoons were posted, to send for that Corps; for there can be no doubt, but the *two* regiments would have charged with considerable success. The main body of the enemy, seeing the fate of their advanced party, drew off; as did their infantry, from the front of the 74th Regiment. The contingent was at this time at some distance on the left, advancing towards the right of Tippoo's line, in èchellon of Corps; supported on its right by three regiments of cavalry, one of which was the 19th Dragoons. A large body of the enemy's infantry quitted their guns and advanced towards the 33rd Regiment, which was the leading Corps of Colonel Wellesley's Division. They shewed great bravery, giving their fire and receiving a discharge of grape and musketry from the 33rd, within 60 yards; when they gave way. General Floyd, at the head of the cavalry, did not let this critical moment escape him; he wheeled round the right flank of the 33rd, cut down some hundreds of the enemy and took six stand of colors. The enemy now retired from height to height with precipitation. The cannonade lasted exactly three hours; their fire had almost ceased; and the country was so open that it was impracticable to overtake them. Thus circumstanced, and being obliged to encamp at Mallavelly, on account of water, the pursuit was stopped. After a short halt, the troops returned; and in the afternoon took up the ground, which had been marked out in the morning. Our loss

was trifling, 2 Officers wounded, 6 Europeans killed and 33 wounded; 1 Native killed, 12 wounded and 6 missing. The enemy's loss must have been considerable, 1,000 were killed and wounded, 6 Officers of rank.

Abdul Azeez, who commanded one of the three Cooshoons which composed the butchery that attacked Colonel Wellesley's Division, was taken prisoner. He says, butchery was entirely destroyed;—that there were only two others and the regular Horse actually engaged under the command of Purneah; who ordered them to advance upon our army; that Tippoo with three of his sons and Curumadeen Cawn, were in a second line, at some distance in the rear. It is confidently reported that Tippoo had given orders to his troops, to direct their attack, particularly against the Europeans: That they did so, is certain. The firmness of his infantry, when opposed to the 33rd and 74th Regiments and the bravery of the small party of Horse, which charged the right of the European Brigade, have seldom been equalled by Tippoo's troops in any former action: and could only be surpassed, by the determined coolness and steadiness of the 12th Regiment when the enemy were repulsed. And here, my dear Aston, a tribute is due to *your* memory for it is acknowledged by all, that it is to *you* the 12th Regiment is indebted, for that high state of discipline, which on all occasions will reflect the greatest credit on them.

There were 6,500 Infantry in the First Line; 10,000 in the second, 2,000 Regular Horse, 9,000 Selladar Horse, 42 Field pieces, 8 Heavy guns.

The heavy guns were served by Said Ghaffar. Commoradeen had no command and took no part in the action. Tippoo was in the rear of the small party of Horse that charged the European Brigade and drew off his cavalry after the repulse.

The Left Wing remained on its ground of encampment, and the park and baggage in the village, during the action, unmolested by the enemy. A party of the Nizam's Horse, led on by Captain Malcolm, charged in the rear of our cavalry and behaved tolerably well. Our advanced piquets were particularly well conducted by Colonel Sherbrooke, and Colonel Cotton with the 25th Dragoons kept in check a large body of the enemy, and threatened the left of their Line.

It will scarce be credited that no disposition was made for the attack, neither when the advanced piquets quitted Mallavelly, nor when the enemy commenced the cannonade; nor even when the brigades advanced; although the position of the enemy was distinctly seen from the walls of the fort. Wellesley regretted that he had not been ordered to march by his *left* as I had proposed the night before; which would have saved much time and probably have put it in his power to have turned the right flank of the enemy.

This action, although it cannot be attended by any particularly good consequences, may be of service to those Corps which have not been much employed in the field.

It had been long determined, but kept secret, that the army from this neighbourhood should turn off to the southward and cross the Cavery near Bannoor where the river has a sandy bottom, and where the ford at this season of the year, is supposed not to be difficult. In consequence of which, I reconnoitred to the left, and having determined upon the next ground of encampment, returned in the evening to head-quarters. Straggling horse were about, but as they were not burning the forage in that direction and only towards Seringapatam, the enemy can have no idea that we mean to alter the direction of our march.

28th March.

The army marched by the left, the right wing leading, followed by four regiments of cavalry and the left wing; the whole flanking the heavy park, which formed a column on the left. The army encamped in three lines, at Congaraparam, 4 miles and a half from Mallavelly. The contingent did not move, being but a short distance in the rear of our right.

The general having expressed a wish to ascertain the distance of the Cavery, as soon as the army came to the ground, I pushed on with two troops of cavalry a few miles to the southward, and having picked up some country people and placed guards over a great quantity of forage, returned to head-quarters. The distance to the Cavery being considerable, Colonel Wellesley proposed to go the next day with the contingent and that I should accompany him in order to send or bring back the necessary information for the march of the army. This was highly approved by the General and some others; while there were those, who thought it better to reconnoitre with a small party, Wellesley's proposal proceeded from excess of zeal and a desire to remove the General's anxiety. I had a good deal of conversation with Macaulay on the subjects, and begged the General to countermand the order for the march of the contingent and to allow me to take the cavalry piquets and that I would go to the Cavery. It was four in the afternoon before we were out of camp, but by galloping the last three or four miles, we reached Sosilly with a small party, just as it was dark, the distance being more than 12 miles. After having ascertained the nature of the ford, we returned to camp and reached head-quarters about midnight. The General was highly pleased with the success of this reconnoitre, in which Macaulay accompanied me. There were a great many inhabitants at Sosilly and all the cattle of the adjacent country near the fort; which promised a large supply for the army.

29th March.

The army marched by the left and encamped at Sosilly. It was of such importance, to secure the passage of the river, that the left wing crossed immediately and encamped on the south side; the right wing encamped

on the north bank and the contingent in its rear. Notwithstanding we know there were so many cattle near the fort; not one-tenth of the number were secured for the public service; indeed, with such innumerable followers as are with our army and with the whole of the Nizam's people, who are plunderers, it is very difficult to protect any cattle we meet with. It was however a seasonable supply; and a great quantity of grain and bazar articles were found in the fort, for which the inhabitants were paid.

The Cavery is about 300 yards broad, with three feet water in the deepest part, a fine sandy bottom, and the banks, which are of soft earth, are not steep. The Capani river, about 200 yards broad, with a sandy bottom, joins the Cavery at Narsingaporam, about a mile below Sosilly. There was little or no water on the road from the last ground, but the country abounded in dry forage and is extremely well-cultivated, the soil being richer than any we have seen. This has proved a no less fortunate than judicious movement of the army; and was made, without the enemy having the slightest intimation of it; for we did not see a horseman on the march. No doubt Tippoo expected us by the direct road to Arrakerry, where it is said, he is with his army. Yesterday evening, I desired Cheenavassyah, who accompanied me on horseback, to recommend to the inhabitants, to remain at Sosilly; they hardly knew who we were. And it seems during the night, a rumour reached those within the fort, that Tippoo had sent a party of horse in the evening, with orders to the inhabitants to remain where they were; in consequence of which, not a soul stirred, and to their astonishment this morning, they found out the mistake.

The Fort of Sosilly is about 560 yards square, built of stone and mud, and is close on the north bank of the Cavery. There are neither guns nor troops in it, but it would make a good post of communication.

The Battering train and stores began to cross the river at daybreak; and with the assistance of a strong working party, who exerted themselves extremely, the whole was got over by one o'clock. In the afternoon the right wing and cavalry crossed, and took up a position in front of the left wing, a battalion of Sepoys having been left in the fort to cover the rear. The contingent also crossed in the course of the day and encamped in the rear of the left wing between the two rivers.

30th March.

The dam at Arrakerry diverts great part of the water into two nullas on either side of the Cavery. That to the southward, winds through our camp and falls into the Capany and has three or four feet of fine running water. As it is of consequence to retain the water for the convenience

of our next encampment, I have recommended that the Pioneers should throw a dam across the Nulla, which has been ordered.

The Nizam's troops have made a sweep of the country to the eastward, but returned without having collected any cattle. A few of their horsemen behaved scandalously ill on the march to Sosilly, having plundered the baggage of the army. Two of them detected in the fact were seized, and Meer Allum afterwards sent them to Captain Malcolm, that they might be punished by the General.

31st March

The army halted to allow everything to be brought across the Cavery and to refresh the cattle. A great deal of grain has been found in the neighbourhood of the encampment and many bullocks and sheep have been brought in by the followers. The General paid Meer Allum a visit, which was well received.

1st April.

The army marched and encamped at Rangasamvodram, the right being about a mile from the Cavery. The Nulla affords an abundant supply of water for the army. A considerable body of the enemy's horse shewed themselves on the left, on high commanding ground, apparently reconnoitring our army. It is reported that Tippoo means to give us battle.

The Nizam's Horse, instead of taking up their ground in the rear of the right of the army, encamped immediately in front. It is not always that the ground pointed out is occupied. So near as we are to the enemy, it is highly improper to permit the Nizam's Troops to be in front; for if they should be attacked, they would fall back upon our line and create the greatest confusion; nor should they ever be allowed to pass through our line of encampment.

2nd April

The army was detained several hours this morning, to allow to Nizam's Horse and their baggage to cross the head of the line, in order to gain their station on the left flank. From the position they had taken up yesterday, this was foreseen. The General sometimes gives his assent to what is proposed, without thinking of the inconvenience it may create, and although a different plan may have been previously determined upon. The army after a very short, but extremely tedious march, encamped at Hooravanelly the right being near the dam at Arrakerry. The heavy park did not get into camp till 8 in the evening; partly owing to the reduced state of the cattle and partly to the badness of the road; having to cross a dry Nulla, with high banks, several times on the march, and which could not be avoided, but by making a considerable detour to the southward. There

was a great deal of confusion, as the Nizam's Horse were getting to their ground of encampment.

On coming to the ground, a large body of the enemy's regular horse drew up about four miles in our front; where they remained, until late in the evening. It was supposed, from crimson umbrellas being seen, that Tippoo was many hours on a high hill, reconnoitring the position of our army. A Hircarrah, who arrived in camp to-day, with a letter from General Stuart, positively asserts that the Sultan set fire to his palace with his own hand and ordered the town to be burnt. A great smoke had been observed in the direction of Seringapatam, but it had more the appearance of smoke occasioned by the burning of stacks of dry forage than of an extensive town. It is also reported that Tippoo has removed his family and treasure to Chittledroog.

3rd April.

The army made but a short march and encamped at Ankanelly. It was intended to have gone farther; but finding sufficient water in the low grounds, it was judged advisable to halt. With so enormous an equipment and Tippoo's Army close to us, with the island to retire to, it is necessary to be cautious in our movements. The army is encamped fronting the the island; the contingent on the right, extending towards the Cavery, which is about a mile distant. The hill from which Tippoo reconnoitred yesterday is immediately in front of the contingent and occupied by the advanced piquet; our position is extremely strong.

On the advanced guard coming to the ground of encampment, a very large body of Tippoo's regular cavalry shewed themselves in front, on the south side of the Cavery, near the Chendagallford, but made no attempt whatever to annoy us. In the afternoon, I had a fine view of Seringapatam from the advanced piquet. A great many troops are encamped on the east face of the fort within the new lines and people were moving about in all directions on the island. It is now ascertained that neither the palace nor town are destroyed; but there is not a house in Shar Ganjam that is not unroofed; Loll-baug is quite bare of trees, and wears a very different face to what it did when first seen last war.

4th April.

The army and contingent marched by the left, in one column, the cavalry leading; the park formed a column on the left, flanked by a strong corps and the whole encamped at Nova-shahar, about 5 miles south of Seringapatam. Every man and every gun in the army must have been distinctly seen by the enemy, from the walls of the fort, as we passed; for we were in one connected line, extending almost from the last, to the present ground of

encampment. A few rockets were thrown by the enemy, which came within our flanking parties, but nothing was attempted by their cavalry. On the march, General Floyd sent Captain Price with a troop of cavalry, to reconnoitre new Mysore about 3 miles on the left or to the southward. The Killedar with about 100 peons came out of the fort, but did not molest our party. It is not finished and is apparently without guns.

In the afternoon, I went to our advanced piquet, which was considerably too distant from the army, not seen from the line, there being high grounds between, and might have been cut off, without our being able to support it. The Officer informed me that large bodies of the enemy, seemingly rocket-boys, had been coming into the large Topemen Sultanpetta, all the afternoon. So the tope is not a mile from the piquet, and the ground between is quite open; on my return, I pointed out to the General the exposed situation of the piquet, and recommended that it should be withdrawn after dark, to the bank of a dry Nulla, which forms a good post and is at a proper distance from camp. The General approved of this; and determined to scour the tope; for which purpose he ordered out General Baird with the 74th Regiment. Having entered the Tope, and not finding the enemy there, the regiment returned, but it being extremely dark, missed the road and came unexpectedly on a small party of the enemy, most of whom were either killed or wounded. After marching about all night, the regiment reached its line; just before the General had beat.

5th April.

The army marched and took up its ground before Seringapatam about 2 miles and a half from the S. W. face of the fort.* The right Wing and Regiment de Meuron, fronted the north, with the left near the south bank of the Cavery; Colonel Wellesley's Division on the right, fronted the N. E; and the Nizam's troops and two Regiments of cavalry were in the rear.

*4000 yards.

It having been determined to detach a force to meet the Bombay Army, the left wing (with the exception of the Meuron Regiment) and four regiments of cavalry, the whole under General Floyd, encamped about 2 miles in the rear, on the high road to Periapatam; for the convenience of moving off the next morning.

After having marked out the ground for this division, General Floyd asked me if I had any objection to his requesting of the General that I might accompany him to Periapatam. He said so many handsome things, it was impossible to shew any reluctance and he called upon me soon after to tell me that the General had consented. Colonel Wellesley

disapproved of my quitting head-quarters, and went to General Harris to prevent it, but the General said it was unavoidable, as General Floyd had made a point that I should accompany him. Although this was flattering, it was far from what I wished. In the afternoon, accompanied General Harris to the advanced piquets, to look at the ground in front; it having been determined to dislodge the enemy from the aqueduct and the Sultanpetta Tope; from which they threw rockets into the lines and occasioned some anxiety for the safety of the park. At sunset, went to General Floyd's Camp.

6th April.

The division under General Floyd marched at daybreak and encamped at Suckuapooram. Small parties of the enemy's horse between us and the Cavery were employed burning the forage; but before we reached our ground, they left us. On the march, we came unexpectedly upon a number of poor inhabitants, who had taken shelter with their cattle, near some low rugged hills. We collected a few bullocks and sheep. A party of the enemy endeavoured to drive them off, but were prevented by our cavalry.

Before the division moved in the morning, we learned that Colonel Shawe with the 12th Regiment and two battalions of Sepoys, had driven the enemy from a ruined village near the aqueduct and had established a post there; but that we had failed in the attempt to dislodge the enemy from the Sultanpetta Tope. A heavy fire of musketry was kept up all the night; and during the day, we have had an incessant fire of cannon from the fort. This state of anxiety and ignorance of what is doing, is quite distressing.

7th April.

The division marched to Cutlimalawady; no appearance of an enemy Abundance of fine forage and water; it is much to be regretted that the cattle of the army were not sent with us. Indeed it was expected that all the pure carriage of every description would have been sent.

8th April.

The division marched to Periapatam and took up a strong position on the east side of the fort, which we occupied with a party of Sepoys. On coming to the ground, the preconcerted signal of minute guns was made, but not returned. On the march, some white objects were observed on a hill towards Sedasur, which were supposed to be rocks; but which from the information we had of the position of the outposts of the Bombay Army, when attacked by Tippoo, we hoped might prove to be tents; and I proposed to General Floyd to go to the Bombay Army which could not be more than 14 miles from us and to acquaint General Stuart of the arrival

of the reinforcement of Periapatam. I set off in the afternoon, with a squadron of the 19th Dragoons, and about 6 miles to the westward of Periapatam, met the Bombay Army. Having heard the signal guns, General Stuart immediately moved from his camp, beyond the Sedaseer Pass, and had just come to his ground. The Coorga Rajah (*a*) was with the General and was much struck with the appearance of the Dragoons; the first European Cavalry he had seen. General Stuart informed me that as his rice and stores were at some distance in the rear, he proposed to halt the next day; and I returned to Periapatam in the evening.

9th April.

Accompanied General Floyd to the Bombay Army and returned after breakfast. In the forenoon, very large bodies of the enemy's horse shewed themselves in front and attacked the piquet, which the Field Officer of the day had very injudiciously posted, It became necessary to reinforce it; but being much exposed, I recommended to General Floyd to move it to a very strong position more to the right, which he did immediately The horse were very numerous and bold, and it was necessary to keep the line under arms, until late in the afternoon; when the enemy drew off. The piquet was at one time very hard pressed and obliged to fire grape upon the enemy's horse as well as rocketboys, and we found it necessary to make a very rapid movement of a regiment of cavalry to the right, to drive off a party that had got within our camp, almost close to head quarters.

The Coorga Rajah (*a*) attended by General Hartley and a number of Officers, paid General Floyd a visit about two o'clock; and being apprehensive that he might have been intercepted by the enemy, a party of the 19th Dragoons was sent to meet him. As soon as the enemy retired he went along the line and was paid every compliment by he troops. He was particularly struck with the appearance of the European Cavalry, and having expressed a wish to have one of the Dragoon Swords, General Floyd, on the Raja taking leave, presented him with his own, in the handsomest manner.

(*a*) The Raja of Coorg, a gallant Chief, was of great help to the British in their wars with Tippoo Sultan. He had a romantic career and was of a chivalrous nature; when a boy, he was made a prisoner by Hyder Ali who compelled him to become a Mussalman. He was enrolled among the slave troops and continued so under Tippoo Sultan, till he escaped into his own dominions in 1785, since when he proved a most useful ally of the British. At the treaty of Seringapatam in 1792 Lord Cornwallis stipulated for the security of the gallant Raja. Tippoo was irritated at the demand and broke off negotiations with the British, who thereupon began to renew hostilities; Tippoo finding his troops reluctant to defend the Capital, was compelled to accept the dictated terms——PENNANT'S VIEW OF HINDUSTAN.

Early in the morning, I met the Bombay Army on the march, and having pointed out the ground it was to occupy, on the south side of the fort, I returned with General Stuart to General Floyd's and every thing was arranged for the whole to march to-morrow. General Stuart requested that I would mark out the ground for his army also, and desired the Quarter Master General to attend to my directions.

10th April.

Wrote to my friends at Madras, by the way of Tellicherry; that I expected to see them by the King's birthday—hoped to embark before my own (11th June) and, at all events, to dine in England on Christmas day.

Large bodies of Horse in front, during the day.

The whole marched at daybreak and encamped at Kumliporam. The enemy were very troublesome on the march; large bodies of regular horse were on our right and approached so near that it was necessary to keep the line quite connnected. They threw a great many rockets and their rocket-boys were particularly daring, as well as some irregular infantry, who came so near as to fire upon the line. The horse hanging upon the division are far more regular and numerous than any we have hitherto seen; and there can be no doubt, but the whole of Tippoo's Cavalry are near us; it is said, they are commanded by Cumeradeen. It was necessary to be particularly cautious in taking up our ground and posting our Piquets. A desperate attempt of the enemy, if successful, might defeat the object of the campaign.

11th April.

We marched to Cutli Marlawady. The horse were uncommonly bold, pressed upon our flanking parties, which had been augmented and obliged us to open guns from the line. Our galloper guns were of the greatest service and our cavalry were very judiciously disposed of. The enemy pressed the rear-guard very hard, although reinforced by a regiment of Europeans. They must have sustained considerable loss, for a great many were knocked down by one discharge of musketry from the rear company.

12th April.

N.B.—A Bengal Sepoy and another person found hanging on a tree by the road side with their hands cut off. It was said by an old man in the village, that this inhuman act was by orders of Cumeradeen Cawn I can scarce believe it.——

We marched to Sucknipooram; the horse were in the rear and on the flanks but not so troublesome as yesterday.

13th April.

We made a long march to Ballagollam and encamped about 2 miles in the rear of the army. The troops did not get to their ground till it was dark. This was very fatiguing march; extremely hot, with very little water on the road and obliged to move slow and cautiously,

14th April.

on account of the enemy. After having marked out the ground, I went to General Harris to inform him that we should encamp near him. I returned to General Floyd and having taken my leave of him, once more joined head-quarters, almost knocked up. This has been a most fatiguing march, and as I acted as Quartermaster-General to the Bombay Army as well as to our own Division. I was scarce from my horse during the day from the time we left Seringapatam. I am happy that I did not disappoint General Floyd, he expressed his satisfaction at my conduct which he said he should have great pleasure in mentioning to the General.

15th April.

Went with General Harris to the Bombay Army. In the forenoon visited all the advanced posts. They are strong and well connected, the aqueduct makes an admirable parallel, although at a considerable distance from the fort

16th April.

Visited the piquets and outposts and examined the encampment. The Bombay Army moved at different periods in the course of the morning. It marched through our camp and crossed the Cavery at Abercromby's ford, which had been previously examined and reported upon, by Lieutenant Sydenham of the Guides. The Pioneers of both armies had been employed to make it more practicable for the guns; but it still was so rugged and difficult that the bullocks were taken out of the yokes and the guns and tumbrels were drawn across by the troops. A few shots were fired from the fort, but without effect.

As I was acquainted with the ground on the opposite side of the river, General Harris requested me to attend General Stuart and point out the position it was desirable the Bombay Army should take up. I crossed with the leading Regiment the 77th and recommended to General Stuart to seize the low rugged hill which commands the high ground, on which the Edgah redoubt stood, last war. It was absolutely necessary to occupy this, not only to prevent the enemy from taking possession (and if they had, which was expected, it might have been difficult to have dislodged them;) but also to cover the left of the camp. General Stuart ordered General Hartley to move to the hill, with the 77th Regiment supported by the Bombay European and 75th Regiments. It is surprising that the enemy made no other attempt to prevent this movement than by opening guns from the ramparts. As soon as the Bombay Army had taken up its ground, I returned to head quarters. The Right is in a line with the Left of the Grand Army; and the Left extends towards the French rocks, having a strong outpost on

the low hill, which protects the left flank as well as the front of the army. I have recommended to General Stuart to throw up a redoubt on the hill; which, as loose stones are on the spot, can be done with very little labour. Two Companies with a brigade of gun would then be a sufficient force there.

General Floyd moved at daybreak, with five regiments of Cavalry and the left wing to Dalasay-yary, beyond Mysore; in order to cover a party of Brinjaries, sent out the preceding evening, under a very intelligent Native Officer to make a sweep of cattle. The Brinjaries returned in the evening, with a considerable number, sufficient to victual the Europeans for 25 days. This is a most seasonable supply; for there was but a very few days provision of cattle, in camp; which is the more surprising, because reports have been made every evening by Major Corner, of the stock remaining. The necessary precautions were not taken at Sosilly, to secure a larger supply; and since that period, no exertion seems to have been made, until yesterday, to collect any.

For the principal part of the following informations of the operations of the army during the period I was absent with General Floyd, I am indebted to Lieutenant Sydenham of the Engineers.

On the 5th April in the evening, the 12th Regiment and two Battalions of Sepoys with their guns, under the command of Colonel Shawe, took possession of the ruined village in front, near the aqueduct; from which, the enemy during the night, kept up a very heavy fire of musketry on our troops, but with little effect. Major Colin Campbell was killed on this attack. Colonel Oliver who commands one of the battalions, was sick; and just before the troops moved out, Major Campbell was requested to take charge of the Corps. It behaved very ill; and Major Campbell, when endeavouring to get the men into some kind of order again, was shot through the heart, and instantly expired. The Service has lost an experienced good officer and he is sincerely regretted by the whole army. Lieutenant Pixon of the 12th Regiment was also killed and his brother. wounded by the same rocket.

The 33rd Regiment and a Bengal Battalion, under the command of Colonel Wellesley advanced about the same time, to take possession of the Sultanpetta Tope, which was occupied by a large body of the enemy. The fire on our troops as they entered the tope, was so galling; the ground was so intersected by Nullas; and the night was so very dark; that it was judged advisable to retire. Colonel Wellesley was slightly wounded.

Just before daybreak on the 6th, the enemy commenced a very heavy fire of musketry and rockets, on Colonel Shawe's party, but with little effect. It being absolutely necessary to establish posts in the aqueduct, which winds in front of the army; it was determined to drive the enemy from the Sultanpetta Tope through which it runs, and at the same time to advance Colonel Shawe's party to the bank of the aqueduct. At 9 in the morning the Scotch Brigade and two Battalions of Sepoys with four guns, the whole under the command of Colonel Wellesley, advanced in the most regular manner to the tope. As they approached, the enemy opened a heavy fire of musketry, which was returned by a discharge of grape from the field pieces; and Colonel Wellesley detached a party to turn the left flank of the enemy which threw them into confusion and they retreated with the utmost precipitation. At the same moment, Colonel Shawe advanced and took possession of that part of the aqueduct immediately in his front; while the Grenadiers of the 74th Regiment; under Lieutenant-Colonel Wallace, detached from camp for the purpose, succeeded in turning the right flank of the enemy. Part of aqueduct was now abandoned and was immediately occupied by our troops. These several attacks were judiciously planned and ably executed, under cover of guns drawn up on commanding ground in front of the line; strong and connected posts were now established, from the south bank of the Cavery to the village, east of Sultanpetta Tope; completely covering the front of the army, and secured from the fire of the fort, by the bank of the aqueduct which is very high. Hossan Ally Cawn, son of Cutabuddin, former Nabab of Cuddapa, was killed in the defence of the tope. Followed by a few of his adherents, he charged a party of the 2nd Brigade 7th Regiment and was shot; but not until he had made his way through the troops. His relations came in search of the body and were permitted to take it away. Colonel Haliburton having placed it in a dooley, under charge of a Sepoy. The Sepoy and dooley bearers were rewarded and escorted back to their post.

On the 7th April the Engineer's park was established, on the south side of the Sultanpetta Tope. A working party was employed strengthening the posts in the aqueduct, and a battery for two 12-Pounders was begun, on the night. The fort kept up a heavy fire on the advanced posts, but with little effect; the troops being well covered by the bank. A considerable body of the enemy's cavalry, with camels loaded with rockets, were seen moving in the direction of Periapatam. The army moved ground and took up its final position for the siege, about 200 yards nearer the fort.

On the 8th the Pioneers and bamboo coolies were employed in the

Engineer's park. The fort kept up a heavy fire on the outposts. Large parties of workmen were observed strengthening the rampart and making an entrenchment along the south bank of the river, opposite the S. W. face of the fort.

On the 9th, the fire from the fort considerably abated. A letter was sent by Tippoo to General Harris, stating that "he had adhered to treaties, and asking what was meant by the approach of the English armies and the commencement of hostilities." The messengers were dismissed being told that an answer would be sent when the General was at leisure.

On the 10th, a letter was sent to Tippoo, refering him to the letter of the Governor General of the 8th of November, for the reasons of the allied armies and the commencement of hostilities. The Pioneers, a Battalion of Sepoys and half the bamboo coolies and lascars of the army were employed preparing materials for the siege, from the Sultanpetta Tope. That and the other topes within the encampment, will not only furnish sufficient materials for the siege, but likewise fire-wood for the army. The enemy were employed in different parts of the rampart and clearing the ground in front of Shawe's post. The village of Sultanpetta has been made a strong post for a party of Europeans; it covers the right flank of the advanced posts.

On the 11th, strong working parties making up materials. The enemy hard at work on the south face of the fort. The entrenchments upon the Island being finished, their infantry encamped within them. Their fire very slack.

On the 12th, the fort hardly fired a shot.

On the 13th, the fort fired several shot into Camp and one fell within the ropes of the General's tent (more than 4000 yards distant.)

On the 14th the General with two regiments of cavalry and 2000 of the Nizam's Horse, moved out on the Periapatam road, expecting to meet the Bombay Army; the signal guns to announce its approach, having been heard the preceding evening. After waiting sometime, the General returned to camp. The Engineer's park is well supplied with gabeons, fascines and every other material, to commence the siege. The Sultanpetta Tope is nearly cut down, but those in the rear will furnish an ample quantity, there are likewise several large topes in the neighbourhood of the army. In the evening, the Bombay Army and General Floyd's Division encamped about 2 miles in the rear.

17th April.

The fort has been carefully reconnoitred during the time the army has been encamped before it. Colonel Gent, the Chief Engineer, having been directed to lay before the Commander-in-Chief, his proposed plan of attack, begged to know, whether he was to proceed on a supposition, that the Island was to be taken possession of, or not. He was informed that it was the General's wish to judge of the particular advantages and disadvantages of every line of attack, before he determined upon that which was to be adopted; and he was desired to propose one plan for an attack, connected with the possession of part of the Island, and another, in which that position might not be necessary. At the same time he was told that he might consider the army as occupying both sides of the river, if requisite. Colonel Gent submitted his two plans to the General; one, an attack on the west angle of the fort, considering the army as occupying both sides of the river; and the other, an attack on the S. W. angle, on a supposition that we were in possession of part of the Island; together with his opinion of the advantages and disadvantages of both; remarking that the attack on the S. W. angle could be carried on, although the Cavery should rise, which might not be the case, if the west angle of the fort should be attacked.

Colonel Gent stated, that the advantages of attacking the west angle of the fort were, 1st, avoiding the entrenchments thrown up by the enemy on the Island; 2ndly, being the weakest point in respect to flank, particularly the S. W. face; 3rdly, the advantage of facilitating the breaching, by opening batteries on both faces of the angle; and 4thly, that the new line of works, which the enemy were then throwing up, on the south bank of the river, would in a great measure be rendered of little or of no effect; because they might be taken in reverse, and that the disadvantages were, 1st, the difficulty of crossing of the river, even in its present state, the ford not being ascertained; 2ndly the disagreeable and unavoidable necessity of abandoning the attack, if the river should come down, so as to render it impassable; 3rdly, the difficulty of breaching the wall to the base, on account of the stone glacies which embraces the west angle, and, 4thly, the probability of a retrenchment being thrown up across the angle, to cut off the breach and the facility with which such a work could be done, on this point, in preference to any other angle of the fort

He stated that the advantages of attacking the S. W. angle, supposing us to be in possession of part of the Island were, 1st, ditch of the enemy's entrenchments forming a parallel, if found to be not enfiladed

from the fort; 2ndly, being in possession of the Island, the siege might be carried on, notwithstanding the rise of the river; 3rdly, having it in our power to divert the attack to any other point, should the rise of the river, contrary to expectation, prevent our attack on the S. W. angle; 4thly, the great advantage of an enfilading fire, on the south face, on account of the rise towards the S. E.; 5thly, the ruinous state of the inner wall favouring the breaching of the S. W. angle; and, 6thly, the probable advantage of approaching the breach, favoured by the enemy's lines and the bank of the river; by which the danger and difficulty of assaulting the breach across the bed of the river would be avoided. That the disadvantages of this attack were, 1st, the danger and difficulty of storming the enemy's entrenchmets; 2ndly, the army being divided and the inconvenience of keeping up the communication, supposing the river to rise; and, 3rdly, the difficulty that would attend the transporting of the battering train across the river, supposing that it should have risen, and that we were compelled to divert the attack from the S. W. angle.

On the 13th Instant, Colonel Gent submitted these plans for the consideration of the Commander-in-Chief. It was determined to attack the S. W. face of the fort and to breach the wall a little to the right or eastward of the great work at the west angle.

General Floyd returned from Dalavay-yary and encamped about 2 miles from the army. He examined Mysore, which cannot be occupied as a post, because there is no water within, nor sufficiently near the fort. The works are not completed.

The siege may be said to have commenced this day. At four in the afternoon a detachment from the Bombay Army, under Colonel Hart, consisting of the 75th Regiment and two Battalions of Sepoys, supported by the 74th Regiment and a Battalion of Sepoys from the Grand Army, drove the enemy from their posts near the village of Agraram, on the north side of the river. The attack was assisted by the fire of 12 or 14 pieces of artillery, in the advanced posts on the south side of the river; no opposition was made by the enemy; indeed they were chiefly working people. But the fort opened a very heavy fire on our troops and a large body of the enemy, under cover of this fire, advanced to recover the post. They kept up a heavy fire of musketry for some time, but with little effect and returned to the fort. Our troops during the night established themselves at this post, which was the ruins of a redoubt and village, within 960 yards of the west end of the fort. A breast-work was

thrown up on the top of the ruins; and a battery for six 18-pounders, was constructed on the right, to enfilade the enemy's entrenchments on the south side of the river, which were seen in reverse: and also to scour the ground between them and the advanced posts of the Grand Army.

During the attack on the north side of the river, Major McDonald advanced with his battalion from Shawe's post and took possession of a broad and deep Nulla on the left about 500 yards nearer the fort, from which the enemy had considerably annoyed our advanced posts, with musketry and rockets. Captain John Munro, a most zealous, active and experienced officer, was wounded in this attack; and although not dangerously, his services will be lost during the siege. A battery for two 6-pounders was begun close to the Cavery, to protect the left of our advanced posts and to drive the enemy from the bed of the river, from which they keep up a teazing fire of musketry.

18th April.

An approach was made from the bridge at Shawe's post to a deep ravine, which communicates with McDonald's Nulla; and the battery on the left, for two 6-pounders was completed during the night. The fort kept up a smart fire on our different outposts. A random shot killed Captain Zoriano of the Bombay Artillery and wounded several men in the Bombay Battery. Lieutenant McReddie, also of the Artillery, was killed. The casualties on the south side of the river, have principally been owing to the men being permitted to snipe, which is very improper, and very generally brings on a smart fire of musketry from the enemy, who are under cover of banks and broken ground. The guns were got into the battery on the north side of the river during the night.

19th April.

The battery on the north side of the river was opened this morning, but not with the effect expected or being marked out agreeably to the plans made in 1792. Owing to some misconception of the orders, the embrasures were not made to bear on the entrenchments; but only to scour the ground between them and our advanced posts. It is unfortunate and the loss of a day, which is of the utmost consequence. It was intended to have attacked the enemy's post at the mill in front of McDonald's Nulla; but it must sure be deferred until to-morrow. During the night, the embrasures of the battery were altered and made to bear on the entrenchment and to enfilade the S. W. face of the fort, as originally intended. Two 8-inch Howitzers were placed on the right of the battery, which had been extended and an entrenchment was made on the left. The enemy

kept up a heavy fire on the Bombay Battery and opened new embrasures in the work, at the west end of the fort. The embrasures are much deranged by their own fire. Large working parties are at the Tetedepont, as if the enemy expected [illegible] to approach in that direction.

Wrote to Generals Sydenham and Grant; gave them an account of our operations hitherto, and sent sketches of the position of the two armies and of the posts we occupy. Informed them of what is intended to be done and added, there is abundance of materials, more guns and ammunition than will be made use of, or can be required, there is no want of provisions, and there is a fair prospect of the fort being at our command, in ten or twelve days. That part of the fort which is to be attacked is weak; the enemy's fire cannot be great and everything we have seen confirms the propriety of the plan of attack which has finally been determined upon, and which will reflect great credit on Beatson.—

Tippoo must have imagined that our attack would have been carried on entirely from the south side of the river; and could have had no idea that any part of our army would have occupied the ground on the north bank; for all the works he has with so much labour constructed to the southward, since the army encamped before the place, will be rendered useless and untenable because they will be completely taken in reverse by the Bombay Battery.

General Floyd marched with the whole of the Cavalry and Colonel Gowdie's Brigade to meet the detachments under Colonel Brown and Rend, which are coming by the way of Covriporam. All the Nizam's Horse were sent which General Floyd; as also the bullocks of the public departments and the Brinjaries. The camp appears quite deserted of followers. Had the bullocks remained with the army, they would have died by hundreds and probably have occasioned some serious sickness, for the ground is covered with dead cattle which are extremely offensive. General floyd requested that I might accompany him to Covriporam; but I had previously desired Macaulay to speak to General Harris on the subject who would not consent to my quitting head-quarters.

N. B. Muster of Public cattle.

The Bombay Battery opened with great effect; enfilading the S W face of the fort, taking in reverse the entrenchments on the south bank of the river and scouring the ground between them and our advanced post. Two 12-pounders were placed on a favourable spot near the tombs, in front of Sultanpetta Tope and opened a cross fire, upon the entrenchments and the

20th April.

post at the mill. A swell of ground, completely covered the 12-pounders from the fire of the fort, although several guns were opened on them from the south face. The enemy, considerably annoyed by the enfilading fire from the Bombay battery discontinued their work on the south face, and their fire much slackened during the day.

As it was impossible to make any further approach, until the enemy were driven from the mill, the attack was ordered to be made at sunset; and after dislodging the enemy, strong covering parties were to be advanced to protect the Pioneers and Sepoys, while making a parallel in front of McDonald's Nulla. Colonel Sherbrooke, the General Officer of the day, was ordered to make the necessary arrangements. The attack took place at dusk; the Bombay battery, the 12-pounders in Shawe's post and those near the tombs, having previously kept up a smart fire on the entrenchments and the mill. Three columns were formed; that on the left, composed of 4 Companies of the 73rd Regiment and 4 of Bengal Volunteers under Lieutenant-Colonel Moneypenny, was to proceed in the bed of the river under the south bank and turn the right flank of the enemy; another column, consisting of the Flank Companies of the 12th Regiment and two Companies of Bengal Volunteers under Lieutenant Colonel Gardiner, was to move down McDonald's Nulla and attack the left of the enemy; while the centre column, consisting of six Companies of the 73rd Regiment and four Companies of Bengal Volunteers under the Honourable Colonel St. John, was to make a feint immediately in front; but in case of a failure in the other columns, was to make a real attack. The three columns, preceded by small parties of Pioneers under cover of our artillery advanced from McDonald's Nulla; the enemy having opened a heavy fire, from the guns on the south face of the fort. The party at the mill, as soon as our troops advanced, gave one discharge of musketry and retreated with precipitation to the entrenchments along the south bank of the river; which being observed by Colonel St. John, he pushed directly forward and reached the post, in time to put some of the enemy to the bayonet. Colonel Moneypenny's Column joined at the same moment. The post was immediately strengthened, the flank Companies of the Meuron Regiment were pushed on, some hundred yards, in front and the proposed parallel was made during the night. Our loss in this attack was very trifling, only one Sepoy killed and two Europeans and two Sepoys wounded. The enemy lost 250 men. There were near 2,000 in this post, under Said Ghaffar. The enemy kept up a heavy fire during the night, but with little or no effect. Lieutenant Fish was killed and Ensign Smith of the 2Bn. 3rd Regiment was wounded, both by random shots as they were going into the trenches.

By daybreak, the parallel in front of McDonald's Nulla, was completed. It extends beyond the mill, is 530 yeards in length, affording excellent cover for the troops; but the entrance from the Nulla, is quite exposed to the Fort. A Battery for six guns was erected near the mill, in the course of the night; and four guns and two Howitzers were got into it. Great quantities of materials were lodged in Shawe's post and McDonald's Nulla. The 74th Regiment which had been on the north side of the river returned to camp.

21st April.

In the evening, the General received a letter from Tippoo.

On the north side of the river, a battery for 4 guns was begun during the night, but not completed.

About three o'clock in the morning a violent attack was made by the enemy on the outpost of the Bombay Army. The enemy having got in the rear of the Bombay army, threw a vast flight of rockets with a view of drawing General Stuart's attention to that quarter, shortly after the attack commenced. The party which was very considerable (6000 Infantry and the French Corps) and headed by Frenchmen followed a small body of our troops, who had been posted in front and having expended their ammunition were obliged to retire. The enemy came into the very trenches, but were driven back with loss, some of the Frenchmen being killed close to the battery.

22nd April.

The six gun battery near the mill, was opened early in the morning with great effect. The fire was directed against the Flag staff Cavalier, the work at west end of the Fort, the round towers on the S. W. face and to enfilade the north rampart. The fire from this battery, was so brisk and well directed, that although in the morning the enemy's fire was very superior, their guns were almost silenced before sunset. The parapets of the Cavalier and work at the west end of the Fort were very much shattered and the S. W. face so completed enfiladed by the Bombay battery, that scarce a man could show himself. As the enemy continued to harass the Bombay outposts, a breastwork for two 6-pounders was thrown upon the left of the parallel, in front of McDonald's Nulla. The guns were opened about one o'clock and obliged the enemy to retire from the front of the Bombay battery to the Fete de front. During the night, two embrasures were added to the 6 gun battery near the mill.

The four gun battery on the north side of the river, was opened with great effect, and gave considerable support to the eight gun battery near the mill and a

23 April.

heavy fire was kept up during the day. The defences on the S. W. face of the Fort, as also those of the Cavalier and work at the west end, suffered considerably. The Flag staff was knocked down in the afternoon, which circumstance, from the repeated cheers in the trenches, must have been considered by our troops as a happy omen. During the night, a battery for the two 12-pounders in Shawe's post was sunk in front of the aqueduct, and the two 12-pounders at the tombs, were advanced to a village about 1300 yards from the S. W. angle of the fort. A redoubt was thrown up on the north side of the river, to secure the left flank of that attack, which was a good deal exposed.

The letter received on the 20th July from Tippoo, was as follows. "It is written in Lord Mornington's letter, that the clearing up of matters at issue is proper, that therefore General Harris having powers for that purpose, would appoint persons for conducting a conference and renewing a treaty; that General Harris was the wellwisher of both Circars, therefore would inform Tippoo what his pleasure was, in order that a conference might take place."

Last night an answer was sent to the Sultan. The letter, recapitulating the substance of Lord Mornington's letter of the 8th November and stating, that Tippoo having rejected the pacific advances of the allies, the Governor General had been compelled to order the armies to advance; that as he appeared desirous to come to an accommodation, the General sent him the draft of a preliminary treaty. And Tippoo was informed, that unless the demands therein contained, were agreed to in less than 24 hours and the money and hostages specified, sent to camp in less than 24 hours more, the allies should extend their demands even to the possession of the Fort, until a definitive treaty was ratified. The preliminaries stipulated for the cession of half of the Sultan's dominions, the payment of two crores of rupees and the delivering up as hostages four of his sons and four of his principal officers, who were named.

Judging from Tippoo's conduct last war and from the information obtained by Macleod, it is thought, he will not accede to the terms proposed certainly not until reduced to the last extremity.

24th April.

The enemy fired a good many shells during the day, a few fell close to the trenches. Approaches were carried on from the mill, towards a spot where a battery is to be erected, to enfilade the south face of the Fort and to take off the defences of the towers on the S. W. face; which the eight gun battery does not bear upon. Our batteries have suffered by the fire of the enemy

but were repaired during the night. It is thought, some desperate attempt on the Park or Camp, as a last effort, may be made by the enemy; the troops,.therefore, are ordered to be under arms at 4 o'clock in the morning and to remain so till daylight.

25th April.

The approaches were widened in the course of the day. The enemy kept up a smart fire from the S. W. angle and round towers on the battery at the mill; two guns in which, were dismounted. This is the more provoking because their fire had been almost silenced; and it is rather a reflection upon us, that we should have allowed them to regain any advantage. I was in the battery in the afternoon.—Major Ball, who had charge of it, did all that was possible. The fire from the Fort, was very smart and well directed; and it was discouraging to the men, to be thus exposed and not to be able to bring a gun to bear upon those of the enemy by which they had been much galled. The Bombay Battery required being animated, small parties of the enemy annoyed the advanced approaches with musketry. During the night a battery for 4 guns was constructed in front and to the right of the mill, in order to silence the enemy's guns in the round towers and at the S. W. angle. A ruined village on the left of the north attack was fortified and the entrenchment connecting with the battery was deepened.

Letters received from Colonel Read mention that he expected to be at Covriporam about the 20th of this month. No accounts from Colonel Brown and Head Quarters appear extremely hurt at the delay which may be attended with serious consequences. An alarming scarcity of rice and provision in the public store. Fortunately 1260 bullock loads were tendered to the General which was sufficient for the fightingmen up to the 20th of May.

26th April.

The four gun battery opened this morning, and was so well served, that it soon silenced the fire of the enemy. Officers should be selected for the duty of the batteries, without attending exactly to the Roster; nor should the public service be sacrificed to an ill-judged punctilio.

The enemy still occupying their entrenchments on the south bank of the river, from which they annoyed our troops; and as our breaching battery was to be erected at the north extremity of them; it was determined to dislodge the enemy and to occupy such posts as were necessary to cover the approaches. Colonel Wellesley, General Officer of the day, had the direction of the attack which was made at sunset, under cover

of a smart fire from the Bombay Batteries and the 12-pounders in front of Shawe's post. One Column, consisted of 4 Companies of the Scotch Brigade and 4 of Bengal Sepoys under Major Skelly, another of 4 Companies of the 73rd Regiment and 4 of Bengal Volunteers under Lieutenant Colonel Moneypenny. The two Columns quitted the trenches at the same instant; that under Major Skelly, entered at the right of the entrenchment, and drove the enemy before them with the bayonet; while the column under Lieutenant-Colonel Moneypenny advanced direct towards the left and completely scoured entrenchment. These two parties took post; Skelly's at a ruined Cholty beyond the bridge over McDonald's Nulla, within 450 yards of the Fort; Moneypenny's occupied a swampy Nulla which runs close along the front of the entrenchment, within 400 yards of the S. W. face. The enemy kept up a very heavy fire on these parties not only of round and grape from the ramparts, but of musketry from circular redoubt, the only post retained by the enemy on the south side of the river. Our troops were so much exposed to this fire, that Colonel Campbell of the 74th, who had just arrived with the relief for the trenches, determined to dislodge the enemy. He pushed forward with the Light Company of the 75th Regiment and a Company of the Regiment de Meuron, accompanied by Major Coloman and attacked the Redoubt. The enemy retreated with the greatest precipitation over the Periapatam bridge followed by Campbell; who did not stop the pursuit, until he had gone a considerable distance on the Island. Some Frenchmen were bayonetted in their tents within the lines on the north bank of the river; and some guns were spiked. This spirited and judicious attack spread an immediate alarm in the Fort; every gun was opened and every part of the ramparts were illuminated with blue lights; and it is probable many of the enemy thought of the night of the 6th February last war and apprehended a more serious attack than was intended. The consternation of the enemy, enabled Colonel Campbell to retire from the Island, with his handful of men after having put thousands to the rout. Our posts were now so considerably in advance and were so much exposed to an attack, that the usual relief of the troops did not take place; and the whole remained in the trenches during the night. The Engineers made two approaches towards the entrenchment, but had not time to complete them; and they afforded little cover to the troops.

27 the April.

The enemy having during the night, reoccupied the circular redoubt from which our troops were extremely galled by musketry, as well as from the left at the entrenchment; it became absolutely necessary either to confine them to the

Island or to abandon those advanced posts, which had cost the lives of a great many brave men. Colonel Sherbrooke, the general officer in the trenches received his orders through Captain Turing, to drive the enemy from the redoubt and to occupy it. Colonel Sherbrooke was pleased that the order was positive and left nothing to his discretion; for the attack was thought extremely hazardous, being exposed to the fire of the whole south face of the Fort, but it was of the last importance. He ordered Colonel Wallace for this dangerous service with three Companies of the 74th Regiment. Wallace with his usual cool and determined gallantry stormed and carried the redoubt, and having driven the enemy from that part of the entrenchment and obliged them to retire to the Island, he effected a lodgment on the outside of the redoubt and covered his party from the fire of the Fort.

These successes, however brilliant, were dearly bought. Captain Hay of the Scotch Brigade, and Lieutenant Irwin of the 74th were killed; Lieutenant Todd of the 73rd, Captain Molle, Lieutenant McBeath Tunis and McLean of the Scotch Brigade, Lieutenant McLean of the 73rd, Captain Ayton, Lieutenant Maxwell Carrington of the 74th, Captain Piachand of the Regiment de Meuron and Lieutenant Fagan of the Bengal Volunteers were wounded. Of Seventyfour File of the 74th Regiment alone, onehalf were killed and wounded. Colonel Campbell and Major Coleman were so much bruised and hurt, that their services will be lost during the remainder of the siege. And it is to be lamented, that Colonel Shawe is so very ill as to be confined to his tent. Heavy however as the loss has been, the advantages gained have been proportionally great; and we find after repeated trials, that Tippoo's troops, howsoever numerous, cannot stand against the bayonet of our Europeans. 1500 of the enemy under the Said Ghaffar were in these posts. They lost 150 men.

During the night, Wallace's and Skelly's posts were strengthened and connected with the trenches. The Fort scarce fired a shot, which is the more extraordinary, as they must have known that our people were busily at work, within 400 yards of the walls.

The Chief Engineer, Beatson, Officers of Artillery &c., examined the spot on which it is intended to erect the breaching battery.

28th April.

During the night, the battery was completed for 6 guns, but the platforms were not laid.

General Harris received a letter from Tippoo acknowledging the receipt of the General's of the 22nd instant and saying, as the points it contained were of importance and could not be concluded without the aid of ambassadors, he was about to send two persons for that purpose. An answer was sent in the evening, recapitulating the substance of the letter of the 22nd and of the preliminary articles; adding that, those demands were in conformity to the orders of the Governor-General, who forbade the receiving of Vaqueels, if those demands were not complied with; but to shew the moderation of the allies, and that they had no projects of ambition, they waived the right of increasing their demands and were willing to grant the terms proposed in the preliminaries, provided they were ratified the next day and the money and hostages sent to camp the day following.

N. B. Platforms of new construction by General Roos, a great improvement and not requiring one-third of the usual carriage.

29th April.

Only five guns were got into the breaching battery last night; because the persons employed on this duty, instead of dragging them directly across to the battery (which might have been done with ease and safety of the dark,) chose to take them through the trenches; by which a great deal of time was lost. The two 12-pounders in front of Shawe's post, placed there by Agnew, fired with considerable effect and ranged over all the town. The defences are almost destroyed and the works at the west end of the Fort are most shattered. Two fieldpieces were placed in Wallace's post to strengthen the right of our attack.

30th April.

The breaching battery at the distance of less than 400 yards was opened this morning with considerable effect; the fire was directed against the Cavalier and that part of the two walls immediately in front of it. By sunset, the Fausse-braye wall appeared to be almost breached. During the night another battery for 5 guns which in compliment to the Nizam, was named "The Nizam's Battery", was made a little more advanced and to the right; and the other gun, was got into the 6 guns-battery.

After dark, Lieutenant Farquhar commanding the European Pioneer, went almost across the river; the bed of which he found very rugged, but with not more than a foot and half of water. The enemy kept up a smart fire upon our batteries, from the distant Cavaliers, but with little effect.

1st May.

A battery for 6 howitzers was finished during the day, on the right of the breaching battery. The platforms of the 6 gun-battery were altered; in order that the fire

may be directed more to the right, on the works at the S. W. angle from which the enemy considerably annoy the trenches. All the guns and mortars were got into the batteries, in the course of the night; and on the north side of the river, a battery for 6 guns was begun on the left of the enfilading battery; intended to favour the storming of the breach. The 6 gun breaching battery was extremely well served and did great execution.

2nd May.

The morning was ushered in, by a glorious peal from all our batteries. The fire was tremendous and extremely well supported. 35 guns and mortars were opened and by sun set, the breach was considerably enlarged and another day's firing, promised to make it practicable. Soon after the batteries were opened, a great explosion took place in the fort occasioned by the bursting of one of our shells in a magazine. An immense column of smoke ascended from the middle of which thousands of rockets flew in every direction. Many of the enemy were killed and wounded. As the enemy still annoyed the 6 gun battery and trenches, from the S. W. angle, a battery for 2 guns was constructed, for the purpose of diverting the attention of the enemy: but they brought so heavy a fire upon this battery, that it was immediately shut up. Colonel Montague lost his arm by a cannon shot and Lieutenant Cookeshy, a very active officer, was killed in the breaching battery.

3rd May.

Our batteries kept up a heavy and well-directed fire, upon the breach and the works to the right. The enemy during the night, repaired the breach, with stone and earth; and were busily employed in palisading a high mound of earth, on the right of the flag staff câvâlier and immediately behind the breach. One of our batteries took fire in the afternoon and the enemy kept up a heavy fire of round and grape, to prevent its being extinguished, but without effect. Unfortunately Captain Casby, Deputy Adjutant General to the Nizam's Detachment, was killed by a grape shot in the neck. The service has lost one of its very best and most promising officers and he is sincerely regretted by the whole army.

This morning I went with Beatson, to the Bombay Batteries and to Montresor's (*a*) Island, to ascertain as far as was practicable the nature of the bed of the river and ditch; of the latter however, we had but an imperfect view. In the afternoon we went to the left of the breaching battery to compare the observations. We discovered an iron grating, at the foot of the glacis, opposite the west end of the Fort; through

(*a*). Montressor commanded the Right Brigade of the Bombay forces.

which, the water is admitted into the ditch. I looked with a glass with the greatest attention but could not observe any stream ; it is, therefore, reasonable to conclude, as the ditch is formed, by the stone glacis being built in the bed of the river, that there is in both, the same depth of water.

Although the passage of the river must be difficult as well as of the ditch, which is hid by the glacis ; still there is no doubt but it is perfectly practicable. Men and cattle have been seen crossing at the old Delhi Bridge and even at the west angle of the Fort.

The passage of the river was examined during the night by Lieutenant Taylor of the 73rd Regiment, the bottom is very rocky and rugged, but there is in general no great depth of water although there are many deep holes. Scaling ladders and materials were lodged in the advanced approaches, to make a lodgment, if necessary, after the storm.

The retaining wall of the glacis, is 7 feet high, including 1 foot under water.

Tippoo's conduct is not to be accounted for ; and he seems determined to rescue his kingdom, in the defence of his capital. Macleod's hircarrahs and deserters agree in their reports, that such is his determination ; and that when urged by his principal people to make peace, he has been displeased and has generally replied that " there is a time for all things ; that it was impossible to accede to the terms proposed and thereby become a dependant like the Rajah of Tanjore, and that whether he lost his life now, or a few years hence, was immaterial." It is said, he is much dejected and so sullen, that few venture to give him their opinion. He must be infatuated, and many think, that he will put an end to himself and to his family, at the moment of the storm. A few hours, will determine his fate.

In the afternoon, General Baird who had been informed by the Commander-in-Chief, that he was to command the assault, had a statement sent to him, of the troops intended for that service ; and he was informed, that they were to be lodged in the trenches during the night, in the order detailed to him ; by which six Flank Companies of the Bombay Army, were to lead the attack. The whole [illegible] for the assault, were placed [illegible] General Baird's orders in the evening ; and he has desired, to direct the several Corps to proceed to the trenches at such hours during the night and in such succession

Colonel Wellesley as well as General Baird applied to command the assault. General Baird's superior rank and having the command of the 1st - European Brigade, made it impossible to gratify Colonel Wellesley.

as would place them agreeably to the order required, a little before day-break. Colonel Sherbrooke, coming on the duty of General Officer of the day, was directed to obey such instructions, as General Baird might have occasion to send him, relative to the movement or disposition of the troops in the trenches.

General Baird assembled the principal officers, who were to be employed on this glorious service, and gave them their orders agreeably to the following instructions, which he had received from the Adjutant General of the Army.—

"The left attack under Lieutenant Colonel Dunlop, to consist of six "Companies of European Flankers from the Bombay Army; H. M. "12th and 33rd Regiments; ten Companies of Bengal Sepoy "Flankers under Lieutenant Colonel Gardiner; 50 Artillery-men with a "proportion of Gun Lascars, under Lieutenant Colonel Saxon; to move in "column, left in front; to take possession of the Cavalier close to the "breach; and move along the north rampart of the Fort and to "proceed till they join the right attack; having a Battalion Company "from the 33rd Regiment, in charge of the Cavalier already men-"tioned close to the breach; and occupying such other posts on the "ramparts, by detachments from the 12th and 33rd Regiments, as shall "be thought proper by Lieutenant Colonel Dunlop.

Storming Party
FIRELOCKS

Europeans	...	2494
Natives	...	1882
Total	...	*4376*

408 killed and wounded.

"The right attack, under Colonel Sherbrooke to consist of, four "Companies of European Flankers from "the Scotch Brigade and Regiment de "Meuron. H. M. 73rd and 74th Regi-"ments; eight Companies of the best Sepoy "Flankers under Lieut. Col. Dalrymple; "six companies of Bombay Sepoy Flankers; under Lieutenant Colonel "Miguan; 50 Artillery men with a proportion of Gun Lascars under "Major Bell; to move in column, right in front. To move along the "south rampart of the Fort, leaving such parties as may be thought "necessary by Colonel Sherbrooke, from the 73rd or 74th Regiment in "charge of such part of the ramparts as he may deem essentially "necessary to occupy.

"Half of the European and half of the Native Pioneers, to accompany each attack with hatchets. The European Pioneers to carry the "scaling ladders, [illegible] men from the Battalion's Companies of "the leading Regiment of each attack; as also to carry the arms. If "the road across the river and the breach, should be deemed sufficiently "broad, the two attacks will move out to the assault, at the same

" moment wheeling to the right and left, so as to get on the face they "are ordered to move on, on coming to the breach, but if the road or "breach is too narrow, the left attack, is to move out first. The leading "Companies to use the bayonet principally, and not to fire but in cases "of absolute necessity. Each attack to be preceded by a Serjeant and "12 Volunteers, supported by a Subaltern Officer and 25 men. The "leading Flank Company of each attack, to be provided with hatchets."

Such were the arrangements made at head-quarters, for this important service :—

Early in the morning, Captain Turing and I by desire of the General, 4th. May. posted Artillery on the most commanding spots in front of the line and made such a disposition of the troops as would best protect the camp, in case Tippoo, with a view of obliging us to withdraw some of the troops from the trenches, should command us.

The breach having been reported practicable, the Commander-in-Chief ordered General Baird to make the assault at one o'clock in the afternoon. The state of suspence and anxiety until the moment arrived, which was to decide the fate of our inveterate and implacable enemy; and perhaps whether we were to retain our power in India, exceeded anything I had ever before experienced. During this awful period, our attention was drawn to the north side of the river, by the enemy opening from two guns on the Bombay Army. At the same time, a party of horse crossed the aqueduct and drove off some cattle from the rear of their camp. General Harris had desired the Officers of the General staff to remain with him in camp. The troops being ordered to be in readiness to get under arms; but it was impossible, and I went with Beatson and Dallas to the trenches.

At the hour appointed, General Baird with a gallantry which will never be forgotten, stepped out of the most advanced part of the trenches, exposed to the view of the whole Fort and of our own troops. He addressed the Flank companies, the Artillery, the Pioneers and the several parties; and being told that they were all ready, he drew his sword and in a manner the most animated and encouraging, desired them to follow him and prove themselves worthy of being called British soldiers. In less than seven minutes from the time the heads of the two columns quitted the trenches, the British Colours were planted on the breach. The right attack headed by General Baird moved rapidly along the rampart of the south face. Captain Molle, commanding the Grenadiers of the Scotch Brigade particularly

signalized himself ; singly he pushed forward, to the mud cavalier behind the great round tower which was occupied by the enemy, planted a stand of Colors on the parapet, and putting his hat on the point of his sword, waved it over his head with that degree of exultation, which so proud an occasion naturally excited. The resistance now became feeble the column moved along the rampart, to the gateway on the east face; having stationed parties in the several works and detached others, to take possession of the inner rampart and great flag staff Cavalier.

The left attack met with serious opposition from the enemy, posted behind the traverses on the rampart of the north face. Colonel Dunlop was disabled by a severe wound, just as he had reached the top of the breach, many officers were killed and wounded, but Captain Lambton (Brigade Major to General Baird) putting himself at the head of the troops forced the enemy to give way. This column, however, was severely galled by musketry, from a high bank of earth, (separated by a deep wet ditch and which formed the inner rampart) until such time as a handful of men under Lieutenant Ingram, who had gained the great Cavalier behind the breach, drove the enemy from it. This party joined by Captain Goodall, with the Right Company of the 12th Regiment pursued the enemy along this inner rampart, as far as a Sallyport. Captain Lambton, who had advanced along the outer rampart, halted the same time opposite this Sallyport, through which the enemy were retreating into the Tower, in the greatest consternation. The slaughter under this gateway from the fire of both our parties, was prodigious. Captain Lambton proceeded along the rampart, stationing small parties in the works and joined General Baird on the east face. The guns of the Fort were now opened upon the fugitives on the Island, who were flying in all directions; and in one hour, the ramparts and every part of the fortifications were occupied by our troops. Resistance had now ceased except at the palace, which was still in possession of the enemy.

From one of the Bastions on the south face, Beatson, Dallas and myself, observed several persons assembled in the palace, many of whom, from their dress and appearance, we judged to be of distinction. I particularly remarked, that one person prostrated himself before he sat down ; from which circumstance, I was led to conclude, that Tippoo, with such of his officers as had escaped from the assault, had taken shelter in the palace. We immediately went to General Baird to apprize him of these circumstances. He had already heard that Tippoo was in the Fort, but the exhausted state of the troops, from the heat and the

fatigue they had already undergone, made it necessary to refresh them, before he attempted to seize the palace, where it was thought the enemy in defence of their sovereign and his family would make a serious resistance. We had just passed Captain Whitlee with the Grenadiers and Major Craigie with some Battalion Companies of the 12th Regiment and I had recommended to them, to keep their men in readiness as it was probable they would be soon called upon, to give the finishing blow and complete the business which had been so nobly begun. I proposed to General Baird to bring these troops to him; to which he assented. On my return, he told me, he would entrust the conduct of the business to me; and requested that I would go to the palace with the detachment of the 12th Regiment and part of Major Gibbings's battalion of Sepoys, which was at hand and inform the enemy, that their lives should be spared, on condition of their immediate surrender, but that the least resistance would prove fatal to every person within the palace walls.

Having fastened a white cloth on a Serjeant's pike, I proceeded to the palace, where I found Major Shee with part of the 33rd Regiment, drawn up opposite the gate. Several of Tippoo's people were in a balcony, apparently in the greatest consternation. I informed them that I was deputed by the General who commanded the troops in the Fort, to offer them their lives provided they made no resistance; of which I desired them to give immediate intimation to their Sultan. In a short time the Killedar, another officer of consequence and a confidential servant, came over the terrace of the front building and descended by an unfinished part of the wall. They were greatly embarrassed and appeared inclined to create delays; probably with a view of effecting their escape, as soon as the darkness of the night might afford them an opportunity. I pointed out the danger of their situation and the necessity of coming to an immediate determination, pledging myself for their protection and entreating them to allow me to go into the palace, that I might in person give these assurances to Tippoo. They were very averse to this proposal; but this was not a moment for indecision and I positively insisted on returning with them. I desired Captain Schohy who speaks Moors with great fluency to attend me. Captain Hastings Fraser at his particular request, also accompanied me. We ascended by the broken wall and lowered ourselves down on a terrace, where a large body of armed men had assembled. I explained to them that the flag which I held in my hand, was a pledge of security, provided no resistance was made; and the stronger to impress them with this belief. I

took off my sword, which I insisted upon their receiving. The killedar and many others affirmed, that the Princes and the family of Tippoo were in the palace, but not the Sultan. They were greatly alarmed and averse to coming to any decision. I told them, that resistance was ineffectual, that delay might be attended with fatal consequences and that I could not answer for the conduct of our troops, by whom they were surrounded and whose fury was with difficulty restrained. They then left me, and shortly after I observed people moving hastily backwards and forward in the interior of the palace; and as there were many hundreds of Tippoo's troops within the walls, I began to think our situation not altogether safe. Captain Fraser advised me to take back my sword; but such an act on my part might, by exciting their distrust, have kindled a flame, which in the present temper of the troops might have been attended with dreadful consequences; perhaps the massacre of every soul within the palace walls. The people on the terrace begged me to hold the flag in a conspicuous place, in order to give confidence to those in the palace and prevent our troops from forcing the gates. Growing impatient at these delays, I sent another message to the Princes, warning them of their critical situation, that I was limited to time and must return. They answered, that they would receive me, as soon as a carpet could be spread for the purpose. So provoking a delay, when their very existence was at stake, put me almost beyond all patience; but immediately after, the killeder came to conduct me. I found two of the Princes seated on the carpet, surrounded by a great many attendants. They desired me to sit down, which I did in front of them. The recollection of Moizadeen, who on a former occasion, I had seen delivered up with his brother, hostages to Marquis Cornwallis; the sad reverse of their fortunes; a thought, that howmuchsoever their father deserved our resentment, that they were blameless; their fear which notwithstanding their struggles to conceal, was but too evident; excited the strongest emotions of compassion in my mind. I took Moizadeen (to whom the attendants principally directed their attention) by the hand and endeavoured by every means in my power, to remove his fears and to persuade him, that no violence should be offered to him or his brother, nor to any person in the palace. I then entreated him, as the only means to preserve his father's life, whose escape was impracticable, to inform me where he was concealed. Moizadeen, after some conversation, apart with his attendants, assured me that the Padshaw was not in the palace. I requested him to allow the gates to be opened. All were alarmed at this proposal and the princes were reluctant to take such a step, but by the authority of their father; to whom, they proposed to send. At length, having promised that I would

post a guard of their own Sepoys within and a party of Europeans on the outside; having given them the strongest assurances, that no person should enter the palace, but by my authority and that I would return and remain with them, until General Baird arrived, I convinced them of the necessity of compliance. I wrote a note in their presence which I begged Captain Fraser to deliver to General Baird, as soon as possible. I again said everything to quiet the minds of the Princes, and I was happy to observe that they, as well as their attendants, appeared to rely with confidence on the assurances I had given them.

On opening the gate, I found General Baird and several officers with a large body of troops assembled. He appeared much irritated and extremely incensed; and said he would not enter the gate, but that the Princes should be brought out to him and Tippoo be found; or he would search every part of the palace, and no soul should escape alive. There were not wanting those, who urged him to put his threats into immediate execution; and the troops, whose resentment was raised to a high pitch, would have been but too ready on the occasion. A crowd of officers were rushing into the palace; I stopped them, and desired aloud, not a man to enter, but by my authority. I told General Baird, that I had pledged my word to the Princes to that effect; begged him to allow me to return, accompanied by Colonel Close and that I would bring the Princes to him. I returned with Colonel Close and we told the Princes that the General desired they would meet him at the palace gate. They were much alarmed and repeatedly objected to go. Colonel Close rose to leave them; but apprehensive of the dreadful consequences, if our troops were allowed to enter, I entreated Colonel Close, again to sit down and to use every argument in his power, to convince them of the necessity of compliance. We had some difficulty in conquering their alarms and the objection they raised, to quitting the palace; but at length they complied and permitted us to conduct them to the gate. The indignation of General Baird had been justly excited, by a report which had reached him, soon after he had sent me to the palace, that Tippoo had inhumanly murdered all the Europeans who had fallen into his hands, during the siege. This was heightened perhaps by a momentary recollection of his own sufferings, during more than three years imprisonment in irons, in that very place. Although naturally eluded by the brilliant and unexampled success which had attended him and scarcely cooled from the fury of the storm, yet the sight of the Princes sensibly affected him; and his gallantry on the assault was not more conspicuous than the moderation and humanity, which he displayed on this occasion.

He received the Princes with every mark of regard and sympathy, repeatedly assured them, that no violence or insult should be offered to them, and he gave them in charge to Colonel Agnew and Captain Marriott, by whom they were conducted to head-quarters in camp, escorted by the Light Company of the 33rd Regiment. As they passed, the troops were ordered to pay them the compliment of presented arms.

General Baird now determined to search the most retired parts of the Palace in the hope of finding Tippoo. He ordered the Light Company of the 74th Regiment followed by others, to enter the palace-yard. Tippoo's troops were immediately disarmed, and we proceeded to make the search, through many of the apartments, some of which were burst open. I entreated the killedar if he had any regard for his own life or that of his Sultan, to inform me where he was concealed. He put his hands on the hilt of my sword, and in the most solemn manner protested, that the Sultan was not in the palace, but that he had been wounded during the storm and lay in a gateway on the north face of the Fort, whither he offered to conduct us and if it was found that he had deceived, said, the General might inflict on him what punishment he pleased. General Baird on hearing the report of the killedar, immediately proceeded to the gateway, which was covered with many hundreds of the slain. The number of the dead and the darkness of the places, made it difficult to distinguish one person from another, and the scene was altogether shocking. But aware of the great political importance of ascertaining beyond the possibility of doubt, the death of Tippoo, the bodies were ordered to be dragged out and the killedar and the other two persons, who still attended me, were desired to examine them, one after another. This however appeared to be endless and as it now was becoming quite dark, a light was procured and I accompanied the killedar into the gateway. During the search, we discovered a wounded person lying under the Sultan's palanquin. This man was afterwards ascertained to be Rajah Cawn, one of Tippoo's most confidential servants. He had attended his master during the whole of the day and on being made acquainted with the object of our search, he pointed out the spot where the Sultan had fallen. By a faint glimmering light, it was difficult for the killedar to recognize the features; but the body being brought out, was satisfactorily proved and conveyed in a palanquin to the palace, where it was again recognized by the eunuchs and other servants of the family.

When Tippoo was brought from under the gateway, his eyes were still open and the body was so warm, that for a few moments, Colonel Wellesley and myself were doubtful whether he was not alive. On feeling his pulse

and heart, that doubt was removed. He had four wounds: three in the body, and one in the temple, the ball having entered a little above the right ear and lodged in his left cheek. Thus fell the determined and inveterate enemy of the British power in the east; an awful example, of the instability of human greatness.

Tippoo was of low stature, corpulent, with high shoulders and a short thick neck; but his hands and feet were remarkably small; his complexion was rather dark; his eyes large and prominen with small arched eyebrows and his nose aquiline. He had an appearance of dignity or perhaps of sternness in his countenance, which denoted him above the common order of people. His dress consisted of a jacket of fine white linen, loose drawers of flowered chintz, and a crimson cloth of silk and cotton round his waist; a handsome pouch with a red and green silk bell hung across his shoulder; his head was uncovered, his turban being lost in the confusion of his fall. He had an amulet on his arm; but no ornament whatever.

Messrs. Chapny and several other French Officers in the Fort delivered themselves up after the storm; and were sent to camp.

Never was success more brilliant or complete; but our loss was considerable. The troops in crossing the river, were exposed to a heavy and well directed fire of grape and musketry; but all opposition was ineffectual, with such noble examples as the officers shewed the men. Of Europeans, 2 Captains, 6 Lieutenants, 3 Sergeants, 1 Drummer, 58 rank and file, were killed; 1 Lieutenant Colonel, 4 Captains, 8 Lieutenants, 3 Ensigns, 2 Conductors of Ordnance, 12 Sergeants, 5 Drummers, 228 rank and file were wounded —Of natives, 13 rank and file were killed; 1 Jamadar, 2 Drummers, 31 rank and file were wounded. In all, 83, killed and 297 wounded. The loss of the enemy was not less than 8,000. The Provost-martial declared he buried *more* than that number. The carnage was dreadful, not only at the gate where Tippoo fell, but at many places on the ramparts; hundreds threw themselves from the walls and leaped into the ditch to avoid the fury of our troops, but still to meet certain death. Said Ghaffar, esteemed the best officer in Tippoo's service, was killed near the breach by a cannon shot; Meer Saduck, the Prime Minister was killed by the Sultan's Troops, endeavouring to make his escape; Sayad Saheb nearly related to Tippoo was mortally wounded. As Beatson, Dallas and myself were going along the rampart, two remarkably fair men, who lay in the inner ditch attracted our notice, and we went down to look more particularly at them. One, whom Dallas immediately recognised to be Sayid Shaheb, attempted to raise himself; we supported him and he clung round Dallas's knees and implored his compassion: He was much surprized at being known and asked Dallas, where he had seen

him; who answered, at Mangalore in 1783, when the Commissioners negotiated the Peace with Tippoo. We gave him some water and endeavoured to carry his palanquin to him which lay in the ditch. We sent for a surgeon to dress his wounds, which we apprehended were mortal; but a heavy fire of musketry commencing in the Fort and a party of the enemy advancing towards that quarter, we were constrained to leave Sayid Shaheb to his fate. On being questioned, he told us that Tippoo and all his family were in the Fort, Carim Shaheb, Tippoo's only brother, made his escape from a place in which he had been for years confined, and came almost naked with his family, to Meer Allum's by whom they were treated with great kindness. In the confusion and after it was dark, he had crossed the breach unobserved by our troops.

Hundreds, I may say thousands, of old men, women and children who immediately after the storm were allowed to quit the Fort, took shelter behind the old walls and hedges in the neighbourhood of the camp. I did not leave the Fort till late and it was midnight before I reached the General's tent. To my surprize the Princes were not there, but they arrived shortly after. They had refused to make use of the palanquins which had been prepared for them in the Fort, and had been obliged to cross the breach and river and walk to camp. The killedar and the other principal officer, I delivered over to the charge of Captain Macleod and retired to my tent to ruminate on the events of the day even to the most extraordinary, I had ever witnessed, and which so much more resembled fictions of the brain, than reality, that it was impossible to form a calm and connected idea of them.

5th May.

Abdul Khan, Tippoo's second son and one of the hostages last war gave himself up. Colonel Dalrymple was posting guards at the ford near the Dowletbaug when he observed a small party of horse on the north bank of the river, waving a white flag. He sent Captain Geraud, his Brigade Major, to learn what they wanted. One of the horsemen came forward and informed Captain Geraud, that one of the Princes was desirous of delivering himself up to the English, provided he had assurances of personal protection and that his honour would be preserved. Captain Geraud pledged himself for the observance of these stipulations and met the Prince in the middle of the river, where he repeated these assurances. Abdul Khan's dread of the European soldiers was so great, that he exacted a promise from Captain Geraud, not to quit him, until he had reached the General's Tent He was conducted to General Baird, who received him with every mark of kindness and accompanied him to head-quarters; when General.

Harris renewed the assurance he had received of protection. Abdul Khan went to Meer Allum's, where he took some refreshment and was then escorted to the Fort. On the way, he was informed by his own servants of the fate of the Sultan and when he entered the palace he desired to see the body. It will scarce be credited that when the curtain of the palanquin was drawn aside and he beheld his father's corpse that he shewed no emotion either of pity or grief, but turning with seeming indifference from a sight, which affected even common beholders, he requested of Colonel Wellesley, who commanded in the Fort to hasten the interment and begged that the body might be placed near that of Hyder Ali in the Mausoleum in the Lallbaug. Moiza-deen and his brother Mahomed Sultan Mohei-ud-deen were sent back to the palace in the forenoon, and when they were informed of the fate of their father were exetremely affected. Colonel Wellesley was very kind to them and allotted them apartments close to his own. Captain Marriott was afterwards appointed to attend the Princes and he remained with them constantly.

Early in the morning, Macleod and I went into the Fort, accompanied by the killedar, Sayed Sahib's brother and another person of consequence. We gave them our horses and I took my palanquin with the intention of bringing Sayid Sahib to camp. I took his brother to the spot, where we had seen him the preceding day, but he was no longer there. The poor brother picked up one of his slippers, which he buried in his bosom and his grief at the sight of it, left no doubt, but it was Said Sahib we had found wounded. I accompanied the afflicted brother to Said Sahib's house, which had been plundered of every article of value; the women and children of the family were supposed to have suffered the worst of fates, perhaps in the fury of the storm, and the scene was truly distressing. At the palace we learned, that the body had been found and removed to a house at no great distance. Thither we repaired and saw the corpse laid out, a fine boy about 8 years of age, Said Sahib's son and some other relations, weeping over it. A party of Pioneers prepared one grave and the corpse having been deposited in Sayid Sahib's house, I left the unhappy brother to pay the last sad duties to it most grateful for my attention.

What shocking sights, did every part of the works, the house near the ramparts and even the Mosque, exhibit, strewed with the dead and wounded. Numberless applications were made to Colonel Wellesley, for male guards, to protect those families, who to avoid the fury of our troops after the storm, had concealed themselves in different parts of the Fort. He gave several Companies of Sepoys to Captain Macleod for that purpose and I accompanied him to search for the family of Cumeradeen,

whom we found in a miserable enclosure, for sheltering cattle, — Colonel Wellesley gave them a guard and he took every possible means to afford protection to all those who could be found, a convincing proof to the unhappy sufferers, that compassion is no less conspicuous in the British character than bravery.

Cumeradeen's house was burnt during the night of the storm, some of our people having accidentally set fire to a large jar of oil, which in a few minutes, set the whole house in a blaze. His family made their escape, but it is said, not before some of his women had been violated.

I examined the different buildings in the Fort with Dr. Anderson, none being sufficiently large or airy we fixed on the Palace in Lallbaug, as a General Hospital; to which place the sick and wounded are to be immediately removed.

Meer Allum at the particular request of General Harris, sent people to prepare everything for the funeral of the deceased Sultan. It was intended, that every honour should be paid to his remains: Colonel Wellesley desired the Head Cazee of the place to attend; the apartments of the palace were searched for every thing requisite; and the body, covered with fine muslins and rich cloths, was placed in the bottom of a State palanquin. Colonel Wellesley informed Abdul Khan that four Flank Companies of Europeans would escort the corpse to the tomb, and that minute guns would be fired during the funeral ceremony; to regulate the number of which, he requested to be informed of the Sultan's age. Abdul Khan at first declined the attendance of the troops and was averse to guns being fired; but being told, that it was meant as a mark of respect to the deceased, he assented and said that his father was about 52 or 53 years of age.

The bier carried by the servants of the Palace, was preceded by two Flank Companies and immediately followed by Abdul Khan on horseback, accompanied by the killedar and a great number of Mussalmans on foot; two companies followed in the rear. During the procession, the Cazee chanted verses from the Alcoran, in which the attendants joined. The streets were crowded with the inhabitants many of whom prostrated themselves as the corpse passed and were loud in their lamentations.

Meer Allum and the Nizam's chiefs, accompanied by Captain Malcolm and a great number of officers of the army, were at the gate of the Lall-

baugh and having paid their respects to the corpse, joined in the procession. On reaching the tomb the Flank Companies formed a street, through which the body passed; it was then placed next to that of Hyder Ali and the usual prayers and ceremonies being performed, 5000 Rupees, which had been given by order of Colonel Wellesley for the purpose, were distributed by the Cazee among the faqueers and poor who attended. A violent storm immediately succeeded the ceremony; peals of the loudest thunder, with continued flashes of lightning and the heaviest rain, made it quite awful and could not but stamp on the minds of all present, a lasting impression of the scene, which they had just witnessed.

Two officers in camp were struck dead by the lightning and several persons were much hurt.

6th May.

The Commissioners assembled in the Fort and resolved to send letters to Futty Hyder (Tippoo's eldest son) Cumer-a-deen and Porneah, offering them protection, if they would deliver themselves up and assist in settling the new Government. As their families are in the Fort, and as they can have no better prospect, there is every reason to think they will comply without hesitation.

Colonel Wellesley has been appointed in General Orders, to command in the Fort of Seringapatam. This has given great offence to General Baird and he has expressed his sense of the injustice which he conceives, has been done him, in the warmest terms to General Harris. There may be political and good reasons, why Colonel Wellesley should have been ultimately appointed to the permanent command; but the generality of the army ignorant of these reasons, naturally take part in General Baird's feelings; and after having so signalized himself on the storm, some pains should have been taken at head-quarters to have prevented those feelings from being so severely wounded; and surely it might have been contrived without making any sacrifice of the public service.

The plundering still continuing, it became absolutely necessary, in order to put a stop to it, to make the most severe example and four men were hung by the Provost Martial, in the most conspicuous place in the fort. The dead bodies lying about are become most shocking sights. The Pioneers are employed to remove and bury them, but it will be a work of several days. Dr. Anderson has shewn every possible attention to the wounded of the enemy: they have been collected together, have been dressed and fed by our surgeons.

The Bombay Army moved ground and encamped on the north bank of the river opposite the N. E. angle of the fort; the heavy guns and stores are removing to the glacis, and head-quarters is fixed in the Dowletbaug.

7th May.

Two Regiments of Europeans and two Battalions of Sepoys, with a proportion of Artillery, are ordered into the fort as the garrison. Captain Macleod has taken charge of the Civil Department. Cowl flags have been hung up in the different streets in consequence of which the inhabitants are opening their shops and exposing their goods for sale.

8th May.

Ali Reza Cawn is now at Vellore; his pension is very liberal; I believe 2000 Pagodas a year.

Ali Reza Cawn, one of the Vaqueels who negotiated the treaty of peace with Marquis Cornwallis, came in with a message from Cumer-a-deen Cawn to the General; that as Fate, by the fall of Seringapatam and the death of the Sultan had placed the Government of the country, at the disposal of the English, submission was the only honourable course for him to take which he did without hesitation or making any conditions; confiding in the justice and consideration of the English Government, who were aware of his rank and family, and of his wish to be put in possession of the jaghire of his father near Gooramconda. The General sent an answer with assurances of respect for his character and attention to his claims. This decided and manly conduct of Cumer-a-deen, has impressed every body with a favourable opinion of his character.

9th May.

The General received a letter from Cumer-a-deen requesting his orders, as to the disposal of about 4000 horse under his command; and proposing to pay the General a visit the next day General Harris consulted with Meer Alum on the subject; who gave it as his opinion, that as Cumer-a-deen was a man of family and great reputation, it would be proper to give him such general assurances as would conciliate his good will and gain him as a friend, which was of much importance; to say, that in every arrangement, he would be suitably provided for and if he wished to have a command in the Mysore Army (which Meer Allum from the purport of several etters he had received from Cumar-a-deen, conceived to be the case) that he had no doubt, but his wish would be complied with. In respect to the force under Cumar-a-deen, as it was of great importance to prevent it from dispersing and plundering the country, they should be informed, that whatever arrangement might be made, troops would be required for the country, and that they wouldeasily get

service; and that in the meantime, they should be regularly paid as heretofore.

Examined the several fords, and pointed out to the Quarter Master General of the Bombay Army, the ground on the south side of the river, which the Commander-in-Chief wished General Stuart to occupy.

10th May.

Captain Macleod was sent to meet Cumeradeen; who was received at head-quarters by Colonel Close and conducted to the General. It was a visit of mere form and after the usual ceremonials and presents, the Cawn took his leave. He then visited Meer Allum and was afterwards conducted to the Fort; tents having been pitched by his desire in his garden. Cumer-a-deen is of a remarkably robust frame of body and very corpulent; he is much marked with the smallpox, his complexion is dark and his countenance, which has nothing of character in it, is far from agreeable. He is much respected, not less for his military talents, than for his honour and justice—he came on horseback and we were told, that he never goes into a palanquin.

11th May.

Poorneah sent a message to General Harris, expressing his desire to pay his respects to the General and regretting that he was prevented by the rising of the river.

The river rose considerably the night after the assault, and might have retarded our progress, but would not have prevented the capture of the place, although it would have been a more arduous undertaking.

General Floyd arrived with the detachment under Colonels Brown and Read, and encamped on the south side of the river, near the Chengali ford.

I this morning went round the fort with Baird and Captain Lambton; and was much gratified with many particulars of storm. How truly enviable must have been Baird's feelings severely wounded and taken prisoner by Hyder Ali in the year 1780; treated with every indignity; in close confinement in Seringapatam, until peace was made in 1784; and to command the assault of that very place, where he gained infinite honour and where the tyrant Tippoo fell.

It was most fortunate that we did not storm in the night; for the broad and deep wet ditch, between the inner rampart and the cavalier,

The Zenana was searched at request of the Prize agents, but no treasure found. Particular care was taken by Colonel Wellesley to prevent the women being subject to the slightest inconvenience. They were removed to a retired part of the palace, and after the search returned to the Zenana.

of which we had no knowlege, would in the dark, have been an insurmountable obstacle and probably have occasioned a repulse.

I examined the river on the north face, where Lord Cornwallis proposed to have crossed; and there is not the smallest doubt, had the siege been prosecuted but he would have carried the place with ease.

12th May.

Poorneah paid a visit to General Harris; assured him of his inclination to have come in from the first; and that Futty Hyder would attend the General whenever he desired. Poorneah suggested that for the present, the Silladars should be directed to go to the jaghires they formerly held, for the maintenance of their parties; and remain there until a final arrangement could be made; that the horses should be taken for the Circar and the men be paid, until provided for. He urged the propriety and dignity, of making a liberal provision for the sons of Tippoo; one of whom, he trusted, would be placed on the Musnud; we at the same time keeping a body of troops in the country. Under such an arrangement, he said he might be employed but under any other, he hoped to be allowed to go to Ramissaram. Poorneah appears to deserve the character he bears for shrewdness and ability. It was settled, that Futty Hyder should come in the next day.

Poorneah's agent shewed Captain Malcolm a letter from Cumer-a-deen to Futty Hyder; in which he desires that Prince, not to enter into any negotiation with the English, lest it should be contrary to that which Ali Reza was negotiating in his name. As Ali Reza negotiated for Cumer-a-deen only, without mentioning Futty Hyder; this gross duplicity was meant to hurt the interest of the Princes; and probably was partly the cause why Futty Hyder has so long delayed coming in.

13th May.

Futty Hyder came to the north bank of the river from beyond the French Rocks, where he had been since the fall of Seringapatam; but did not visit the General.

The Bombay Army, which had previously crossed to the south side of the river, commenced their march back to Malabar Coast.

Although there are a variety of opinions as to the nature of the Covriporam Pass, yet from all I can learn, from Captain Munro and many others, who were with Colonel Read, it was found to be, as it had been described. The proof that it was not difficult is that the detachments

with a very large convoy marched the first day, from Covriporam ... and a half; the second 9; and the third 10 and a half, to Cowdahelly; and they were much impeded by thousands of Brinjaries. Nizam's Horse and followers, who were going down the pass while the detachment was marching up; besides, the road was not repaired. Had the army gone through it, the Pioneers would previously have been employed to remove every obstacle; and I am persuaded, there would not have been more, perhaps less difficulty, than we experienced between Maranhelly and Kankanhelly. The scarcity of forage and water, from the failure of rain, was the principal objection to that route; and Colonel Brown's detachment in April, the very worst month of the year, being the last of the dry season, were more sensible of this, than we should have been in the month of February. In the dry state of the tanks in the Barramall, we could not have taken that route; and as it is impossible to have been more fortunate, we may congratulate ourselves, that we went by Kankanhelly.

Beatson received a letter of the 23rd April, from Lord Mornington, informing him that a vessel was ordered to be ready at Bombay to convey his Lordship's despatches to Bussora; and that as Tippoo was likely to be compelled to sue for peace, he wished that one of us should proceed to Bombay, to go home overland. Beatson declined this. After much enquiry, having reason to think there was little chance of getting a vessel on the Malabar Coast particularly as the General had not heard from the Admiral; being ignorant whether the fleet was at Cananore; the monsoon to all appearance having set in; besides, the General having the day after the capture of Seringapatam, sent letters to be forwarded by the Admiral by sea and overland; I also determined to go to Madras, and not to make an attempt, in which I was so likely to fail. Beatson and I propose setting off in a day or two, having received the General's permission.

14th May.

Captain Malcolm went to meet Futty Hyder; he found him under a common mean tent, with about 50 or 60 Sirdars, who attended him to head-quarters. General Harris received him with every mark of attention. Futty Hyder was much depressed and affected; no doubt, by the change of his fortunes. All the Sirdars, Chiefs of Regular Horse paid great respect and deference to their Prince and to Porneah; they were seated on the ground, Futty Hyder alone, being on a chair. It was a painful visit to all parties. Ameed-Cawn, one of the Sirdars, a very fine looking man, raised himself up, and in a loud voice addressed the General, at the same time was perfectly respectful and dignified in his manner. "You have been successful," said he; "behave in such a manner" pointing to Futty Hyder that

...me for justice, may go as far as your fame for victory; the whole world acknowledge that the English are brave, shew, that you are equally generous." There was something in his manner as well as speech, that impressed every person present, with respect for his character.

After dresses had been presented to Futty Hyder and to the principal Sirdars, the Prince retired, and was conducted by Captain Malcolm to a house in the fort, prepared for his reception.

General Harris has received a letter from Lord Mornington in consequence of intelligence respecting the French in Egypt. His Lordship thinks no officer should quit his post, and he particularly mentions Beatson and me paying us at the same time some compliments. This distinction is flattering, and in some measure reconcile us to the disappointment. This prohibition will be removed no doubt, as soon as his Lordship is informed of our successes and the annihilation of Tippoo's Army.

15th May.

Looked at ground for the army, on the north side of the river, and went over the field of battle, where Lord Cornwallis, this day eight years, gained a complete victory over Tippoo.

16th May.

The army encamped on the north bank of the river; the infantry on the west and the cavalry on the east side of the Carrigal-hills. The Nizam's Horse are opposite the Douletbaug, in which Meer Allum resides.

When I waited on the General the other day, to ask his permission to proceed to the Presidency, he thought I was going to make some request, respecting the appointment of Quarter Master General; and without waiting to hear what I had to say, told me, that he would most readily come into any arrangement I proposed. I thanked him and having undeceived him, said there was nothing that the Service offered which could induce me to remain in the country, now that I could retire with propriety. The General has repeatedly regretted that he had not made me Quarter-Master General; this is so far satisfactory as it shews, that his refusal to recommend me for the appointment, when Richardson proposed to resign, was not because he thought me ill-qualified: There was mystery in the whole of his conduct in that business and something which perhaps will never come to light. I have given the General a map of the marches of the army, which he means to send to the Governor General; and I have addressed an official letter to the Adjutant-General, that a just sense of the duty which I owe not less to the service than to my own character, detained me in India, while there was a prospect of the army being

actively employed in the field; but conceiving that I now can retire with propriety, I have to request he will procure for me the Commander-in-chief's leave to proceed to Madras; it being my intention to solicit the permission of Government to embark for Europe, on the first ship that sails.

In the evening, General Harris informed me that Beatson and I might proceed to Madras; and that he meant to send his son, in charge of the Colors of Seringapatam, otherwise he would have entrusted them to me. He assured me that he would in his public letters speak of me in such terms of approbation as my services and character merited.

17th May.

Took leave of many valuable friends and in the afternoon left head-quarters with Beatson, Conolly and Harris. We joined a detachment under Colonel Read, which lay a few miles from Seringapatam, and which is to take possession of the several forts, between this and the Carnatic.

18th May.

The detachment marched to Kerakode. Colonel Read detached a party under Major Torin towards Ryacotta to take possession of Copaulchoog, Ramgerry, Shevanagerry and Marlawady. As Lord Mornington was expected at Ryacotta, a Regiment of Cavalry was sent with us to escort his Lordship to Seringapatam.

19th May.

Colonel Read moved towards Sawendroog and we turned off to the eastward and encamped half way between Kerakode and Muddoor.

There were found in the Fort 373 guns, 60 Mortars and 11 Howitzers of brass; 466 guns, 12 Mortars and 7 guns unfinished, of iron; in all, 929 pieces of ordnance of which, 287 were mounted on the fortification; 424, 400 rounds shot; 520,000 pounds of powder; 99,000 muskets, Carbines, &c., of which there were 30,000 stand of French and 7,000 of the Company's arms, which had never been used.

In the fort, there are 11 powder magazines for making small arms; ? buildings for boring guns and muskets; 5 large arsenals; and 17 other [illegible]ildings filled with swords, accoutrements, rockets and a variety of [illegible]all stores.

The confusion and want of arrangement, in all these military store-houses could not fail to strike every observer; and it is surprizing that Tippoo, who of late years seemed to have neglected everything, except military preparations, should have taken so little pains to place so essential

a branch of them upon a more respectable footing: his gun carriages in particular, are extremely heavy, ill-constructed and in bad repair; not only those in the fort, but also those of his field train; and this the more surprizing, because he had many of our field carriages, which would have served as models.

The French force at Seringapatam after the siege was not more than 120 (of whom 20 were Officers) commanded by Mons. Chapuy. They had remained with Futty Hyder and came in with that Prince.

There were 100 elephants, 240 camels and 3,164 horses; of which, about 400 horses and as many mares, will answer for our cavalry.

Our loss during the siege (from the 4th of April to the 4th of May) was 22 Officers killed and 45 wounded; 181 Non-Commissioned rank and file Europeans killed, 622 wounded, and 22 missing; 119 natives killed, 420 wounded and 100 missing; making in all 1,531; of whom, 322 were killed, 1087 wounded, and 122 missing. Most of the missing of the natives, were young recruits, who returned to the Carnatic; principally owing to the scarcity of provisions.

By a present state of the armies of Madras and Bombay and the contingent, the force at Seringapatam was as follows:

	958	Cavalry	Europeans
	881	Artillery	
	24	Engineers	
	6,513	Infantry	
Total	8,376		
	865	Horses	
	1,787	Cavalry	
	2,079	Artillery	
	19,428	Infantry	
	1,436	Pioneers	
	130	Store Lascars	
Total	24,860		
	1,753	Horses.	

being 8,376 Europeans, 24,860 Natives, in all 33,236 fighting men; 2,618 horses; exclusive of the detachments under Colonels Brown and Read (the former of which consisted of 4,400 men;) the Nizam's Sepoys 4,600 and his horse nearly 10,000; making in all a force of about 54000 men actually employed in the field.

About 21,000 shot and 2,400 sixty pound barrels of powder were expended by us during the siege. 6,420 fascines, 1,007 gabions and 20,000 pickets were made.

The present state of the King's troops in the field, on the 16th May, was as follows:—

Corps	Fit for Duty — Ryn	Ry File	Sick — S.	Rfs File
19th Light Dragoons	20 :	331	—4 :	100
25th ditto	22 :	395	—2 :	28
12th Foot	32 :	470	–11 :	136
33rd	40 :	649	—3 :	66
73rd	29 :	491	—5 :	63
74th	30 :	510	—6 :	142
Scotch Brigade	23 :	340	—8 :	92
Regt. de Meuron.	44 :	523	—2 :	65
Total.	240 :	3,709	–41 :	692

Making in all 4682.

By a Memorandum I received from Major Hart, it appears, that he received at Madras, 14,713 bullock loads of rice; of which 2,571 were left at Vellore by order of the Commander-in-Chief. In addition to the quantity he brought on with the army (12,142 loads) he received 4,700 from the Commissary of Supplies. Rice was regularly issued to the troops from the 1st of March at the rate of ¾ seer to the Europeans and ½ seer to the Natives. There was sufficient to serve the troops up to the 20th of May. This included 1,260 bullock loads, which were tendered to the General, by an individual in the army and removed very serious apprehensions of a scarcity, before General Floyd was expected to join.

Tippoo has 26 children, thirteen sons and the same number of daughters. The eldest 26 years old, the youngest only 18 months.——— Padshaw-Begum; his eldest daughter, died about two years ago at the age of 23.—

* Hostage with Lord Cornwallis. The only legitimate son and intended successor.

** Hostage with Lord Cornwallis.

Sons.	Age	Daughters	Age
Futty Hyder	26	* Biby-Begum	15
* Abdul Khalick	21	** Asmut-Ulnissa Begum	12
{ MahomedSultan }	15½	Noor Ulnissa Begum	10
{ Mohei-ud-deen }		Ameena Begum	10
** Maoioz-ud-deen	15'4m	Fatimah Begum	8
Yaseen—Sahib ...	12	Hollim-Sahib Begum	5
Subhaun Sahib	11	Buddoor Ulnissa Begum	5
Shuk-un-Ullah	9	Ahommudy-Begum	4
Sarour-ud-deen	6	Umdut-Begum	4
Jamei-ud-deen	5	Kerim-Unnissa	4
Mununowir-ud-deen	2½	Noor Jehan-Begum	2
Golam-Mohammed	2	Hussain-Begum	1¾
Golam-Ahommed	1¾	Sud-Begum	1½
Sandy-Sahib	8m		

* Married to the son of a favorite killadar Said-Shah Abbus.

** Married to Meer-Abdul Kadir.

The following is a translation of the Persian inscription, on most of the Furzees and blunderbusses, found in the place.

" This incomparable piece, belonging to the Sultan of the East, which has no equal, but in the most vivid lightning, will annihilate the enemy that it strikes, although Fate should otherwise have ordained him to live.

The following is a translation of the several Arabic lines, on the handle of Tippoo's sword, which was to be placed on his Musnud and of which I am in possession.

" My victorious sabre, is lightning for the destruction of the unbelievers.

"Hyder, the Lord of the Faith, is victorious for my advantage.

" And, moreover, he destroyed the wicked race who were unbelievers: Praise be to him, who is the Lord of Worlds!

" Thou art our Lord, support us against the people who are unbelievers!

" He to whom the Lord giveth victory prevails over all (mankind.)

" Oh Lord, make him victorious, who promoteth the faith of Mahomed.

" Confound him, who injureth the faith of Mahomed; and withhold us from those who are so inclined.

" The Lord is predominant over his own works. Victory and conquest "are from the Almighty.

" Bring happy tidings, oh Mahomed, to the faithful; for God is the "kind Protector, and He is the most merciful of the merciful.

" If God assists thee, thou wilt prosper. May the Lord God assist "thee, oh Mahomed, with mighty victory."

On some gold medals found in the palace, there is in Persian characters on one side, " Oh God the Bestower of Blessings " and on the other, " Victory and Conquest are from the Almighty." They were struck, in commemoration of some victory; but they have no date nor could I learn on what occasion, probably after the war of 1780.

Translation of an inscription upon a stone, found in Seringapatam and which was meant to have been put up in a conspicuous place in the Fort.

" Oh almighty God! disperse the whole body of infidels! scatter their "tribe, cause their feet to stagger! overthrow their councils! change their "state! destroy their very root! cause death to be near them, cut off from "them the means of sustenance! shorten their days! be their bodies, the "constant object of their cares! *deprive their eyes of sight make black their

** Meaning, infest them with diseases.

"faces! (*a*) destroy in them the organs of speech! slay them as Shedand (*b*) "was slain! drown them as Pharoah was drowned and visit them with the "severity of thy wrath. Oh avenger! Oh avenger! Oh Universal Father! "I am depressed and overpowered, grant me thy assistance."

Probably this inscription was cut since the last war, after half his dominions and a large sum of money had been wrested from him by Marquis Cornwallis. It shews his inveterate rancour and determined enmity to the English, of which there are numberless proofs. On this occasion, one might suppose that he had taken a leaf out of Ernunlphus's book of Curses.

On a three pound shot, carefully wrapt up and found in the Royal Store rooms, there was an inscription in Persian purporting that "Dalway Deo Raji having proved ungrateful, placed two guns before the Nursee-Pagoda (the great Pagoda in the Fort) and fired two shots on the palace of Kishen Raje" (Rajah of Mysore) Tippoo ordered the shot to be taken out of the door, in which it had lodged and the above to be cut upon it, to commemorate the circumstance.

One morning, when I was with Colonel Wellesley in the Fort, a fine-looking young man, an inhabitant of Seringapatam, who spoke English remarkably well gave a letter written by himself, to the Colonel soliciting his protection. He passes the highest encomiums on the bravery and humanity of the English, contrasted with the usual conduct of Tippoo's troops; and states, that an European soldier, taken prisoner in the battle of Sattannoyalum, had been placed under his charge; that he gave him victuals and clothes and every thing he required: in return, that the soldier taught him English. The man belonged to the 19th Dragoons and was kept in Cumer-a-deen's family, who now and then used to amuse himself, by taking lessons of English. This was reported to Tippoo, whose jealousy being excited, he desired the European to be brought to him. Having asked Cumar-a-deen if it was true, that he had learned English and being answered in the affirmative, the inhuman monster desired the Cawn to take his last lesson, and ordered the unfortunate European to be hung in his presence.

It is impossible that Tippoo could have been beloved by his people. The Musselman, certainly looked up to him, as the head of their faith and by them, perhaps his death is regretted but they could not have been

(*a*) Bring shame and disgrace upon them!,
(*b*) A tradition exists that a king of this name presumptuously aiming to establish a Paradise for himself was slain by the command of God.

attached to him, by affection or why the necessity of that barbarous policy, which Tippoo was constrained to adopt of keeping in close confinement in the fort af Seringapatam, the families of his principal officers and of his troops in general.

The report of Tippoo having inhumanly murdered the unfortunate Europeans who fell into his hands during the siege, has been confimed: Their bodies were dug up. They had been strangled in the Fort by Tippoo's orders. On the 28th of April, the day, perhaps at the very hour, that he was writing a letter to General Harris, proposing to send ambassadors to camp to negotiate a peace, was this deed perpetrated ! Of the real character of this Prince, we hitherto have been ignorant ! but now it will be placed in its true light. That he was suspicious, vindictive, cruel and hurried away by the sadder impulse of passion, to which he was subject even without any apparent provocation, is certain; and probably it will be found, that he was more deficient in military talents, and others as essential to govern an extensive kingdom than has been generally imagined. Every circumstance relating to such a character becomes interesting. Rajah Cawn, a slave who always attended Tippoo and prepared his Betel has given a particular account of his conduct, for the last fourteen days previous to his death. He says that during the whole of the siege, Tippoo lived in a tent, between the walls on the north face of the Fort. On the morning of the 4th of May, he went to those parts of the works, most exposed to the fire of our batteries to encourage his men. Expecting from the information he had received and from the unusual number of men in the trenches, that we should storm in the course of that evening or during the night, he ordered his people to eat their dinner and be prepared for us. Scarce had he returned to his tent to take some refreshment, but he was apprized, that our troops were moving out of the trenches to the assault. He hastened along the north rampart towards the breach and found his troops giving way. Encouraged by his presence and example, they rallied; and it is said, he killed or wounded two or three Europeans with his own fuzee: but nothing at this time, could check the ardour of our troops. Tippoo was wounded and mounted a favourite mare that had been brought after him. He retreated with the crowd along the ramport, till he came to the gateway, which leads into the body of the place. Here the confusion was prodigious; our troops halted and fired several volleys, and at the time and under this gateway Tippoo fell. Raja Cawn proposed to him, to make himself known to our soldiers, which he refused and immediately after received a wound; which killed him on the spot.

Rajah Cawn is of opinion, that Tippoo's object, when compelled to retreat, was to reach the Palace! and that he intended to have put an end to himself and his family, to avoid that disgrace, to which his women would have been exposed, in the fury of the storm. He had too much reason to dread the meeting of our Europeans.

20th May.

Halted at Madoor. The inhabitants bring everything to us that we require; and seem quite reconciled to the change of masters.

21st May.

Arrived at Chenopatam. This fort was destroyed by Tippoo at the commencement of the last war. I am persuaded it never could have been Tippoo's intention to have removed the seat of Government to this place. This was a prevalent opinion, some years since.

22nd May.

Arrived at Moodoowady, which gave up immediately. This is an insignificant post and of no importance not being on any great road. Copant-droog, Ramgerry and Shevanagerry also surrendered, on the approach of parties of sepoys, detached by Major Torin, with letters to the Killedars, from the English Circar at Seringapatam. These letters were signed by the person who was styled killedar of all the forts in the Sultan's dominions.

23rd May.

Arrived at Rampoor.

24th May.

Arrived at Annacull, having marched the direct road through a difficult pass and very wild country. The road could be made tolerably good for detachments going to the westward down the pass. All the country in the neighbourhood of Annacull, which was covered with forage and abundantly supplied with water, when the army passed the 10th of March is now quite parched up and the tanks almost dry. In the afternoon, Beatson, Conolly, Harris and myself, came on with a small guard of Sepoys to protect our baggage, to Kellamungolam. All the inhabitants appear quite reconciled to the change of Government, and they make frequent enquiries for Colonel Read, whose reputation has reached every part of the Mysore country.

Mr. Wellesley and Colonel Kirkpatrick arrived at Kellamungolam in the course of the night, on their way to Seringapatam. Lord Mornington has not left Madras.

25th May.

Arrived at Ryacotta, found there a note from Lord Mornington, addressed to Beatson, Harris and myself, desiring to have 24 hours' previous notice of our arrival at Madras; as it was his intention to receive the Colours of Seringapatam publicly in the fort.

26th May.

Arrived at Kistnagerry. Great improvements have been made in the lower fort; but it is a great deal too confined to admit of any quantity of stores being lodged below, and there is not space to draw up a hundred carriages. It is fortunate perhaps, that it will no longer be a question, whether this place should be made a depôt for stores and grain.

27th May.

Arrived at Tipatore.

28th May.

Arrived at Amboor. Captain King having provided pellankine boys for me, I set off immediately and reached Vellore in the afternoon, to the no small mortification of my fellow travellers. Being informed that Lord Mornington was to leave Madras on the 30th in the evening, I prevailed upon Mr. Skardon to furnish me with bearers and set off from Vellore after supper.

29th May.

I reached Conjeveram in the afternoon. Luckily my Dubash was there; with his and Mr. Hodson's aid, I got to Madras early the next morning.

30th May.

I immediately waited on Lord Mornington and was received with every mark of kindness and in a manner particularly gratifying. Being the first Officer from the army, I had a very long and unreserved conversation with his Lordship.

31st May.

Lord Mornington, after expressing himself in the handsomest manner of my services during the campaign and assuring me that he should make them known to His Majesty's Ministers, as well as to the Court of Directors, and even the King himself, told me that the only public mark of distinction which he had in his power to confer upon me, was to make me his Honorary Aide-de-Camp and he presented me with the Order for the appointment. Judging from his Lordship's conversation, that it was possible the French might make some attempt to land a force on the Malabar Coast, and that it might be necessary to keep part of the army in the field, I told his Lordship, although I was anxious to embark for England on the first ship that sailed, that I should, however, consider myself entirely at his disposal.

2nd June.

Lord Clive was equally kind.

A Proclamation was published announcing the arrival of Lieutenant Harris in charge of the Colours of Seringapatam and that his Lordship had appointed the 4th of June for the public reception of them in the Fort; after which ceremony, his Lordship would proceed to the Church, to offer up a public thanks giving for the interposition of Providence in the late

signal and important success of our armies in Mysore; by which the treacherous designs of our enemies had been frustrated and the British possessions had been delivered from the peril of foreign invasion and restored to state of security and ease.

An account of this ceremony appeared in the Madras papers.

By the most authentic accounts, Tippoo's army at the commencement of the War, consisted of 47,470 *fighting men,* exclusive of Pioneers, Lascars, &c., &c. There were 3,503 stable Horse, 9,392 Silladar or Irregular Horse, 23,483 Regular Infantry; 6,209 Armed Militia; 4,747 Ashaam or Peons; 101 Buckshees, or Brigadiers; 9 Meer Subdoors, or Superintending Officers of Forts; and 26 Meer Meerams or Generals. The monthly expense was 2,92,349 Cantaray, equal to 2,43,624 Star pagodas.

Reply of Lord Mornington to Major Allam, on being presented Tippoo Sultan's sword.—"The gift is peculiarly acceptable from an officer distinguished throughout the whole campaign by the most meritorious exertions of activity and valour, and particularly at the close of it, by the most generous efforts of humanity and compassion. I shall always remember with pleasure the personal kindness of such a character towards myself and I am happy to take this public opportunity of expressing my sense of those manly and amiable qualities which have appeared with such lustre not only in the moment of difficulty and danger, but in that of victory and conquest."

Tippoo's Military Forces of every description amounted to 94.537; which includes Gunners, Lascars, Artificers attached to Corps and Departments, Public followers, grass-cutters attached to the Cavalry, &c. &c. viz.:—

Staff	436	
Sircar or Stable Horse	7,630	
Silladar or Irregular Horse	9,453	
Regular Infantry	34,484	
French Brigade	440	
Peons	4,730	
Pioneers	6,508	
Garrison of Seringapatam	5,419	—69,100
Garrisons—		
Regular Infantry	7,966	
Peons	17,471	—25,437
Total Military force of every description		94,537

Tippoo had 11,800 fighting men, when he attacked General Suart's outposts at Sedaseer; 3,000 composed the right hand column, the same number the left, and 1,860 men the centre; the reserve of 4,000 men was commanded by Tippoo in person. Futty Hyder, Sultan Mohei-ud-deen, Cumeradeen Cawn and most of his principal officers were present. 1,500 men were killed and wounded, among the former, was the Binkey Nabob, a most distinguished officer.

At the Battle of Mallavelly, he had 27,500 men, with 42 field-pieces and 8 heavy guns: 6500 Infantry composed the first, and 10,000 the second line: There were 2,000 Regular and 9,000 Silladar Horse. 1,000 men were killed and wounded.

During the Campaign 45 officers of rank were killed and wounded in Tippoo's Army; 9 of whom were Meer Merams.

From a statement of the Revenues of Mysore, agreeably to the Schedule of 1792, they amount to 30,41,809 Cantaray or 25,34,840 Star pagodas. There is reason to believe they will be found to be nearly double that sum; that there will be an increase of at least 80 per. cent. is thought certain.

Agreeably to the Partition Treaty of Mysore, 2 June 1799, they have been divided as follows; 7,87,170 to the English, out of which 2,40,000 is to be appropriated for the maintenance of the families of Hyder Ali and Tippoo Sultan having 5,47,170 or 4,55,975 Star Pagodas.— 6,17,332 to the Nizam, including 70,000, the Jaghire to Cumeradeen Cawn and his relations; leaving 5,47,332 Cantaray pagoda 2,64,015 eventually to be given to the Mahrattas; at present under the management of Mysore.

13,73,291 to the Rajah of Mysore, out of which he is to pay the Company a subsidy of 8,40,000 or 7 lacks of Star pagodas.

Since the war of 1792 the management of the revenues of Mysore was entrusted principally to Meer Saduck.

In a statement of Tippoo's Jemabundy for 1797/8 it appears, that the following sums were allotted as Jaghires, &c.

Tippoo's 4 eldest Sons	To Futty Hyder ...	12,000 Cantaray pagodas.	
	Abdul Kalick ...	12,000	
	Sultan Mohei-ud-deen	4,300	
	Moiza-ud-deen ...	4,300—32,600	
	Said Saheb now called Meer Mohun-ud-deen.	12,000	
	Cumeradeen ...	4,000	
	Cootab-a-deen ...	2,700	
	Babber Jung ...	2,550	
	Poligar of Benban ...	5,000	
	Meer Mahomed, Brother of Cumer-a-deen/	900	59,750
	Inams to Pagodas, Mosques and Bramins, estimated at		2,50,000
		Cantaray pagoda:	3,09,750

deducted from the gross revenue.

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In the year 1795, the Jemabundy of Tippoo's Dominions was increased 3¾ Cantaray fanams on each pagoda of 10 fanams; being near 38 per cent. and amounting to 19,67,877 Cantaray pagodas.

All revenue accounts are kept in *Cantaray* pagodas. There are 10 Cantaray fanams to a Cantaray pagoda and 12 in a Star pagoda. To find the amount in *star* pagodas, add a decimal and divide by 12.—

12/19,678770
16,39,897½ Star Pag.

Memorandum of Prize property. Star pagodas.

16,00,000—in specie		actually counted and valued.
6,50,000—in jewels		
4,50,000—	in jewels	not valued, but supposed by the Prize Agents, to be the amount.
3,00,000—	grain	
10,00,000—	cloths &c.	
30,000—	the throne	The Military stores probably 10 lacks.

40,30,000 Star pagodas, equal to one million six hundred thousand pounds.

The Library, which is very valuable, is to be given to the Court of Directors for the foundation of their Eastern Literature; the duplicate copies are to be sent to the Asiatic Society, Calcutta.

A diamond Star and ornaments are to be presented by the army to Lord Mornington.

Tippoo's war turban, one of his swords and a sword of Morarirow's, are to be sent to Marquis Cornwallis.

A sword found in Tippoo's bed-chamber was publicly presented by General Harris to General Baird.

Memorandum from Captain Walker.

21st. February, the Bombay army marched from Cananore to Coralli, distance 8 miles.

22nd. To Kolliand, 10½ miles.

23rd. Halted.

24th. Marched to Stoney river, 11½ miles.

25th. Ascended the Poodacherrum-gaut and encamped in the Coorga country, distance 7 miles.

2nd March. Army encamped at Sedaseer, the Right Brigade took post at Sedaseer, and the Left remained with the provisions at Ahmootinar.

5th. The enemy appeared encamped Periapatam.

6th. The post at Sedaseer attacked by the enemy.

10th. April. Joined General Floyd at Periapatam.

14th. Joined the Grand Army at Seringapatam.

16th. Crossed the Cavery and took up ground on the north side of

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13th May. The Bombay army commenced its march back to Malabar, halted half way between Seringapatam and Suguapoor.

14th. Encamped at Suguapoor.

15th. Encamped 3 miles beyond Cutti-Marlawady.

16th. Encamped at 2 miles west of Periapatam.

17th. Halted and made arrangements for descending the Gauts.

20th. The advance descended Poodacherum Gauts.

23rd. The first division arrived at Cananore, and the corps as they came up in succession, proceeded to their respective cantonments. The army was distributed as follows :

Cananore. European Regiments, the Artillery and one Native Regiment.

Colaparamba. One Native Battalion.

Tillicherry. One European and one Native Regiment.

Mangalore, Beckla-Deriah, Behandergur and Sydashagur, in *Canara.* Three Native Battalions and a detachment of artillery without guns. This force marched on the 30th of May and arrived at Mangalore on the 4th of June. Inmalabad refused to surrender, but all the other forts in Canara had either been taken possession of or made offers of submission.

After occupying these posts, the principal part of the detachment cantoned in the neighbourhood of the old fort of Mangalore, which is now in ruins. No barracks, as we had so often heard, had been built for the reception of the French at that place ; but the inhabitants pointed out four large houses, which the Sultan had destined for their accommodation.

Memorandum from B. S.

"The present Rajah of Mysore is a child of about 5 years of age, "and is the 4th in descent from Kistna Raje Wourrear deposed by "Hyder Ali. He is of the Khetry caste and his name is Nanderaj "Wourrear.

"Kistna Raje died about 32 years ago "and was succeeded in his "nominal authority by his eldest son Nunderaje who dying at the age of "14, left his brother Cham Raje at the head of the family.

Cham Raje lived only to the age of 12 and of course having no issue "obliged the Sultan to select some person related to the family as a "successor. Cham Raje (2nd) a child, was the person nominated and he "died of small-pox four years ago and about 24 years of age, leaving the "present incumbent, a mother and five wives. He had been twice married "and on the death of his second wife, Tippoo said there would be no end "to it and sent him five wives whom he married at the same time."

"The present Rajah Nunderaje's family consists of himself, the five "wives above mentioned, a grandmother (96 years old), a wife of "Kistnaraje (58 years), the mother of Cham Raje (60 years) and a "mistress of Kistna-Raje, in all ten persons. He had a small establish-"ment of servants, for which he received an annual allowance of 269 Can. "Pag.: 5 T. besides this he had a monthly allowance of provisions and clothes "issued from the public stores; the former estimated at annually "22-16 C. Pag.:. 8 T. 2 e and the latter at 166 C. P. 8 T., making in all "26-55 C. Pag.: 1 T.: 2-e.

"He was turned out of the palace about three years ago, owing it is "said to Meer Saduck's influence over the Sultan and now resides near the "north face, in a small house adjoining to that of Moina-deen, Tippoo's "fourth son. The palace is an old building, much out of repair, and since "the Rajah's removal has been made use of as an armoury and store-house; "Nunderaje's maternal grandfather is now in Seringapatam; a poor man "named Balaraje. There is also a son-in-law of Kistnaraje, named Narain "Raje, who has a son about 18 years of age, both are in Seringapatam and "in great indigence."

"The Mysore Hindu principality was formed during the convulsion occasioned by the death of Ramraje, Sovereign of Beejanagur of which Mysore was a province, and a disputed claim to the throne of that kingdom. The Rajah of Beejanagur was killed by the confederate Princes of the Deccan, in a pitched battle near Tellĕcottah on the banks of the Kistna in 1563. In the confusion occasioned by this event, Raje Warrior some years afterwards secured that province for himself; at first he was Poligar and subsequently Governor. He was succeeded by his son Chamraje, who was followed by his son Imbaraje. Then came his son Narsingraje, who was succeeded by his nephew Dotaraje, after him followed Nursingraje. Dotakistnaraje and Chamraje, having no children, the kingdom fell to Kistnaraje, a relation, who was deposed by Hyder Ali."—

Lord Mornington has displayed great wisdom, justice, liberality and humanity, in the partition of the conquered dominions of the late Sultan and in every other arrangement he has made. I had many conversations with his Lordship, and have perused much of the official correspondence, and the reasoning on all these measures does honour to his head and heart.

From the justice and success the war, the Company and the Nizam had acquired an undoubted right to dispose of the conquered countries; because the Mahrattas by taking no part, had forfeited every pretension

to any advantage. Tippoo's family could plead no title which had not been superseded by the conquest of the kingdom: nor was it possible to forget the usurpation of Hyder and the sufferings of the family expelled from the Throne; the lineal descendant of which, whatever he might hope from our moderation and humanity, could assert no right to any share.

The army of the late Sultan was annihilated; most of the forts had either surrendered or were likely soon to be in our possession; and the inhabitants shewed every disposition to submit to our authority.

After the most serious consideration of several plans for the partition of the conquered dominions, Lord Mornington determined on a separate Government of Mysore under the protection of the Company, eventually to admit the Mahrattas to a certain participation and to divide the remainder equally between the Company and the Nizam.

It became painful to determine between the family of Tippoo and that of Mysore. His Lordship's reasoning on this head is placed in the most just and striking point of view. Since the peace of 1792, Tippoo's principal object had been to destroy the British power in India; for which purpose, he sought an alliance with France and sent an Embassy to Zeeman Shah. His heir must have been educated in the same principles. Had he been placed on the throne he would have considered himself degraded to a state of humiliation. Animated by the examples of his father and Hyder Ally, he might have been tempted to risk the remnant of power, to recover independent sovereignty. No sincere alliance could have been formed with such a Prince. An enemy still would have remained in the centre of our possessions ready to avail himself, of the intrigues of French emissaries and of the machinations of discontented factions in India: and what made it necessary to reduce the power of Tippoo, made it equally so to guard against the revival of similar danger, in the person of his son.

Policy, humanity and generosity, favoured the restoration of the ancient family. They naturally would be grateful and attached to that power, who delivered them from oppression and raised them to distinction. They would be jealous of the friends of the usurping family and adverse to the French. Sensible that their continuance on the throne, depended upon the British Government, it would be their interest to unite with cordiality in every place of their mutual benefit. These considerations determined his Lordship to restore the family of Mysore; at the same time to grant to the families of Hyder and Tippoo a munificent maintenance and to provide liberally, for the Chiefs of Tippoo's army and the families of those who had fallen during the war.

Lord Mornington appointed a new Commission for the affairs of Mysore, consisting of General Harris, the Hon'ble Colonel Wellesley, the Hon'ble Henry Wellesley, Colonel Kirkpatrick, and Lieutenant-Colonel Close; Captains Malcolm and T. Munro, Joint Secretaries.

The Commissioners assembled at Seringapatam on the 8th of June and were all bound by oath to secrecy. Agreeably to instructions from Lord Mornington, their first object was to provide for the Chiefs of Tippoo's army. A Jaghire of 70,000 Cantaray pagodas, which had formerly belonged to his father, was settled on Cumer-a-deen-Cawn and his relations; and he left Seringapatam on the 19th June for Gooramconda, to take charge of it. The Chiefs were allowed the same pay as they had received from Tippoo; and a suitable provision was made for the families of those who had fallen during the war. The surprise and gratitude of the chiefs, assembled to have this liberal arrangement communicated to them, can scarce be described; and it must secure their attachment to our Government. The whole expense is inconsiderable and it will decrease, as they die or are otherwise provided for.

Two lakhs and forty thousand Cantaray or two lakhs of Star pagodas were allotted for the annual maintenance of the families of Hyder Ali and Tippoo Sultan. Considerations of delicacy made his Lordship direct that the four eldest sons of Tippoo should be removed from Seringapatam, before any measures were adopted, respecting the restoration of the Mysore Rajah: The previous arrangements having been made by Colonel Wellesley, with the greatest attention to the feelings of the family, they set off with a large escort under Lieutenant-Colonel Coke for Vellore, which place had been prepared for their reception. Lieutenant-Colonel Doveton appointed to that command, was to have the immediate charge of the Princes, whose allowance had been fixed at 50,000 Rupees each.

After the departure of the princes, the Commissioners visited the Mysore family, and found them in the utmost state of wretchedness They communicated through Poorneah, who had been appointed Dewan, the intention of the British Government, to place the young Rajah on the throne; and the interview was very affecting.

The Commissioners next settled the Partition Treaty of Mysore, which was executed by them and Meer Allum on the 22nd of June; was ratified by the Governor General in Council at Madras on the 26th and by the Nizam at Hyderabad on the 13th of July.

In the meanwhile, the Mysore family had been removed from Seringa-

patam to old Mysore, about 9 miles distant, where accommodations had been prepared for them.

The 30th of June, having been fixed upon by the Bramins, as the most auspicious day for placing the young Rajah on the throne, the Commissioners, attended by Meer Allum and escorted by a regiment of European infantry, proceeded to the residence of the family, and performed the ceremony amidst the joyful acclamations of thousands of Hindoos, who had assembled on the occasion.

On the 8th of July, the Commissioners executed the subsidiary treaty with the Rajah of Mysore, which was ratified by the Governor-General in Council at Madras, on the 23rd of the same month.

By this treaty it is stipulated, that we are to protect the Mysore country, in consideration of an annual subsidy of seven lakhs of Star pagodas; with the power to interfere in all internal affairs and even to assume the direct management of the country whenever the Governor-General in Council shall deem it expedient; in which case, the Rajah is to receive annually one lakh of pagodas and one-fifth of the revenues. We are to garrison repair or destroy such forts as we think proper; and the Company reserve to themselves the exclusive possession of the fort and island of Seringapatam, which secures the communication between both coasts and consolidates all our lines of defence.

The Company's acquisitions by the partition treaty, secure an uninterrupted tract of country, from the coast of Coromandel to that of Malabar; the entire sea coast of Mysore, and the Eastern, Western and Southern ranges of Gauts, with the forts at the head of them.

In stating the expenses of the War, those which became indispensably necessary for the *defence* of our possessions, and which were incurred for the magazine of grain, stores, battering train and equipment of cattle, should not be included, because the expediency of putting the army in a state of preparation for field service and advancing it to our frontier, as soon as our Government was advised of the hostile intentions of Tippoo and of his connexion with the French, who had made their way to Egypt, cannot be disputed: this admitted, it may fairly be stated, that the expenses of the war are those only, of moving the army and the battering train into Mysore; which perhaps have not much exceeded the charges, had they remained on our frontier: In which case the expense must have been protracted, until all danger from Tippoo's connexion which the French should have ceased. The movement of the army to

Seringapatam, therefore, was the most effectual and economical measure, in order to frustrate the views of the enemy, and to secure the tranquility of our own possessions. And on the other hand by delay Tippoo would have increased his strength and we, our hazard of the impending contest.

The success of the war, unexampled in its importance, excluded the French from Mysore; has provided ample indemnity for the expenses of it; has destroyed the hostile power of Tippoo; has precluded its revival; has transferred the sword of an implacable enemy into our own hands; and has turned to our own use the main spring of his wealth and strength.

By the Partition treaty, we have acquired an annual augmentation of 6,47,641 Star pagodas; by the Subsidiary Treaty of Mysore, 7 lakhs making 13,47,641; and leaving after deducting for the maintenance of the families of Hyder and Tippoo 11,47,641:—By the Treaty of Hyderabad, the subsidy increased from 6,44,556 to 14,17,100 Arcot rupees; being an addition of 5,64,982 Star pagodas. The total augmentation of our resources since June 1798, is 17,12,623 Star pagodas; and they probably well amount to more than 25 lakhs; if the revenues of the newly acquired territory are realised according to well-founded expectation.

Whatever arrangement might have been made, for the partition of the conquered dominions, no doubt could exist of the propriety of providing for the families of the late Hyder Ali and Tippoo Sultan. Humanity and common justice made it equally proper, to support the ancient family of Mysore; and it was expedient to make some provision, for the principal officers of the late Sultan and the families of those, who had fallen during the war.

Agreeably to the schedule of 1792, the revenues of Tippoo's dominions at the late conquest, amounted to 30,22,535 Cantaray pagodas. Allowing as at present for the families of Tippoo and Hyder 2,40,000; for the family of Mysore, one lakh; and for Cumer-a-deen and the Chiefs &c. 1,60,000; it would make five lakhs; which deducted from the whole revenue, would leave 25,535 Cantaray or 21,02,112 Star pagodas.

An equal division with the Nizam would have excited the jealousy of the Mahrattas. It would have aggrandized the power of the Nizam beyond all bounds of discretion and have increased his dominions to an extent which, in the event of a future rupture, might be attended with serious consequences; more particularly if a junction was formed between that Court and the Mahrattas, it would have placed many strong forts in

the hands of the Nizam, thereby considerably weakening our frontier and consequently would have obliged us to have increased our military establishment: and it would have considerably diminished the revenues of the Company.

By the Treaty of Mysore, the Nizam's share is 5,47,332 Cantaray pagodas exclusive of 70,000 on account of Cumer-a-deen-Cawn which is *less* than if there had been an equal partition by 7,13,935. The Company's share is 5,47,170, and by the subsidiary Treaty of Mysore an addition of 7 lakhs of Star or 8,40,000 Cantaray pagodas, making 13,87,170, which is *more* than if there had been an equal partition, by 1,25,903.

An equal partition between the Company, the Nizam, and the Mahrattas would have been impolitic and a bad example to native allies: It would have been unjust to the Company, as well as to the Nizam; because as the Mahrattas had borne no expense or hazard in the war and had taken no part, they had forfeited all claim to a participation of the advantages; although it might be desirable to conciliate their good will. There were the same objections in a military point of view; weakening our northern frontier and having in the hands of two native powers, who alone can affect our future tranquility in the peninsula, most of the strong forts. And the Nizam would have had just cause of complaint; not only for the diminution of his portion, but for the aggrandizement of a power, already too formidable to him. If there had been an equal partition between the Company, the Nizam and the Mahrattas, each would have had an annual revenue of 8,40,845 Cantaray pagodas. The Company's share, including the Mysore Subsidy, is 13,87,170; by this mode therefore, the Company would have received 5,46,325 *less* than at present.

If there had been a partition of the territories into five parts; two to the Company, two to the Nizam and one to the Mahrattas, the Company would have received 10,09,014, which is 3,78,156 *less* than at present.

If there had been a partition, giving the same proportion as at present to the Mahrattas, and dividing the remainder, equally between the Company and the Nizam, the Company's share would have been 11,29,260, which is 2,57,910 *less* than at present.

On a comparative statement therefore, of several plans for the partition of the conquered Dominions, that which Lord Mornington adopted, has increased our political and military importance.

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December, 1792.

Memorandum.

Before any plan of offensive operations against Mysore is proposed, it may not be uninteresting to take a retrospect of the general circumstances, under which Lord Cornwallis advanced to besiege Seringapatam at the close of the war, and to compare the force there employed with that which we may now be able to assemble, to form the army in the field.

The force above the Ghauts in March 1792 amounted to more than 43,000 British troops, 23,000 Mahratta Cavalry, and 12,000 of the Nizam's best horse; their Infantry and Artillery are not worth noticing.

	Cavalry.		Artillery.		Infantry.		Total.		Grand Total.
	Europeans.	Nats.	Europeans.	Nats.	Europeans.	Nats.	Europeans.	Nats.	
British Main Army ...	444	723	1,245	3,117	5,145	16,8 8	7,434	20,658	28,092
Bombay Army ...	"	"	203	269	2,942	4,390	3,145	4,659	7,804
At the Gazzlehatty Pass	"	"	50	200	350	2,100	400	2,360	2,700
With the Mahrattas ...	"	"	56	120	62	2,173	118	2,293	2,411
With the Nizam ...	"	"	58	185	38	1825	96	2010	2,116
Total ...	444	723	1,612	3,891	9,137	27,306	11,193	31,920	43,113

The force actually at Seringapatam in February 1792 amounted to nearly 29,000 British troops which composed the two armies under Lord Cornwallis and General Abercrombie, about 12,000 of the Nizam's Horse with a detachment of 2,100 Coast troops; a Mahratta army under Harry Pant, another under Pursoram Bow with a Detachment of 2,400 Bombay troops which joined Lord Cornwallis, on the 10th of March; making in all 33,400 British troops and 35,000 of the Nizams and Mahratta Cavalry.

	Cavalry.		Artillery.		Infantry.		Total.		Grand. Total.
	Europeans.	Nats.	Europeans.	Nats.	Europeans	Nats.	Europeans.	Nats.	
Lord Cornwallis' Army.	404	702	1,145	3,077	4,482	11,133	6,031	14,912	20,901
Bombay Army ...	"	...	216	500	8,8 0	4,432	3,026	4,932	7,958
Pioneers 1,049 ...	404	702	1,361	6,577	7,192	5,565	9,057	19,844	28,901

	ORDNANCE.	Brass.	Iron.
Lord Cornwallis's Army.	Field Pieces	46	
	Howitzers	4	
	Mortars	8	
	24 Pounders	,,	4
	18 Ditto	,,	2
	12 Ditto	,,	4
Bombay Army.	Field Pieces	20	,,
	Battering guns ... ... —	,,	16
		78	44

With a proportionate quantity of military stores, 60 days' rice (or the reduced allowance) for the fighting men and our bazars abundantly supplied.

Posts were established from the Carnatic to Seringapatam by the route of Bangalore and Hoolhoordroog; and this line of communication was so secure, that escorts were scarce required. We were in possession of the Poodacherum and Guzzlehatty Passes, the Nizam's dominions were open to us by the route of Goramconda, and the Mahratta countries by that of Darwar.

We were in the undisturbed possession of great part of country to the eastward of Seringapatam, from which we collected considerable supplies. A reference to the map will shew the advantages which must have resulted to us from the number of captured forts and posts above the Ghauts which were occupied by our troops.

Vanketagerry, Colar, Oofscotta, Bangalore, Sevendroog, Outraydroog, Hoolioordroog, Kerakode and Hoorooloor were posts on the direct communication from our depot at Amboor to Seringapatam.

Nundedroog, Calaramconda, Rymandroog, Ambajeegur and Deonelly covered the advance of supplies from the Nizam's dominions.

Ryacatta, Woodradroog Chenroyendroog, Neeldroog Rutengerry, Auchittydroog Ofsoor, Ramgerry Sevanagerry and Annacull were forts, from the neighbouring countries of which great numbers of cattle were collected for the use of the army; whilst Copuldroog and two other trifling hill forts of little importance and off any great road were the only places to the eastward of Seringapatam and above the Ghauts which were retained by the enemy.

Dindigal, Nalacacherry, Coimbator and the countries dependent upon them were also in our possession.

Success had attended the British troops from the time they had ascended the Ghauts and they were in the highest spirits; while the enemy had been constantly beaten; their army commanded by Tippoo in person, defeated on the 15th of May, driven from their camp under the walls of Seringapatam, on the 6th of February, with great slaughter; almost completely shut into the Island, and consequently dispirited; yet even thus circumstanced the siege of Seringapatam was considered an arduous undertaking, but no doubt would have been crowned with success.

I conclude, that the force which will be assembled to from the army before Seringapatam, will be at least 30,000 British troops, 6,000 of the Nizam's Infantry and 8 or 10,000 of his best horse, and that we may reckon on the following British force for certain.

	Cavalry.		Artillery.		Infantry.		Total.		
	Europeans.	Nats.	Europeans.	Nats.	Europeans.	Nats.	Europeans.	Nats.	
Madras Troops ...	900	2,000	500	1,500	4,000	6,500	5,400	10,000	15,400
From Bengal ...	...	...	...	...	...	3,000	...	3,000	3,000
Colonel Roberts's Detachment ...	...	...	150	350	...	6,000	150	6,350	6,500
Bombay Troops ...	...	...	...	...	1,200	3,500	1,200	3,500	4,700
Pioneers 1,000 ...	900	2,000	650	1,850	5,200	19,000	6,750	22,850	29,600

Ordnance.	Brass.	Iron.
Field Pieces	...	...
18 Pounders	2	...
12 Ditto	8	...
6 Ditto	32	...
Calvalry Guns	12	...
Howitzers	4	...
Mortars	8	...
24 Pounders	...	4
18 Ditto	...	30
12 Ditto	...	8
With Colonel Roberts's Detachment:		
Field Pieces	20	...
Total ...	86	42

Exclusive of the Ordnance which may be brought by the Bombay Army and the Nizam's Infantry.

From the foregoing statement it appears that our present force is greatly inferior to that employed above the Ghauts in 1792; and even inferior in real

strength, to that actually at Seringapatam in February 1792 for the *total number* is greater, that of *Europeans* is less by above 2,300, and it is probable the army would be diminished 2,000 by sickness, before it could reach Seringapatam.

As it cannot be doubted but the ultimate object in an offensive war with Tippoo Sultan must be the siege and capture of his capital in order to avoid a long and protracted war, which must be ruinous to the interests of the Company, it may be presumed that the army is to lay siege to Seringapatam during this season; for after the setting in of the monsoon on the Malabar Coast, about the middle or perhaps early in May and the consequent filling of the Cavery, it would be impracticable to prosecute offensive operations; that Colonel Roberts's Detachment and the Nizam's troops are to join the army; that the junction of the troops from the Malabar Coast will be formed after the arrival of the army at Seringapatam; and that we are not to look for the assistance of the Mahrattas, until nearly the close of the siege; for it can scarce be expected they will pass their own territory, which is 200 miles from Seringapatam until they ascertain that we are actually before the place.

The line of operations on that road by which the army shall advance to Seringapatam and by which we mean to bring forward our supplies from the Carnatic after we have commenced the siege, is of the greatest importance and demands the most deliberate and minute investigation, before it is determined upon, for on the choice of this line, the final event of the war materially depends.

The difficulty appears to be to determine which of the two routes should be taken, that to the northward, by Bangalore, or that to the southward by Covriporam; and this difficulty principally arises, from not knowing, whether our operations before Seringapatam, will be carried on from the north or the south-side of the Cavery.

Notwithstanding the advantages we possess of the knowledge acquired of Seringapatam during the last war, yet being ignorant of the actual state of the fortifications, which are said to have undergone considerable improvement, it may be impossible to determine which part of the fort should be attacked; but as the south-west face will probably be found the most vulnerable; as the army taking up a position on the south side of the river, will certainly be most favourable to secure the junction of the troops from the Malabar coast; and as the lines of communication with the Carnatic, the Southern Countries and the Malabar coast will be shorter and more easily established, it is not improable, that our operations may be prosecuted from that quarter.

Of the many passes which are practicable for an army between Muglee and Rutengherry, those of Pedanaichdroog and Woodiadroog deserve the preference, and on reference to the map it will appear that the best possible distance an army can march from Vellore to Seringapatam, is 206 miles, which is by the route of the Pedanaichdroog pass to Bangalore, and from thence by Chenapatam to Seringa-

patam,—but as the route by Maggery is generally thought preferable, the distance is 215 miles; 175 of which including the pass is through the enemy's country.

If the army took the route of the Woodradroog Pass to Bangalore and from thence by Maggery to Seringapatam, the distance is 251 miles; 140 of which including the pass, which is defended by the fort, is through the enemy's country.

Whichever route the army might take, between Muglee and Rutenghery, there is reason to think it would be found necessary to occupy the forts of Woodradroog, Nuldroog, Auchittydroog, Sawendroog, Outraydroog and Hodioordroog, and if Ossoor and Bangalore should be found dismantled which is reported, to put those places also in a posture of defence; in order to cover the advance of our convoys; which even with these posts, so distant as they are from each other, would be subject to interruption from the enemy's horse, unless protected by large escorts of our troops, than we might be able to spare; considerable time must elapse before so many places could be taken even supposing the enemy to make no better defence, than they did last war; which would considerably retard the progress of the army when at this advanced season, a day may be of the utmost importance; besides which, there would be a considerable expenditure of stores and provisions, loss of men to take and garrison so many places, and there would be great risk in bringing forward supplies, a distance of 175 or 140 miles, through the enemy's country. Tippoo would have the two roards by Chenapatam and Kankanelly to the southward of our line of communication and the whole country to the northward open to him, he would be at liberty to employ the greatest part of his force against us, during the whole of our operation previous to our setting down before Seringapatam—he could act upon both our flanks, falling back as we advanced, and then retire to the Island.

As it was found impracticable last war, completely to invest Seringapatam, when we had the further assistance of 23,000 Mahratta Cavalry, Captain Little's detachment of 2400 men, and another detachment of our troops, of nearly the same strength, with the Nizam's Horse; it may be supposed, that Tippoo will be able during the siege, to detach a considerable force to act upon our line of communication, which he could do with the more safety, having posts to retire to, in case of failure.

All these circumstances considered, I cannot but give the preference to the southern route by Covriporam. The failure of rain and scarcity of water between Darampoory and the Cavery, made it no longer a question which route the army should take. The distance from Vellore to Seringapatam is 222 miles, 90 only of which including the pass is through the enemy's country. The first part of the road from Coveriporam (where you enter the enemy's country) for about 25 or 30 miles, is among hills; but from every account it would not be found difficult;

the latter part from Marathelly, about 60 miles, is through a well-cultivated and generally open country; the Cavery is at no great distance on the right; which would enable a General to regulate his marches as he pleased; there would be a probability of finding cattle, forage and grain; for the country about Ardenally, Naujanagoodall and the Capani River, is remarkably fertile; and there are no forts to retard our progress. The army advancing by this route and the Bombay troops at the same time advanced to Sedasser near Periapatam, it is not likely that Tippoo would make any serious attempt to oppose us; strengthened as we should be by the Cavery on the right, and he would scarce hazard himself on the left or to the southward and thereby place our army, between his and Seringapatam.

Convoys from the Carnatic might be covered in their approach through our own country as far as Coveriporam, by forts at almost every stage; and from thence to Seringapatam posts could be established: for the first 30 miles, as far as Marathelly, the natural strength of the country would afford considerable protection; and as in the Mysore country, there is scarce a village which is not in some degree fortified to protect the inhabitants from the ravages of Mahratta cavalry, it is probable there are mud forts at convenient distances; and if not, redoubts could be thrown up. With such posts as might be established, our cavalry, supported by a body of infantry, would be able to bring forward our convoys from Marathelly to the army.

By the route, convoys would certainly be subject to less, and probably to little interruption; because the rocky bed of the Cavery in the Mysore country, appears so many difficulties in the passage of it (even at the very few fords there are) that an enemy in force would scarce hazard himself on the south side without a post to retire to in case of accident, while the whole of our troops would be operating on the line between Marathelly and Periapatam, and also in possession of the passes of Coveriporam, Guzzlehatty and Poodacherum.

Supposing Tippoo to detach his cavalry to the Baramahal, unsupported by a large body of infantry, which he could not well spare, if his capital was threatened—they could not remain long in a country so confined, and in which, there might be so many forts occupied by our troops; for I conclude, that on the arrival of the army near Coveriporam—we should take possession of Woodradroog, Rutengerry, Nuldroog and Auchettydroog which cover the principal entrances into the Barramahal.

Daniancotta, Sattimungalam, Coimbatoor, Daraporam, Groad, Aravacourchy and Carrorr, judging from the state they have been in during the last three wars with Mysore, are not likely to be put into such a posture of defence as to make any serious resistance against a detachment, which might be formed at and sent from Trichinopoly; these places, (many of which might be occupied by our Polygars) with Ardenelly and Mysore above the Gauts, would give us a communication with, the resources of the Southern Countries, by the way of the Guzzlehathy and Covriporam passes.

The junction of the force from Hyderabad, being the first object and supposing Colonel Roberts to have arrived at Cudapah, it appears advisable that he should march by the way of the Calway Pass (which is reported practicable for guns) Rampoor, Vanketagerry, and join the army near Vellore, because this route would be perfectly secure, even were Tippoo commence hostilities, by endeavouring to prevent the junction; an attempt, not likely to be made, and which from the natural strength of the country, with the great range of Gauts on the right or to the westward, the whole way could scarce be attended with success; and because the detachment during a march of more than 400 miles from Hyderabad, may be expected to have suffered many casualties and to have expended great quantities of provisions; deficiencies which might be made up from our magazines and thereby the detachment enabled to leave Vellore with its equipment complete; or Colonel Roberts might march by the more direct route of the Chittel Valley to Tripetty which is separated from Tippoo's country by a high range of mountains.

Supposing the Grand Army to leave Vellore on 10th of February by the route of the Woodradroog Pass, Bangalore and Maggery and allowing 25 marches, 8 halting days and that nothing occurred to impede its progress, it might reach Seringapatam on the 14th of March; or by the route of Covriporam (likewise 25 marches, and allowing 8 halting days) might arrive at Seringapatam on the same day.

{ The Army moved from Vellore on 11th February and encamped before Seringapatam 5th April. 37 marches 9 half days, 270 miles, 772 miles a day.

Orders should be sent to the Captain of Guides to examine the country from Vellore to Vaniambady, and if found practicable, a road should be made along the south bank of the Palaur; by which, the necessity of crossing that river three times will be avoided. This would considerably facilitate the march of the army; because the battering train and park could move on that road, at the same time that the troops with field trains could march parallel to it, by the high road along the north bank of the river.

The two roads from Pinagra to the Cavery very bad; that to Sholapady on account of the Gardagoota Pass, and that to Covriporam, on account of the Godaygoondaheky Pass; an examination of them by official persons may be improper at this juncture, but they certainly will require considerable repair. I am inclined however to believe, that both passes can be avoided; by going from Niganar on the Sholapady road beyond Beygennu (7 miles and a half) and then turning to the right, along a nulla to Reddioor, (about 3 miles) which is on the Covriporam road; from thence to the Cavery, the road is good. The Cavery is about 120 yards broad and between Sholapady and Covriporam, in a space of 6 miles, there are nine fords, seven of which could with little labour be made practicable for carri-

ages. I examined them early in April 1704, and they were little more than knee deep.

The Covriporam Pass or more properly, as it should be called, the Covriporam Valley, is from 25 to 30 miles in length. At Chiekakowell, which is the first barrier and the entrance of the Pass and at Nadoo-kowell, the next barrier about halfway, the hills are within 120 yards of each other and at these two places they form small passes; but in general, the hills are from one to three miles distant that space, its inmost parts covered with jungle; but there are open grounds at convenient distances, on which troops might encamp. The Wombattelly, a small river with rugged banks, winds through the valley and crosses the road nine times. There is generally water in it, and when filled by rains, the stream is rapid, but the waters soon run off into Cavery.

It is only in March and April that there is no stream in the Wombattally, but water can always be found lodged in holes or by digging in the sand.

4th January 1899—

Tippoo has about 200 miles of sea coast extending from Kawye to a river about 15 miles north of Carwar. From Kawye as far as Bednore, the Gauts are about 30 miles distant from the sea, and thence to Carwar not more than 20.

It is the possession of Seringapatam as his *Capital* that makes Tippoo so respectable as an enemy; because in *offensive* operations, he can with equal facility move from thence, either to the Coast of Coromandel or Malabar, to the dominions of the Mahrattas or to those of the Nizam; and when on the *defensive*, it can be attacked only between the months of January and May.—Having so great an extent of sea-coast, with the Port of Mangalore and probably many others, he can receive succours from the French and may become still more formidable.

In *offensive* operations against Mysore, (and none other should be thought of) the principal objects which appear desirable to obtain, are a ready access at Seringapatam at the commencement of a war; the junction of the army from the Malabar coast that of troops and supplies from the dominions of the Nizam; the co-operation of the Mahrattas and it is no less desirable that Tippoo should be cut off from all communication with the French.

The acquisition of that part of the district of Covriporam situated on the south and west side of the river Cavery would ensure a ready access to Seringapatam, and give us a fair prospect of being able to reduce the place during the only period, in which it can be attacked: that part of the Coimbatoor

country to the southward of the Noyell river, or even the small tract, which lays south of the road from Pyhey to Palacherry, would enable us to form a junction with the Bombay Army; and give us a *direct* communication with our possessions on the Malabar Coast which at present, we have only by the very circuitous route of Tirrivelly and through the Travancore country; Gooramconda and the country which lay to the eastward of the road from thence to Kistnagerry ceded to the Nizam, would secure the advance of troops and supplies from his Highness' dominions, direct to the Barramahal: that part of the coast of Malabar, from Kawye to Mangalore, in our hands and thence to Carwar in those of the Mahrattas, would not only ensure the immediate co-operations of that power at the commencement of a war, making an attack on the rich province of Bednore and cut off all direct communication between Tippoo and the French; but also enable the Bombay army, if such a measure should be judged expedient, to form a junction with the army from this coast to the northward of the river Cavery.

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